David Weberman

(1955 - 2026)

This paper reexamines the central thesis of Gadamer’s theory of interpretation that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, I consider three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. I reject this argument as insufficient. I also reject a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend it against two objections: that it conflates meaning and significance; and that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism.

This long-awaited book sets out the implications of Habermas's theory of communicative action for moral theory. "Discourse ethics" attempts to reconstruct a moral point of view from which normative claims can be impartially judged. The theory of justice it develops replaces Kant's categorical imperative with a procedure of justification based on reasoned agreement among participants in practical discourse.Habermas connects communicative ethics to the theory of social action via an examination of research in the social psychology of moral and interpersonal development. He aims to show that our basic moral intuitions spring from something deeper and more universal than contingent features of our tradition, namely from normative presuppositions of social interaction that belong to the repertoire of competent agents in any society. Jürgen Habermas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt.

My making choices and acting on those choices in a way that might count as my being free would seem to require that those choices are truly my choices. Furthermore, for my choices to be truly mine, it would seem that these choices must reflect my true self. So it seems that choosing and acting freely depends in a robust sense on such choosing and acting being authentic. Yet the concept of authenticity seems problematic. What or where is that true self which would be the basis for authentic choosing, acting and living? Perhaps there is no such true self. This problem is central to the philosophies of both Sartre and Foucault. For the philosophers freedom authenticity or self-hood were central. The paper aims to show that, in spite of Foucault’s criticism, Sartre does not fall back on the idea of a true or deep self that is given to us. Sartre can appeal to the idea of authenticity without holding on such a dubious construct as a given, true self. Therefore the exploration of bad faith, good faith and authenticity in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, where the problem is posed but left unresolved, is necessary. Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, where a more concrete problem – the problem of authentically identifying oneself with a group of human beings − actually opens up a way how to overcome the problem of authenticity

This book addresses the social, functional and symbolic dimensions of urban space in today’s world. The twelve essays range from a conceptual framing of the issues to case descriptions, rich with illustrations. Together they provide a thorough exploration of the nature and significance of social space and particular aspects of its distribution in today’s urban spaces and the various factors that are competing for it. The book addresses a topic that is intrinsically interdisciplinary. Questions of space are examined from a rich variety of perspectives from urban planning to political philosophy, shedding some light on this shadowy process. Some of the issues addressed include the dichotomies of public and private space, rights and duties regarding the use of space, and conflicts over its allocation. Well-reasoned and lively discussions are offered from the perspective of basic values and rights. The recognition of the specifics of (minority community) identity as an institutional policy is raised in opposition to “abstract distributive accounts of justice” – economic pressures by developers and would-be gentrifiers.

This dissertation aims to clarify and evaluate early Heidegger's argument that traditional philosophy has fallen victim to an intellectualistic fallacy because it overlooks the fact that human beings are not merely knowers, but also historically rooted, willing agents. The argument at issue purports to show that 'care' and 'concern' are central to a proper philosophical understanding of knowledge, truth and experience. ;I begin with a detailed analysis of two key terms in Heidegger's argument, 'readiness-to-hand' and 'presence-at-hand,' in order to show that their meaning and relation have not been properly worked out. The former term must be construed not technically, but in its full-blown relation to the sphere of praxis. I then attempt to explain the 'deficiency' of presence-at-hand by going beyond Heidegger's own explanation. The result is a triadic relation whereby theory and practice are grounded, in different ways, in the same unitary structure--a structure which is itself practical. ;I then reconstruct Heidegger's argument for the priority of the practical. The argument is shown to consist of two distinct claims: first, for the priority of readiness-to-hand and the everyday world to theoretical inquiry; second, for the priority of praxis as a condition for the possibility of human experience as we know it. The argument, combining these two claims, is shown to a be a strategy relying partly on a 'non-legitimating transcendental argument' and partly on certain assumptions about human nature. It is shown that this argument leads to a purportedly non-skeptical version of historical relativism. The consistency of Heidegger's relativism is then examined. ;In the final part, I assess the degree to which Heidegger's argument and position succeeds as a critique of intellectualistic theories of experience. I argue that his strategy is successful only if we interpret it as making the claim that theoretical inquiry is shaped by everyday experience. It is then shown that Heidegger is able to formulate a unique and engaging anti-scientistic, anti-skeptical and anti-realist philosophical position