David Weberman

This dissertation aims to clarify and evaluate early Heidegger's argument that traditional philosophy has fallen victim to an intellectualistic fallacy because it overlooks the fact that human beings are not merely knowers, but also historically rooted, willing agents. The argument at issue purports to show that 'care' and 'concern' are central to a proper philosophical understanding of knowledge, truth and experience. ;I begin with a detailed analysis of two key terms in Heidegger's argument, 'readiness-to-hand' and 'presence-at-hand,' in order to show that their meaning and relation have not been properly worked out. The former term must be construed not technically, but in its full-blown relation to the sphere of praxis. I then attempt to explain the 'deficiency' of presence-at-hand by going beyond Heidegger's own explanation. The result is a triadic relation whereby theory and practice are grounded, in different ways, in the same unitary structure--a structure which is itself practical. ;I then reconstruct Heidegger's argument for the priority of the practical. The argument is shown to consist of two distinct claims: first, for the priority of readiness-to-hand and the everyday world to theoretical inquiry; second, for the priority of praxis as a condition for the possibility of human experience as we know it. The argument, combining these two claims, is shown to a be a strategy relying partly on a 'non-legitimating transcendental argument' and partly on certain assumptions about human nature. It is shown that this argument leads to a purportedly non-skeptical version of historical relativism. The consistency of Heidegger's relativism is then examined. ;In the final part, I assess the degree to which Heidegger's argument and position succeeds as a critique of intellectualistic theories of experience. I argue that his strategy is successful only if we interpret it as making the claim that theoretical inquiry is shaped by everyday experience. It is then shown that Heidegger is able to formulate a unique and engaging anti-scientistic, anti-skeptical and anti-realist philosophical position

This paper re-examines the central thesis of Gadamer’s hermeneutics that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event, or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, this paper considers three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the literature on Gadamer, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. The paper rejects this argument as insufficient. Similarly, the paper rejects a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. The paper then articulates a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions in which it is grasped. The paper appeals to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend the position against two objections: i) that it conflates meaning and significance, and ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism

In a book that first appeared in 1965 entitled Analytical Philosophy of History, Arthur Danto argues that historical inquiry cannot be conceived as an attempt to reconstruct the past along the lines of an "ideal chronicler." The ideal chronicler "knows whatever happens the moment it happens, even in other minds. He is also to have the gift of instantaneous transcription: everything that happens across the whole forward rim of the Past is set down by him, as it happens the way it happens." Historians cannot aspire to this ideal because they inevitably use what Danto calls "narrative sentences," that is, sentences that describe one event by referring to one or more later events. For example, "The Thirty Years War began in 1618" is a sentence typical of historical inquiry but unavailable to the chronicler because it goes beyond what could have been known at the time it occurred, that is, that the war was to last thirty years. Danto reasons that because of the indispensability of narrative sentences to historical understanding, we can never give a complete description of past events since this presupposes knowledge of all relevant later events. The consequence is that our descriptions of past events will inevitably change as history unfolds. This discovery is remarkable and incontrovertible: descriptions of past historical events will and must always be reconceived not just because of the unearthing of new documents or the changing interests of the historian but because of the peculiar narrative structure of historical understanding.

This paper re-examines the central thesis of Gadamer’s hermeneutics that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event, or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, this paper considers three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the literature on Gadamer, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. The paper rejects this argument as insufficient. Similarly, the paper rejects a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. The paper then articulates a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions in which it is grasped. The paper appeals to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend the position against two objections: i) that it conflates meaning and significance, and ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism.

Diese Studie will zeigen, daß die Antwort auf das Problem des historischen Erkennens nicht in der Alternative zwischen Objektivismus und Subjektivismus zu suchen ist. Im Mittelpunkt der Analyse stehen drei zeitgenössische Philosophen, Gadamer, Habermas und Danto, die das objektivistische Modell für inadäquat halten. Dies führt zu einer weiterentwickelten Konzeption der Zukunftsorientiertheit des historischen Erkennens und strebt einer Widerlegung aller Arten des Objektivismus an, auch derjenigen in subjektivistischer Verkleidung, ohne in den Subjektivismus zurückzufallen.

Peter Geach and others suppose that change in an object's relational properties absent any change in its intrinsic properties is not a genuine change in that object but only a “mere Cambridge change.” I explain and reject two strategies challenging Geach's position. I then present my own argument against Geach which depends on the recognition of entities identified in terms of their emergent properties, i.e. properties not reducible to physical properties. I provide some examples of such entities and address the problem of finding a criterion for distinguishing genuine from nonge‐nuine change