Alex Sager

Business in Ethical Focus, Second Edition is a comprehensive compilation of classical and contemporary essays on business ethics. Readers will become acquainted with seminal ideas on corporate social responsibility and the place of business in a just society. Other topics include diversity in the workplace, sexual harassment, workplace rights, environmental responsibility and sustainability, global business, intellectual property, bribery, and ethical issues in advertising and marketing. The Second Edition builds on the First Edition’s strengths and adds new articles to reflect developments in the field from the last eight years. New sections include Global Perspectives (with articles on Islamic, Confucian, and Buddhist business ethics) and Entrepreneurship, the Non-Profit Sector. The editors have also commissioned twelve new in-depth case studies with study questions that can be used to generate fruitful class discussion.

Enrique Dussel and John Dewey share commitments to philosophical theory and practice aimed at addressing human problems, democratic modes of inquiry, and progressive social reform, but also maintain productive differences in their fundamental starting point for political philosophy and their use of the social sciences. Dussel provides a corrective to Dewey’s Eurocentrism and to his tendency to underplay the challenges of incorporating marginalized populations by insisting that social and political philosophy begin from the perspective of the marginalized and excluded. Simultaneously, Dewey encourages a modest experimental and fallibilist approach to social transformation that promises more feasible social reforms than Dussel’s approach rooted in phenomenology and the critical social sciences.

At its core, philosophy of leisure is an investigation into part of the good life. As such, it is a branch of moral and political philosophy. Philosophy of leisure enquires into the ends that should be pursued for their own sake, the role of social institutions in supporting valuable ends, and the virtues people ought to cultivate to best avail themselves of their free time. This chapter examines the meaning of leisure, traces its philosophical development, and discusses its moral and political significance. The first section offers a definition of leisure and distinguishes it from related concepts. The second section briefly traces the historical development of the idea of leisure in the Western philosophical tradition. The third section turns to leisure’s ethical implications and the fourth section explores the politics surrounding leisure.

Normative reflection on the ethics of migration has tended to remain at the level of abstract principle with limited attention to the practice of immigration administration and enforcement. This paper explores the implications of this practice for an ethics of immigration with particular attention to the problem of bureaucratic domination. I contend that migration administration and enforcement cannot overcome bureaucratic domination because of the inherent vulnerability of migrant populations and the transnational enforcement of border controls by multiple public and private actors. The implication is that even if restrictive immigration policies are permissible in principle, the attempt to enforce them leads to injustices that make them ethically unacceptable in practice.

A number of prominent political philosophers, including Will Kymlicka and Joseph Carens, have suggested that one reason for limiting immigration is to protect culture, particularly what Kymlicka calls “societal culture”: “a territorially-concentrated culture, centered on a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life (schools, media, law, economy, government, etc.).” I situate this claim in the context of liberal nation-building and suggest that the arguments for the protection of culture are often vague, confused or tend to conflict with liberal commitments. When clear, they gain their plausibility from other concerns (e.g., self-defense), not cultural protection. Finally, given plausible empirical assumptions, the dangers to societal culture are considerably exaggerated and provide little reason for preventing immigration. I then briefl y consider the case of general culture and whether there are some grounds to limit immigration to protect it, using the example of Iceland and aboriginal cultures to situate my arguments. Once again, I conclude that the appeal to culture to limit immigration is weak and philosophers searching for arguments against open borders should turn elsewhere.