Alex Sager

Enrique Dussel and John Dewey share commitments to philosophical theory and practice aimed at addressing human problems, democratic modes of inquiry, and progressive social reform, but also maintain productive differences in their fundamental starting point for political philosophy and their use of the social sciences. Dussel provides a corrective to Dewey’s Eurocentrism and to his tendency to underplay the challenges of incorporating marginalized populations by insisting that social and political philosophy begin from the perspective of the marginalized and excluded. Simultaneously, Dewey encourages a modest experimental and fallibilist approach to social transformation that promises more feasible social reforms than Dussel’s approach rooted in phenomenology and the critical social sciences.

At its core, philosophy of leisure is an investigation into part of the good life. As such, it is a branch of moral and political philosophy. Philosophy of leisure enquires into the ends that should be pursued for their own sake, the role of social institutions in supporting valuable ends, and the virtues people ought to cultivate to best avail themselves of their free time. This chapter examines the meaning of leisure, traces its philosophical development, and discusses its moral and political significance. The first section offers a definition of leisure and distinguishes it from related concepts. The second section briefly traces the historical development of the idea of leisure in the Western philosophical tradition. The third section turns to leisure’s ethical implications and the fourth section explores the politics surrounding leisure.

Normative reflection on the ethics of migration has tended to remain at the level of abstract principle with limited attention to the practice of immigration administration and enforcement. This paper explores the implications of this practice for an ethics of immigration with particular attention to the problem of bureaucratic domination. I contend that migration administration and enforcement cannot overcome bureaucratic domination because of the inherent vulnerability of migrant populations and the transnational enforcement of border controls by multiple public and private actors. The implication is that even if restrictive immigration policies are permissible in principle, the attempt to enforce them leads to injustices that make them ethically unacceptable in practice.

A number of prominent political philosophers, including Will Kymlicka and Joseph Carens, have suggested that one reason for limiting immigration is to protect culture, particularly what Kymlicka calls “societal culture”: “a territorially-concentrated culture, centered on a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life (schools, media, law, economy, government, etc.).” I situate this claim in the context of liberal nation-building and suggest that the arguments for the protection of culture are often vague, confused or tend to conflict with liberal commitments. When clear, they gain their plausibility from other concerns (e.g., self-defense), not cultural protection. Finally, given plausible empirical assumptions, the dangers to societal culture are considerably exaggerated and provide little reason for preventing immigration. I then briefl y consider the case of general culture and whether there are some grounds to limit immigration to protect it, using the example of Iceland and aboriginal cultures to situate my arguments. Once again, I conclude that the appeal to culture to limit immigration is weak and philosophers searching for arguments against open borders should turn elsewhere.

This comprehensive volume contains much of the important work in political and social philosophy from ancient times until the end of the nineteenth century. The anthology offers both depth and breadth in its selection of material by central figures, while also representing other currents of political thought. Thucydides, Seneca, and Cicero are included along with Plato and Aristotle; Al-Farabi, Marsilius of Padua, and de Pizan take their place alongside Augustine and Aquinas; Astell and Constant are presented in the company of Locke, Rousseau, and Wollstonecraft. The editors have made every effort to include translations that are both readable and reliable. Every selection has been painstakingly annotated, and each figure is given a substantial introduction highlighting his or her major contribution within the tradition. In order to ensure the highest standards of accuracy and accessibility, the editors have consulted dozens of leading academics during the course of the anthology's development (a number of whom have contributed introductory material as well as advice). The result is an anthology with unparalleled pedagogical benefits, and one that truly breaks new ground.

This article sets out the principal ethical considerations for a just immigration policy. Advocates of a more liberal immigration regime have called for open borders or at least a more relaxed immigration policy. They argue that it is incompatible with basic rights such as freedom of movement, association, and opportunity. Furthermore, the use of coercion to prevent needy people from seeking opportunities abroad sits uneasily in a world of massive inequalities divided along geographical and state lines, as well as the large number of refugees. At the other end of the spectrum, many individuals and groups protest immigration levels and their real or imagined effect on jobs, wages, and culture. The article briefly discusses the causes of migration and the implications of moral theory for immigration policy. It gives special consideration to the case of refugees and addresses the difficult question of how states should treat guest workers and undocumented immigrants.