James Warren

Plato and Aristotle both think that for humans to live full and flourishing lives, we must live together in political communities. They are therefore interested in their various ways in which the people in any given political community relate to one another, how they respond to or value one another, and how they conceive of their good in relation to their fellow citizens. Plato and Aristotle think that instilling and maintaining the correct beliefs and attitudes (such as 'solidarity', 'like-mindedness', and 'friendship') among the citizens is the most important mechanism to ensure that the city is 'one' and resistant to internal strife, factionalism, and perhaps the eventual dissolution of the community. This study is an investigation of the various ways in which Plato and Aristotle approach the question of political unity, how their views differ from and are alike one another, and the ways in which their views matter for continuing discussions. James Warren investigates their arguments for what kinds of relationships are important and how citizens should relate to and think about one another, work together, and feel as part of a single unified political community.

Epicurean accounts of philosophical therapy—as involving, for example, repetitive practices, as well as argumentation—allow that a person may fail to know himself because he fails to know what he believes. This chapter considers two Epicurean texts that offer categorizations of kinds of belief and attempts to distinguish a class of what we might call ‘hidden’ beliefs: beliefs that can be extremely damaging but are difficult to identify and remove because the believer does not know that he is committed to them. Closer attention to these Epicurean texts is important for a full understanding of the Epicureans’ psychological outlook and the presuppositions of some of their therapeutic practices. The author then evaluates the positing of such hidden beliefs.

As the first article in its March 1889 issue, The Classical Review published a short piece jointly authored by Henry Sidgwick and John Grote: a dialogue between Socrates and friends and John’s brother, George Grote. This brief but complex and playful dialogue is a microcosm of a broader discussion between a group of friends, colleagues, and relatives in the third quarter of the nineteenth century about individual happiness, justice and the good of the community. This article introduces the dialogue and places it in the context of two important wider debates in order to show how this brief dialogue illuminates the intellectual milieu of the time and the personalities involved. The first is a debate about how to read and engage with Plato’s philosophical dialogues. The second is a debate about utilitarianism, the nature of happiness, and the correct end of human actions.

In Plato’s Republic, Socrates’ account of a soul with more than one part or power provides ways of accounting for interesting self-directed or reflexive reactive attitudes, including ‘self-reproach’, the analysis of which is otherwise not at all straightforward. Thinking about these attitudes reveals some fundamental characteristics of how Socrates imagines the relationships between the parts of the soul. This is illustrated by looking again at two very familiar passages: the discussions in Republic 4 of the cases of Leontius and Odysseus (439d5–441c3).

In Tusculans 2 the interlocutors discuss the value of physical pain. They swiftly agree that it is not the greatest evil but take longer to consider whether it is bad or, as the Stoics think, merely indifferent. Enduring pain is taken to be an indication of courage and manliness (virtus) and this is undermined by the claim that physical pain is not bad. Therefore neither the Epicureans nor the Stoics provide a wholly satisfactory account of the value of physical pain and its relationship to virtue.

Cicero composed the Tusculan Disputations in the summer of 45 BC at a time of great personal and political turmoil. He was grieving for the death of his daughter Tullia earlier that year, while Caesar's defeat of Pompey's forces at Munda and return to Rome as dictator was causing him great fears and concerns for himself, his friends and the Republic itself. This collection of new essays offers a holistic critical commentary on this important work. World-leading experts consider its historical and philosophical context and the central arguments and themes of each of the five books, which include the treatment of the fear of death, the value of pain, the Stoic account of the emotions and the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Each chapter pays close attention to Cicero's own method of philosophy, and the role of rhetoric and persuasion in pursuing his inquiries. A collection of world-leading specialist scholars provide up-to-date new essays on one of Cicero's most important works Covers the whole of the work, including parts which have previously been less often discussed Pays close attention to the historical and philosophical context of the Disputations, so being of use to those interested in the intellectual history of the Roman Republic

Dans son Commentaire sur le Philèbe de Platon, § 167-168, Damascius rapporte une série d’objections à la thèse fameuse de Socrate dans le Philèbe selon laquelle il existe des « plaisirs faux ». Ces objections furent formulées par Théophraste, l’élève d’Aristote, peut-être dans son livre en un volume Sur les plaisirs faux (DL 5.56). Dans cet article, je montre d’abord comment les critiques de Théophraste recourent aux ouvrages d’Aristote, et notamment à son analyse des différents types de fausseté en Métaphysique Δ 29. Je montre ensuite comment Damascius défend Platon contre ces critiques en retournant les arguments d’Aristote, l’autorité sur laquelle Théophraste se fonde, contre Théophraste lui-même. Ce faisant, Damascius atteste sa grande familiarité avec le corpus aristotélicien et montre que certains des textes que Théophraste convoque à l’appui de ses critiques peuvent être mobilisés pour défendre la position platonicienne.

Crito thinks Socrates should agree to leave the prison and escape from Athens. Socrates is also determined that he and Crito should have a ‘common plan of action’ (koinē boulē: 49d3), but he wants Crito to share his preferred plan of remaining and submitting to the court’s sentence. Much of the drama of the Crito is generated by the interplay of these two old friends, both determined that they should come to an agreement, but differing radically in what they think the two of them should agree to do. I show how agreements of various kinds—including agreements about how to agree—play important roles in the dialogue and how Socrates’ commitment to a certain method for determining what to do underpins his own integrity. What’s more, attention to that theme helps to explain one of the most pressing questions for any interpretation of the Crito: Why does Socrates choose, at the end of the dialogue, to present to Crito a speech in the voice of the personified laws of Athens?

Selon les épicuriens, toutes les impressions des sens sont vraies et la raison trouve en elles son fondement. Nombreux sont ceux, cependant, qui croient que les impressions des sens ne sont pas toutes vraies. Les épicuriens expliquent cette croyance de la façon suivante : la source de cette erreur est souvent la croyance que les impressions des sens peuvent se contredire. Mais cette dernière croyance résulte souvent de ce que les épicuriens tiennent pour notre tendance naturelle, et fréquemment utile, à généraliser et à former des opinions par extrapolation à partir des impressions de nos sens.

At _Philebus_ 50e–53c Socrates outlines a class of true and pure pleasures, principally by reference to certain particular perceptual objects that are beautiful _kath’ hauta_. He considers the nature of the perceived object as an important determinant of the nature of the pleasure, specifying that pure and true pleasures derive from “beautiful” colors, shapes, sounds, and smells (51b3) and then offering what he acknowledges is an unorthodox account of the criteria by which shapes and sounds should be considered beautiful (51b9–e6). Chapter 11 suggests that these objects, while pure and simple, nevertheless can be said to display a kind of _symmetria_ and therefore conform to Socrates’ claims about beauty elsewhere in the dialogue, particularly his claims about music. It also considers the pure and true pleasures of _mathēmata_ introduced at 51e7–52b9.

We can remember an experience with pleasure or look forwards to an experience with trepidation. Our memories and anticipations can be pleasant or painful and what we remember and anticipate was or will be pleasant or painful too. We humans, in short, have ways of looking forwards and backwards within a life and bringing to mind in the present some non-present personal event. Our capacity to do so allows us access to a wide range of affective experiences. This phenomenon is itself not a trivial observation and it attracted the attention of thoughtful ancient writers. Here I briefly explore some of what they had to say about it. I suggest that we can distinguish in their writings two broad ways of thinking about the fact that we can take pleasure in and be pained by our memories and our anticipations.

Caton d’Utique est parfois présenté comme un exemple d’agent moral ayant toujours agi avec honnêteté. Il refuse tout compromis moral. J’analyse ici comment les auteurs antiques présentent cette honnêteté comme une forme d’inaptitude, plus précisément une inaptitude à envisager toute action injuste, et comment cela est présenté comme une forme d’obstination et d’échec empêchant d’interagir avec les gens tels qu’ils sont réellement. Je compare ces anciennes représentations et ces jugements sur Caton avec le traitement des « saints moraux » par Susan Wolf.

This book provides a study of regret (metameleia) in the moral psychology of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. It was important for all these philosophers to insist that regret is a characteristic of neither fully virtuous nor wholly irredeemable characters. Rather, they took regret to be something that affects people who retrospectively feel pain at realising an earlier mistaken action. Regret sets out in full the accounts of the nature of this emotion found in the works of these philosophers, viewing them in the context of their respective accounts of virtuous and non-virtuous agents, ethical progress, the role of knowledge in producing good actions, and compares it with modern philosophical notions of 'agent regret'.