Christoph Menke

In einem Brief nennt Adorno die "Negative Dialektik" kurz nach ihrem Erscheinen unter seinen Schriften "das philosophische Hauptwerk, wenn ich so sagen darf“. Dieser herausgehobenen Bedeutung, die das Werk für Adorno hatte, entspricht nicht nur die lange Zeit, die er mit der Abfassung des Buchs beschäftigt war, sondern auch die lange Geschichte, die ihre zentralen Motive in seinem Denken haben. Philosophische Begriffsklärung, die Arbeit an "Begriff und Kategorien“ einer negativen Dialektik, versteht Adorno dabei als dialektischen Übergang in inhaltliches Denken – und so betreibt er sie auch hier. Das hat Konsequenzen für die Form des kooperativen Kommentars, der in diesem Band versucht wird. Adornos "Negative Dialektik" zu kommentieren, kann nur in dem Bewußtsein der unüberbrückbaren Kluft gelingen, die den Kommentar von diesem Text trennt.

At a central point in his much-discussed book Real Presences, George Steiner writes of the “mountebank’s virtuosity... of a Hitler,” that realises “a counter-logos which conceptualizes and then enacts the deconstruction of the human.” It was clear to Steiner’s American readers what was meant by this transposition of the term ‘deconstruction’ from the field of aesthetics and philosophy, of literary and cultural criticism, to the context of political and ideological struggle against fascism and totalitarianism in general. Steiner discusses this in another context, but again with all the pathos of confession at his disposal: “I believe that the eclipse of the humanities, in their primary sense and presentness, in today’s culture and society, implicates that of the human.” This creed closes Steiner’s discussion of the “liberals” who are treated with contempt because they preach tolerance in the face of the triumphal procession of deconstruction in the humanities. According to Steiner, such a policy of appeasement once again misjudges the degree of threat to which our social order is exposed: what starts in the humanities ends in society as the nihilistic corruption of binding human values. With the establishment of deconstruction in literary studies at elite American universities, the Occident succumbs to the powers of disintegration and ‘brutalization’ for the second time in the twentieth century—Yale of the seventies and eighties repeats Munich of 1938.

Un des problèmes centraux des discussions sur la relation entre éthique et esthétique tourne autour de la question de la violence. Celle-ci emprunte deux avenues dans le texte. La première traite d'aspects déterminés de la peinture de Francis Bacon, comme la façon dont l'art représente la violence. À ce propos, on formule la thèse que la provocation éthique de cette peinture ne repose pas tant sur le fait qu'elle représente la violence, mais qu'elle engendre en sa présence un détachement esthétique, et même, un plaisir à l'occasion de cette présentation. La deuxième avenue proposée interroge l'effet éthique du plaisir esthétique en face de la violence. La théorie aristotélicienne de la catharsis est alors amenée comme modèle d'une « économie de la différence » qui permet d'élucider la relation entre plaisir esthétique et jugement éthique.A central problem in the discussion about the relation between Ethic and Aesthetic is the question of violence. This question follows two paths in the text. The first one debates the determinated aspects in Francis Bacon painting, the way art represents violence. On that matter, we draw up the thesis that the ethical provocation in his painting don't stand upon the representation of violence but also his tryptic creates an aesthetical indifference and even a pleasure. The second part questions the ethical effects of the aesthetical pleasure in front of violence. The aristotelien catharsis theory is therefore proposed as a model of an "economy of the difference" that allows the elucidation of the relation between aesthetical pleasure and ethical judgment

The paper asks for the preconditions and the consequences of the emergence of aesthetics in and for philosophy. The question is: what does it mean for philosophy to engage the question of the aesthetic? My answer will be: it means nothing less than putting philosophy in question. Or, more precisely: by engaging the question of the aesthetic, philosophy puts itself in question. In order to show this, I will refer to a brief passage in the Phenomenology of the Spirit and then attempt to turn it against what I take it to be Hegel’s own intention. The paper attempts to sketch this argument in three brisk moves by (1) distinguishing a philosophy of the “poetic” from a philosophy of the “aesthetic”; (2) describing the aesthetic as “regressive” and “(self-)reflexive”; and (3) sketching the paradoxical place of aesthetics within philosophy. &nbsp