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69Charles Taylor on overcoming incommensurabilityPhilosophy and Social Criticism 26 (5): 47-61. 2000.As he recognizes, Taylor's view of practical reasoning commits him to the existence of incommensurable world-views. However, he holds that it is in principle possible to overcome these incommensurabilities. He has two major arguments for this conclusion, which I label the argument from the human condition, and the transition argument. I show that the first argument, though perhaps successful in the case Taylor takes as an example, cannot be generalized. The second argument is even less successfu…Read more
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150Cognitive scientific challenges to moralityPhilosophical Psychology 19 (5). 2006.Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to nonmoral features of the world, not to moral properties. They therefore might be taken to show that our moral intuitions are systematically unreliable. I examine three cognitive scientific challenges to morality, and …Read more
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148It is, as Dana Nelkin (2004) says, a rare point of agreement among participants in the free will debate that rational deliberation presupposes a belief in freedom. Of course, the precise content of that belief – and, indeed, the nature of deliberation – is controversial, with some philosophers claiming that deliberation commits us to a belief in libertarian free will (Taylor 1966; Ginet 1966), and others claiming that, on the contrary, deliberation presupposes nothing more than an epistemic open…Read more
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20Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for LibertariansDialectica 59 (1): 51-61. 2005.To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Agains…Read more
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164Cultural Membership and Moral ResponsibilityThe Monist 86 (2): 145-163. 2003.Can our cultural membership excuse us from responsibility for certain actions? Ought the Aztec priest be held responsible for murder, for instance, or does the fact that his ritual sacrifice is mandated by his culture excuse him from blame? Our intuitions here are mixed; the more distant, historically and geographically, we are from those whose actions are in question, the more likely we are to forgive them their acts, yet it is difficult to pinpoint why this distance should excuse. Up close, hi…Read more
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144Contrastive explanations: A dilemma for libertariansDialectica 59 (1): 51-61. 2005.To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Agains…Read more
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90Countering Cova: Frankfurt-Style Cases are Still BrokenEthical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3): 523-527. 2014.In his “Frankfurt-style cases user manual”, Florian Cova (2013) distinguishes two kinds of Frankfurt-style arguments against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), and argues that my attack on the soundness of Frankfurt-style cases succeeds, at most, only against one kind. Since either kind of argument can be used to undermine PAP, Cova suggests, the fact that my attack fails against at least one means that it does not succeed in rescuing PAP from the clutches of Frankfurt enthusiasts…Read more
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833Book review: Understanding blindness (review)Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3): 315-324. 2004.
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14Countering Cova: Frankfurt-Style Cases are Still BrokenEthical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3): 523-527. 2014.5 page
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61Bad Luck Once AgainPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 749-754. 2008.In a recent article in this journal, Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe sketch an account of indeterminist free will designed to avoid the luck objection that has been wielded to such effect against event‐causal libertarianism. They argue that if decision‐making is an indeterministic process and not an event or series of events, the luck objection will fail. I argue that they are wrong: the luck objection is equally successful against their account as against existing event‐causal libertarianisms. Like…Read more
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25Bruce N. Waller , Against Moral Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 32 (3): 234-236. 2012.
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73Capacities and Counterfactuals: A Reply to Haji and McKennaDialectica 66 (4): 607-620. 2012.In a recent paper, Ishtiyaque Haji and Michael McKenna argue that my attack on Frankfurt-style cases fails. I had argued that we cannot be confident that agents in these cases retain their responsibility-underwriting capacities, because what capacities an agent has can depend on features of the world external to her, including merely counterfactual interveners. Haji and McKenna argue that only when an intervention is actual does the agent gain or lose a capacity. Here I demonstrate that this cla…Read more
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297A will of one's own: Consciousness, control, and characterInternational Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5): 459-470. 2004.
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105A Role for Consciousness After AllJournal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2): 255-264. 2012.In a recent paper in this journal, Matt King and Peter Carruthers argue that the common assumption that agents are only (or especially) morally responsible for actions caused by attitudes of which they are conscious needs to be rethought. They claim that there is persuasive evidence that we are never conscious of our propositional attitudes; we ought therefore to design our theories of moral responsibility to accommodate this fact. In this reply, I argue that the evidence they adduce need not wo…Read more
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186Against Philanthropy, Individual and CorporateBusiness and Professional Ethics Journal 21 (3-4): 95-108. 2002.
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A Gresham's Law For Reporting About GeneticsAustralian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 4 (2). 2002.
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102Addiction, Autonomy, and Informed Consent: On and Off the Garden PathJournal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (1): 56-73. 2015.Several ethicists have argued that research trials and treatment programs that involve the provision of drugs to addicts are prima facie unethical, because addicts can’t refuse the offer of drugs and therefore can’t give informed consent to participation. In response, several people have pointed out that addiction does not cause a compulsion to use drugs. However, since we know that addiction impairs autonomy, this response is inadequate. In this paper, I advance a stronger defense of the capaci…Read more
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10Addiction and CompulsionIn Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley-blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: References Further reading.
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272Addiction as a disorder of beliefBiology and Philosophy 29 (3): 337-355. 2014.Addiction is almost universally held to be characterized by a loss of control over drug-seeking and consuming behavior. But the actions of addicts, even of those who seem to want to abstain from drugs, seem to be guided by reasons. In this paper, I argue that we can explain this fact, consistent with continuing to maintain that addiction involves a loss of control, by understanding addiction as involving an oscillation between conflicting judgments. I argue that the dysfunction of the mesolimbic…Read more
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511Autonomy and addictionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3): 427-447. 2006.Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics University of Melbourne, Parkville, 3010, Australia and.
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43Autonomy and AddictionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3): 427-447. 2006.Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsibility, reasons-responsiveness, self-realization, flourishing, and so on—addiction is universally recognized as impairing autonomy. But philosophers have frequently misunderstood the nature of addiction, and therefore have not adequately explained the manner in which it impairs autonomy. Once we recognize that addiction is not incompatible with choice or volition, it becomes clear that none of the St…Read more
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238The feeling of doing: Deconstructing the phenomenology of agnecyIn Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition, Bradford Books. 2009.Disorders of volition are often accompanied by, and may even be caused by, disruptions in the phenomenology of agency. Yet the phenomenology of agency is at present little explored. In this paper we attempt to describe the experience of normal agency, in order to uncover its representational content
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441Amputees by choice: Body integrity identity disorder and the ethics of amputationJournal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1). 2005.In 1997, a Scottish surgeon by the name of Robert Smith was approached by a man with an unusual request: he wanted his apparently healthy lower left leg amputated. Although details about the case are sketchy, the would-be amputee appears to have desired the amputation on the grounds that his left foot wasn’t part of him – it felt alien. After consultation with psychiatrists, Smith performed the amputation. Two and a half years later, the patient reported that his life had been transformed for th…Read more