S. K. Sarkar

Two questions are raised for Grafen’s formal darwinism project of aligning evolutionary dynamics under natural selection with the optimization of phenotypes for individuals of a population. The first question concerns mean fitness maximization during frequency-dependent selection; in such selection regimes, not only is mean fitness typically not maximized but it is implausible that any parameter closely related to fitness is being maximized. The second question concerns whether natural selection on inclusive fitness differences can be regarded as individual selection or whether it leads to a departure from the central motivation that led to the formal darwinism project, viz., to show that “Darwinian” evolution through individual selection leads to “good design” or phenotypic adaptation through trait optimization

This paper analyzes the development of evolutionary theory in the period from 1918 to 1932. It argues that: (i) Fisher's work in 1918 constituted a not fully satisfactory reduction of biometry to Mendelism; (ii) there was a synthesis in the 1920s but that this synthesis was mainly one of classical genetics with population genetics, with Haldane's The Causes of Evolution being its founding document; (iii) the most important achievement of the models of theoretical population genetics was to show that natural selection sufficed as a mechanism for evolution; and (iv) Haldane formulated a prospective evolutionary theory in the 1920s whereas Fisher and Wright formulated retrospective theories of evolutionary history.

The following piece is a response to the critiques from Frank, Garson, and Odenbaugh. The issues at stake are: the definition of biodiversity and its normativity, historical fidelity in ecological restoration, naturalism in environmental ethics, and the role of decision theory. The normativity of the concept of biodiversity in conservation biology is defended. Historical fidelity is criticized as an operative goal for ecological restoration. It is pointed out that the analysis requires only minimal assumptions about ethics. Decision theory is presented as a tool, not a domain-limiting necessary requirement for environmental philosophy

The first comprehensive treatment of environmental philosophy, going beyond ethics to address the philosophical concepts that underlie environmental thinking and policy-making today Encompasses all of environmental philosophy, including conservation biology, restoration ecology, sustainability, environmental justice, and more Offers the first treatment of decision theory in an environmental philosophy text Explores the conceptions of nature and ethical presuppositions that underlie contemporary environmental debates, and, moving from theory to practice, shows how decision theory translates to public policy Addresses both hot-button issues, including population and immigration reform, and such ongoing issues as historical legacies and nations' responsibility and obligation for environmental problems Anchors philosophical concepts to their practical applications, establishing the priority of the discipline's real-world importance

Environmental philosophy is a hybrid discipline drawing extensively from epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of science and analyzing disciplines such as conservation biology, restoration ecology, sustainability studies, and political ecology. The book being discussed both provides an overview of environmental philosophy and develops an anthropocentric framework for it. That framework treats natural values as deep cultural values. Tradeoffs between natural values are analyzed using decision theory to the extent possible, leaving many interesting question for philosophical deliberation. This framework is supposed to be applicable in practical contexts

Ricotta argues against the existence of a unique measure of biodiversity by pointing out that no known measure of α-diversity satisfies all the adequacy conditions that have traditionally been set for it. While that technical claim is correct, it is not relevant in the context of defining biodiversity which is most usefully measured by β-diversity. The concept of complementarity provides a closely related family of measures of biodiversity which can be used for systematic conservation planning. Moreover, these measures cannot be replaced by summary statistics but must rely on inventories of biodiversity surrogates at candidate sites for conservation.

David Malament's (1977) well-known result, which is often taken to show the uniqueness of the Poincare-Einstein convention for defining simultaneity, involves an unwarranted physical assumption: that any simultaneity relation must remain invariant under temporal reflections. Once that assumption is removed, his other criteria for defining simultaneity are also satisfied by membership in the same backward (forward) null cone of the family of such cones with vertices on an inertial path. What is then unique about the Poincare-Einstein convention is that it is independent of the choice of inertial path in a given inertial frame, confirming a remark in Einstein 1905. Similarly, what is unique about the backward (forward) null cone definition is that it is independent of the state of motion of an observer at a point on the inertial path.

Frank has recently argued for an information-theoretic interpretation of natural selection. This interpretation is based on the identification of a measure related to the Malthusian parameter (for population change) with the Jeffreys divergence between the present allelic distribution of the population and that distribution in the next generation. It is pointed out in this analysis that this identification only holds if the mean fitness of the population is a constant, that is, there is no selection. This problem is used to argue for the superiority of the standard dynamical interpretation of natural selection over its information-theoretic counterpart

Norton has argued for the salience of deliberative strategies for making environmental decisions which is supposed to be preferable to formal decision analysis. This paper argues that formal multicriteria decision analysis, when deployed with care, has the flexibility to absorb the advantages of deliberative decision making. It can also be used for decision support during a deliberative process. This feature of decision analysis is illustrated using a case study from Merauke in Papua province of Indonesian New Guinea.

Carnap’s work was instrumental to the liberalization of empiricism in the 1930s that transformed the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle to what came to be known as logical empiricism. A central feature of this liberalization was the deployment of the Principle of Tolerance, originally introduced in logic, but now invoked in an epistemological context in “Testability and Meaning”. Immediately afterwards, starting with Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, Carnap embraced semantics and turned to interpretation to guide the choice of a theoretical language for science. The first thesis of this paper is that recourse to an intended interpretation led to a partial retrenchment of the conventionalism implied by the Principle of Tolerance. It required that the choice of a language be based on abstraction from a context; this procedure later became a component of the process of explication that was distinctive to Carnap’s mature views. The interpretive origin of formal systems also ensured their likely syntactic consistency, an issue on which Carnap was strongly criticized by figures such as Beth and Gödel. The second thesis of this paper is that this reliance on an intended interpretation enabled constructed formal systems to be relevant to the development of empirical science.

This paper reconstructs the history of the introduction and use of iterative algorithms in conservation biology in the 1980s and early 1990s in order to prioritize areas for protection as nature reserves. The importance of these algorithms was that they led to greater economy in spatial extent (“efficiency”) in the selection of areas to represent biological features adequately (that is, to a specified level) compared to older methods of scoring and ranking areas using criteria such as biotic “richness” (the number of features of interest). The development of these algorithms was critical to producing a research program for conservation biology that was distinct from ecology and eventually led to what came to be called systematic conservation planning. Very similar algorithmic approaches were introduced independently in the 1980–1990 period in Australia, South Africa, and (arguably) the United Kingdom. The key rules in these algorithms were the use of rarity and what came to be called complementarity (the number of new or under-represented features in an area relative to those that had already been selected). Because these algorithms were heuristic, they were not guaranteed to produce optimal (most “efficient”) solutions. However, complementarity came to be seen as a principle rather than a rule in an algorithm and its use was also advocated for the former reason. Optimal solutions could be produced by reformulating the reserve selection problem in a mathematical programming formalism and using exact algorithms developed in that context. A dispute over the relevance of full optimality arose and was never resolved. Moreover, exact algorithms could not easily incorporate criteria determining the spatial configuration of networks of selected areas, in contrast to heuristic algorithms. Meanwhile metaheuristic algorithms emerged in the 1990s and came to be seen as a credible more effective alternative to the heuristic algorithms. Ultimately what was important about these developments was that the reserve selection problem came to be viewed a complex optimal decision problem under uncertainty, resource, and other constraints. It was a type of problem that had no antecedent in traditional ecology.

On the basis of distinctions between those properties of entities that can be defined without reference to other entities and those that (in different ways) cannot, this note argues that non-trivial forms of frequency-dependent selection of entities should be interpreted as selection occurring at a level higher than that of those entities. It points out that, except in degenerately simple cases, evolutionary game-theoretic models of selection are not models of individual selection. Similarly, models of genotypic selection such as heterosis cannot be legitimately interpreted as models of genic selection. The analysis presented here supports the views that: (i) selection should be viewed as a multi-level process; (ii) upper-level selection is ubiquitous; (iii) kin selection should be viewed as a type of group selection rather than individual selection; and (iv) inclusive fitness is not an individual property.

This book provides a richly interdisciplinary assessment of the thought and work of Bryan Norton, one of most innovative and influential environmental philosophers of the past thirty years. In landmark works such as Toward Unity Among Environmentalists and Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management, Norton charted a new and highly productive course for an applied environmental philosophy, one fully engaged with the natural and social sciences as well as the management professions. A Sustainable Philosophy gathers together a distinguished group of scholars and professionals from a wide array of fields to engage Norton’s work and its legacy for our shared environmental future. A study in the power of intellectual legacy and the real-world influence of philosophy, the book will be of great interest scholars and students in environmental philosophy, public policy and management, and environmental and sustainability studies. By considering the value and impact of Norton’s body of work it will also chart a course for the next generation of pragmatic environmental philosophers and sustainability scholars grappling with questions of environmental value, knowledge, and practice in a rapidly changing world.

A framework is presented in which the role ofdevelopmental rules in phenotypic evolution canbe studied for some simple situations. Usingtwo different implicit models of development,characterized by different developmental mapsfrom genotypes to phenotypes, it is shown bysimulation that developmental rules and driftcan result in directional phenotypic evolutionwithout selection. For both models thesimulations show that the critical parameterthat drives the final phenotypic distributionis the cardinality of the set of genotypes thatmap to each phenotype. Details of thedevelopmental map do not matter. If phenotypesare randomly assigned to genotypes, the lastresult can also be proved analytically.