Edwin Etieyibo

This volume is a collection of chapters about contemporary issues within African philosophy. They are issues African philosophy must grapple with to demonstrate its readiness to make a stand against some of the challenges society faces in the coming decade such as xenophobia, Afro-phobia, extreme poverty, democratic failure and migration. The text covers new methodical directions and there is focus on the conversationalist, complementarist and consolationist movements within the field as well as the place of the Indigenous Knowledge System.The collection speaks to African philosophy’s place in intellectual history with coverage of African Ethics and African socio-political philosophy. Contributors come from a variety of different backgrounds, institutions and countries. Through their innovative ideas, they provide fresh insight and intellectual energy. The book appeals to philosophy students and researchers.

What is the status and nature of the “it” and the ontological progression from an “it” to an “it” in Ifeanyi Menkiti’s normative conception of a person? In this article, I attempt to preliminarily give some nuance content to the “it” of childhood and the “it” of the nameless dead. My motivation is straightforwardly simple: to defend Menkiti’s claim that both “its” have some depersonalised moral standing or existence. However, in doing so, I argue that a better account of the ontological progression of personhood is from an “it” to an “it-it”5 rather than from an “it” to an “it.” On this modified version of the double hyphenated “its”, which isunderpinned by the idea of moral force, the prior moral worth of the nameless dead is taken into account as valuable members of our collective immortality, notwithstanding the fact that their names have been forgotten.

I want to do a couple of things in this essay. First, I want to articulate the central direction that postmodern thinking or philosophy takes. Second, I want to present a brief sketch of African philosophy, focusing mostly on some aspects of African ethics. Third, I want togesture towards the view that while postmodern thinking seems to suggest that African philosophy is a legitimate narrative or “language game” it could beargued that given its central ideas and doctrines African philosophy may be open to some of the worries facing modern thinking.

This book, appropriately titled Decolonisation, Africanisation and the Philosophy Curriculum, signposts and captures issues about philosophy, the philosophy curriculum, and its decolonisation and Africanisation. This topic is of critical importance at present for the discipline of philosophy, not the least because philosophy and the current philosophical canons are perceived to be improvised by virtue of their historical marginalisation and exclusion of other valuable and important philosophical traditions and perspectives. The continued marginalisation and exclusion of one such philosophical tradition and perspective, i.e. African philosophy connects to issues of space contestations and raise questions of justice. The chapters in this book engage with all of these issues, and they also attempt to make sense of what it will mean for philosophy and the philosophy curriculum to be decolonised and Africanised; how to go about achieving this task; and what the challenges and problems are that confront efforts to decolonise and Africanise the philosophy curriculum. Furthermore, the contributors initiate discussions on the value and importance of non-western philosophical traditions and perspectives, and by so doing challenge the dormant and triumphant narrative and hegemony of Western philosophy, as well as the centrality accorded to it in philosophical discourse. The chapters in this book were originally published as articles in the South African Journal of Philosophy.

This paper seeks to determine whether or not the divesture of Nigeria’s state-owned enterprises by the Federal Government of Nigeria is ethical. Towards this end, it employs an analytic methodology to undertake a conceptual examination of the divesture of Nigeria’s SOEs by the FGN. The paper’s findings are: A large proportion of the Nigerian citizenry is opposed to its government’s privatization policy. A conducive socio-economic environment for privatization is lacking in Nigeria.The paper concludes that although privatization in general may be a “good” policy, it is ethically wrong for the FGN to privatize some of its SOEs, given the absence of a conducive socio-economic milieu

In this paper, I argue that Ubuntu can be construed as a strict form of cosmopolitan moral and political theory. The implication of this is that the duty or obligation that humans owe other humans arises in virtue of humanity or the notion of human-ness. That is, one is a person insofar as he or she forms humane relations and it is this particular way of beingness that makes every person both an object and subject of duty. On this cosmopolitan interpretation of Ubuntu, I therefore, argue that Ubuntu would support the principle of natural resource redistribution according to which all humans fall within the scope of justice and the principles of distributive justice. If this is right, then Ubuntu’s cosmopolitanism has something to contribute generally to cosmopolitanism, as an account of global justice.

The position that I defend and argue for in this paper is that we ought to or are obligated to Africanise the philosophy curriculum in universities in Africa. This obligation is grounded on the overarching consideration not to wrong Africans by committing testimonial and hermeneutical injustices against them, and where committing these forms of epistemic injustice prevents us from enhancing the autonomy of Africans and maximising or promoting utility. I take the issues that I discuss and the argument that I provide for this position to be important, particularly in our times. This is so in the context of present and broader debates and discussions, not just in respect of decolonisation in education, and the Africanisation of institutional cultures and practices in schools or tertiary institutions, but also regarding curriculum transformation and development, in general, and diversification of the philosophy curriculum, in particular.

René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy is his most celebrated philosophical work. The book remains one of the most significant and influential works in epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of mind in the history of Western philosophy. In this paper I examine the relationship between the various hyperbolic doubts, the dreaming, imperfect creator, and evil demon hypotheses in Meditation I. The paper shows that the "painting analogy" occupies a central position in the First Meditation not only because it effectively links together the hyperbolic doubts, but also because it lays the groundwork for the claim that although it may be impossible for us to know things outside us as our thoughts represent them to be, we can know at least the feature of our thoughts themselves. By raising the necessary doubt about our sensible experience and the corporeal world, the "painting analogy" makes the case for the primacy of the intellectual world

I want to do a couple of things in this essay. First, I want to articulate the central direction that postmodern thinking or philosophy takes. Second, I want to present a brief sketch of African philosophy, focusing mostly on some aspects of African ethics. Third, I want to gesture towards the view that while postmodern thinking seems to suggest that African philosophy is a legitimate narrative or “language game” it could be argued that given its central ideas and doctrines African philosophy may be open to some of the worries facing modern thinking.

Bargaining and distribution of benefits accruing from social cooperation are central topics in contractarian accounts of morality or distributive justice in general and David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement in particular. In this paper, I raise some problems for MbA both with regards to bargaining over the benefits of social cooperation and the distribution of such benefits. The worries I raise piggyback on a couple of Jan Narveson’s earlier queries of some of the topics in MbA: those of ‘questionable foundation’ and redundancy. However, I go beyond the substance of these queries by arguing that they raise fundamental worries about the correctness of the description of the elements of the bargaining situation, and the role and significance of agreement in MbA

In his recently published book Animals and African Ethics, Kai Horsthemke makes two important and related claims. The first is that most African metaphysical, religious, and ethical positions and perspectives on animals are anthropocentric. Second, he states that if there are one or more principles of duties regarding other animals derivable from these positions and perspectives, they are at best “indirect duties.” In this article, I critically engage with these claims in the context of the ontological beliefs and ethical standpoints that flow from anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. I argue that the African metaphysical worldview and African practices on animals are not anthropocentric. The nub of my argument is that a closer examination of African practices on animals and one dominant African metaphysical worldview—one that Horsthemke engages with in the book—presents us a different conclusion, one that suggests that the worldview and practices are conceivably biocentric or ecocentric rather than anthropocentric.

The debate over the host of moral issues that genetic enhancement technology (GET) raises has been significant. One argument that has been advanced to impugn its moral legitimacy is the ‘unfair advantage argument’ (UAA), which states: allowing access to GET to be determined by socio-economic status would lead to unjust outcomes, namely, create a genetic caste system, and with it the exacerbation and perpetuation of existing socio-economic inequalities. Fritz Allhoff has recently objected to the argument, the kernel of which is that it conflates the use of the technology with its distribution. GET, he argues, would generate unjust outcomes only if it is distributed according to principles of an unjust pattern of distribution; for if we can determine what constitutes a ‘just’ distributive scheme, then the technology can be allocated according to the principles of that scheme. In this paper I argue the following cluster of related claims: (1) both UAA and Allhoff's proposed distributive schemes ignore the importance of non-genetic factors in the development of an individual's characteristics and capacities; (2) if we accept the view that it is good to prevent unjust outcomes that arise because some have exclusive access to GET, then we have to accept wide-ranging distributive schemes; (3) by tracking genetic and non-genetic factors wide-ranging schemes do violate in some sense the widely shared value of neutrality in liberal democracies