•  58
    Authority as a contingency plan
    Philosophical Explorations 22 (2): 130-145. 2019.
    Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of cont...
  •  45
    Ethical objectivity: The test of time
    Ratio 32 (4): 325-338. 2019.
    Ratio, EarlyView.
  •  33
    Emotions and the Dynamics of Reasons
    Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (3): 347-363. 2018.
  •  4
    Constructivism in metaethics
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2017.
    Metaethical constructivism is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, they are not fixed by normative facts that are independent of what rational agents would agree to under some specified conditions of choice. The appeal of this view lies in the promise to explain how normative truths are objective and independent of our actual judgments, while also binding and authoritative for us. Constructivism comes in several varieties, some of which claim a place within metaethics while other…Read more
  • “Reflective Efficacy. On Neil Sinhababu Humean Nature"
    Rivista Italiana di Filosofia E Psicologia 1 (9): 67-72. 2018.
    This is a contribution to the symposium on Neil Sinhababu Humean Nature.
  • Responsabilità, reciprocità e cooperazione
    Rivista di Filosofia 99 469-475. 2018.
    This article accounts for the relation among the concepts of mutual accountability, cooperation, and reciprocity.
  •  1
    Love’s Luck Knot
    Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 25 (1). forthcoming.
  • Constrained by reason, transformed by love: Murdoch on the standard of proof
    In Browning Gary (ed.), Truth and Love, London: Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 63-88. 2018.
  •  29
    Claiming Responsibility for Action Under Duress
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4): 851-868. 2018.
    This paper argues that to understand the varieties of wrongs done in coercion, we should examine the dynamic normative relation that the coercer establishes with the coerced. The case rests on a critical examination of coercion by threat, which is proved irreducible to psychological inducement by overwhelming motives, obstruction of agency by impaired consent or deprivation of genuine choice. In contrast to physical coercion, coercion by threat requires the coercee’s participation in deliberatio…Read more
  •  129
    This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions of rationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining the selective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moral sanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining the stability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities of self-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are …Read more
  •  21
    Reflective Efficacy
    Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 9 (1): 67-72. 2018.
    : The purpose of this paper is to highlight some difficulties of Neil Sinhababu’s Humean theory of agency, which depend on his radically reductivist approach, rather than to his Humean sympathies. The argument is that Sinhababu’s theory builds upon a critique of reflective agency which is based on equivocation and misunderstandings of the Kantian approach. Ultimately, the objection is that his reductivist view is unequipped to address the rclassical problems of rational deliberation and agential…Read more
  •  4
    La mente moral. Una invitación a la relectura de Iris Murdoch
    Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 60 39-54. 2013.
    Este artículo sostiene que Iris Murdoch se opone al no-cognitivismo porque este no tiene en cuenta los fenómenos morales dinámicos que son clave en cualquier exploración filosófica de la vida moral adecuada, es decir, la experiencia subjetiva de la moralidad, la diferencia y el cambio. El argumento de Murdoch pone en cuestión la dicotomía hecho/valor y cognitivo/emotivo, y propone un modelo de la mente complejo, sensible al tiempo y dinámico que se centra en el cambioy la transición. En este mod…Read more
  •  3
    In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, b…Read more
  •  8
    The Appeal of Kantian Intuitionism
    European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.
  •  81
    Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem
    Philosophia 44 (4): 1229-1246. 2016.
    According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some …Read more
  •  71
    Starting Points: Kantian Constructivism Reassessed
    Ratio Juris 27 (3): 311-329. 2014.
    G. A. Cohen and J. Raz object that Constructivism is incoherent because it crucially deploys unconstructed elements in the structure of justification. This paper offers a response on behalf of constructivism, by reassessing the role of such unconstructed elements. First, it argues that a shared conception of rational agency works as a starting point for the justification, but it does not play a foundational role. Second, it accounts for the unconstructed norms that constrains the activity of con…Read more
  •  124
    Morality and the Emotions (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
  •  10
    Constructivism about Practical Knowledge
    In Constructivism in Ethics, Cambridge University Press. pp. 153-182. 2013.
    It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commit…Read more
  •  15
    I dilemmi morali e l'integrità
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 12 (2): 291-312. 1999.
  •  39
    The Autonomy of Morality
    Philosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.