Leon Horsten

This article discusses Peter Galison's views on the structure and evolution of experimental and instrumental cultures in 20th century particle physics, which are unfolded in his recent book Image and Logic. A Material Culture of Microphysics. First a description is given of the uncomfortable predicament in which the Kuhnian tradition finds itself in the past two decades. It is then explained how Galison distinguishes a layered structure in the practice of modern particle physics. Physics as a practice consists of three relatively autonomous levels: the experimental level, the instrumental level and the theoretical level. This paper focuses mainly (but not exclusively) on the instrumental level in particle physics. Subsequently an analysis is given of Galison's metaphor of the wall, which Galison offers as an alternative to the Kuhnian image of paradigms and scientific revolutions. Galison's model is also compared with Laudan's reticulational model of the evolution of scientific research traditions. To conclude, an analysis is made of Galison's attempt to solve the incommensurability problem

We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF and conjectured that the detour through classical logic in KF is dispensable. We refute Reinhardt's Conjecture, and provide a direct axiomatization PKF of Kripke's theory in partial logic. We argue that any natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory in Strong Kleene logic has the same proof-theoretic strength as PKF, namely the strength of the system RA&lt ωω ramified analysis or a system of Tarskian ramified truth up to ωω. Thus any such axiomatization is much weaker than Feferman's axiomatization KF in classical logic, which is equivalent to the system RA&ltε₀ of ramified analysis up to ε₀

There are two perspectives from which formal theories can be viewed. On the one hand, one can take a theory to be about some privileged models. On the other hand, one can take all models of a theory to be on a par. In contrast with what is usually done in philosophical debates, we adopt the latter viewpoint. Suppose that from this perspective we want to add an adequate truth predicate to a background theory. Then on the one hand the truth theory ought to be semantically conservative over the background theory. At the same time, it is generally recognised that the central function of a truth predicate is an expressive one. A truth predicate ought to allow us to express propositions that we could not express before. In this article we argue that there are indeed natural truth theories which satisfy both the demand of semantical conservativeness and the demand of adequately extending the expressive power of our language.

In this paper, a general perspective on criteria of identity of kinds of objects is developed. The question of the admissibility of impredicative or circular identity criteria is investigated in the light of the view that is articulated. It is argued that in and of itself impredicativity does not constitute sufficient grounds for rejecting a putative identity criterion. The view that is presented is applied to Davidson’s criterion of identity for events and to the structuralist criterion of identity of places in a structure.