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Leon Horsten

Universität Konstanz
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    97
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    23
  •  News and Updates
    91

 More details
  • Universität Konstanz
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Catholic University of Louvain
Institut supérieur de philosophie
PhD, 1993
Areas of Interest
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
  • All publications (97)
  •  19
    A Note Concerning The Notion Of Satisfiability
    Logique Et Analyse 47 463-468. 2004.
    Tarski has shown how the argumentation of the liar paradox can be used to prove a theorem about truth in formalized languages. In this paper, it is shown how the paradox concerning the least undefinable ordinal can be used to prove a no go-theorem concerning the notion of satisfaction in formalized languages. Also, the connection of this theorem with the absolute notion of definability is discussed.
    Areas of Mathematics
  •  163
    One Hundred Years of Semantic Paradox
    Journal of Philosophical Logic (6): 1-15. 2015.
    This article contains an overview of the main problems, themes and theories relating to the semantic paradoxes in the twentieth century. From this historical overview I tentatively draw some lessons about the way in which the field may evolve in the next decade
    Liar Paradox
  •  245
    Computational Structuralism &dagger
    with Volker Halbach
    Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2): 174-186. 2005.
    According to structuralism in philosophy of mathematics, arithmetic is about a single structure. First-order theories are satisfied by models that do not instantiate this structure. Proponents of structuralism have put forward various accounts of how we succeed in fixing one single structure as the intended interpretation of our arithmetical language. We shall look at a proposal that involves Tennenbaum's theorem, which says that any model with addition and multiplication as recursive operations…Read more
    According to structuralism in philosophy of mathematics, arithmetic is about a single structure. First-order theories are satisfied by models that do not instantiate this structure. Proponents of structuralism have put forward various accounts of how we succeed in fixing one single structure as the intended interpretation of our arithmetical language. We shall look at a proposal that involves Tennenbaum's theorem, which says that any model with addition and multiplication as recursive operations is isomorphic to the standard model of arithmetic. On this account, the intended models of arithmetic are the notation systems with recursive operations on them satisfying the Peano axioms. [A]m Anfang […] ist das Zeichen.
    Mathematical Structuralism
  •  259
    Review of M. Leng, Mathematics and Reality (review)
    Analysis 71 (4): 798-799. 2011.
    Mathematical FictionalismMathematical Practice
  •  89
    Modal-Epistemic Variants of Shapiro’s System of Epistemic Arithmetic
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (2): 284-291. 1994.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicEpistemic Logic
  • Gomperts, M.C., Neeltje komt dinsdag in evakostuum (review)
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 55 (3): 571. 1993.
  • The Semantical Paradoxes, the Neutrality of Truth and the Neutrality of the Minimalist Theory of Truth
    In P. Cartois (ed.), The Many Problems of Realism (Studies in the General Philosophy of Science: Volume 3), Tilberg University Press. 1995.
    Liar ParadoxMinimalism about Truth
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