-
564A Plea for UnderstandingIn Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Language, Palgrave. 2009.
-
95Understanding what was saidSynthese 195 (2): 815-834. 2018.On the most prominent account, understanding what was said is always propositional knowledge of what was said. I develop a more minimal alternative, according to which understanding is sometimes a distinctive attitude towards what was said—to a first approximation, entertaining what was said. The propositional knowledge account has been supported on the basis of its capacity to explain testimonial knowledge transmission. I argue that it is not so supported.
-
318Linguistic understanding and knowledgeNoûs 42 (1). 2008.Is linguistic understanding a form of knowledge? I clarify the question and then consider two natural forms a positive answer might take. I argue that, although some recent arguments fail to decide the issue, neither positive answer should be accepted. The aim is not yet to foreclose on the view that linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge, but to develop desiderata on a satisfactory successor to the two natural views rejected here.
-
167Review: Robert J. Matthews: The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution (review)Mind 117 (466): 494-500. 2008.
-
48The Objects of Thought by Tim Crane Oxford University Press2014, pp. 208, £27.50 ISBN: 978-0-19-968274-4 (review)Philosophy 90 (1): 146-151. 2015.
-
812Ignorance of Linguistics: A Note on Michael Devitt’s Ignorance of LanguageCroatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1): 21-34. 2009.Michael Devitt has argued that Chomsky, along with many other Linguists and philosophers, is ignorant of the true nature of Generative Linguistics. In particular, Devitt argues that Chomsky and others wrongly believe the proper object of linguistic inquiry to be speakers' competences, rather than the languages that speakers are competent with. In return, some commentators on Devitt's work have returned the accusation, arguing that it is Devitt who is ignorant about Linguistics. In this note, I c…Read more
-
82Where should we look for the mind?Think 2 (5): 45-50. 2003.Is your mind in your head? The answer, surprisingly, may be . Guy Longworth sets out the philosophical case for accepting that our minds extend much further into the world than that
-
607Prospects for a truth-conditional account of standing meaningIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. 2012.
-
308Reading Philosophy of Language: Selected Texts with Interactive Commentary (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2005.Designed for readers new to the subject,_ Reading Philosophy of Language_ presents key texts in the philosophy of language together with helpful editorial guidance. A concise collection of key texts in the philosophy of language Ideal for readers new to the subject. Features seminal texts by leading figures in the field, such as Austin, Chomsky, Davidson, Dummett and Searle. Presents three texts on each of five key topics: speech and performance; meaning and truth; knowledge of language; meaning…Read more
-
67The Philosophy of J. L. Austin, edited by Martin Gustafsson and Richard Sørli (review)Mind 123 (491): 917-920. 2014.
-
621Conflicting Grammatical AppearancesCroatian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3): 403-426. 2007.I explore one apparent source of conflict between our naïve view of grammatical properties and the best available scientific view of grammatical properties. That source is the modal dependence of the range of naïve, or manifest, grammatical properties that is available to a speaker upon the configurations and operations of their internal systems—that is, upon scientific grammatical properties. Modal dependence underwrites the possibility of conflicting grammatical appearances. In response to tha…Read more
Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
20th Century Philosophy |
Epistemology |
Social Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
PhilPapers Editorships
4 more
Knowledge of Language |
Languages |
Linguistic Convention |
Idiolects |
Languages, Misc |
Linguistic Universals |
Private Language |
Public Language |
Words |