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627Conflicting Grammatical AppearancesCroatian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3): 403-426. 2007.I explore one apparent source of conflict between our naïve view of grammatical properties and the best available scientific view of grammatical properties. That source is the modal dependence of the range of naïve, or manifest, grammatical properties that is available to a speaker upon the configurations and operations of their internal systems—that is, upon scientific grammatical properties. Modal dependence underwrites the possibility of conflicting grammatical appearances. In response to tha…Read more
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176You and mePhilosophical Explorations 17 (3): 289-303. 2014.Are there distinctively second-personal thoughts? I clarify the question and present considerations in favour of a view on which some second-personal thoughts are distinctive. Specifically, I suggest that some second-personal thoughts are distinctive in also being first-personal thoughts. Thus, second-personal thinking provides a way of sharing another person's first-personal thoughts
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173Some Models of Linguistic UnderstandingThe Baltic International Yearbook 5 (1): 7. 2009.I discuss the conjecture that understanding what is said in an utterance is to be modelled as knowing what is said in that utterance. My main aim is to present a number of alter- native models, as a prophylactic against premature acceptance of the conjecture as the only game in town. I also offer preliminary assessments of each of the models, including the propositional knowledge model, in part by considering their respective capacities to sub-serve the transmission of knowledge through testimon…Read more
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78Faith in KantIn Paul Faulkner & Thomas W. Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust, Oup. 2017.Cooperation threatens to become rationally problematic insofar as the following conditions hold: reliance has a worst outcome—we rely and the other proves unreliable; the interaction is one-off; and we are ignorant of the other’s particular motivations but recognize a general motivation to be unreliable. The problem is that the satisfaction of these conditions is commonplace. Thus cooperation should be much less common than it in fact is. So what explains it? This chapter considers and rejects v…Read more
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58Timothy Williamson. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 340 (review)SATS 3 (1): 135-139. 2002.
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134Comprehending speechPhilosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 339-373. 2008.What is the epistemological role of speech perception in comprehension? More precisely, what is its role in episodes or states of comprehension able to mediate the communication of knowledge? One answer, developed in recent work by Tyler Burge, has it that its role may be limited to triggering mobilizations of the understanding. I argue that, while there is much to be said for such a view, it should not be accepted. I present an alternative account, on which episodes of comprehension are better …Read more
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638Surveying the factsIn John Collins & Tamara Dobler (eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception, Oup. 2018.
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566A Plea for UnderstandingIn Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Language, Palgrave. 2009.
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97Understanding what was saidSynthese 195 (2): 815-834. 2018.On the most prominent account, understanding what was said is always propositional knowledge of what was said. I develop a more minimal alternative, according to which understanding is sometimes a distinctive attitude towards what was said—to a first approximation, entertaining what was said. The propositional knowledge account has been supported on the basis of its capacity to explain testimonial knowledge transmission. I argue that it is not so supported.
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321Linguistic understanding and knowledgeNoûs 42 (1). 2008.Is linguistic understanding a form of knowledge? I clarify the question and then consider two natural forms a positive answer might take. I argue that, although some recent arguments fail to decide the issue, neither positive answer should be accepted. The aim is not yet to foreclose on the view that linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge, but to develop desiderata on a satisfactory successor to the two natural views rejected here.
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168Review: Robert J. Matthews: The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution (review)Mind 117 (466): 494-500. 2008.
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