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58Timothy Williamson. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 340 (review)SATS 3 (1): 135-139. 2002.
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134Comprehending speechPhilosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 339-373. 2008.What is the epistemological role of speech perception in comprehension? More precisely, what is its role in episodes or states of comprehension able to mediate the communication of knowledge? One answer, developed in recent work by Tyler Burge, has it that its role may be limited to triggering mobilizations of the understanding. I argue that, while there is much to be said for such a view, it should not be accepted. I present an alternative account, on which episodes of comprehension are better …Read more
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638Surveying the factsIn John Collins & Tamara Dobler (eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception, Oup. 2018.
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566A Plea for UnderstandingIn Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Language, Palgrave. 2009.
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97Understanding what was saidSynthese 195 (2): 815-834. 2018.On the most prominent account, understanding what was said is always propositional knowledge of what was said. I develop a more minimal alternative, according to which understanding is sometimes a distinctive attitude towards what was said—to a first approximation, entertaining what was said. The propositional knowledge account has been supported on the basis of its capacity to explain testimonial knowledge transmission. I argue that it is not so supported.
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321Linguistic understanding and knowledgeNoûs 42 (1). 2008.Is linguistic understanding a form of knowledge? I clarify the question and then consider two natural forms a positive answer might take. I argue that, although some recent arguments fail to decide the issue, neither positive answer should be accepted. The aim is not yet to foreclose on the view that linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge, but to develop desiderata on a satisfactory successor to the two natural views rejected here.
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168Review: Robert J. Matthews: The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution (review)Mind 117 (466): 494-500. 2008.
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48The Objects of Thought by Tim Crane Oxford University Press2014, pp. 208, £27.50 ISBN: 978-0-19-968274-4 (review)Philosophy 90 (1): 146-151. 2015.
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818Ignorance of Linguistics: A Note on Michael Devitt’s Ignorance of LanguageCroatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1): 21-34. 2009.Michael Devitt has argued that Chomsky, along with many other Linguists and philosophers, is ignorant of the true nature of Generative Linguistics. In particular, Devitt argues that Chomsky and others wrongly believe the proper object of linguistic inquiry to be speakers' competences, rather than the languages that speakers are competent with. In return, some commentators on Devitt's work have returned the accusation, arguing that it is Devitt who is ignorant about Linguistics. In this note, I c…Read more
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83Where should we look for the mind?Think 2 (5): 45-50. 2003.Is your mind in your head? The answer, surprisingly, may be . Guy Longworth sets out the philosophical case for accepting that our minds extend much further into the world than that
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617Prospects for a truth-conditional account of standing meaningIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. 2012.
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