•  43
    II—Michael Ridge: Epistemology for Ecumenical Expressivists
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 83-108. 2007.
  •  39
    Universalizability for Collective Rational Agents: A Critique of Agentrelativism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 34-66. 2007.
    This paper contends that a Kantian universalizability constraint on theories of practical reason in conjunction with the possibility of collective rational agents entails the surprisingly strong conclusion that no fully agent‐relative theory of practical reason can be sound. The basic point is that a Kantian universalizability constraint, the thesis that all reasons for action are agent‐relative and the possibility of collective rational agents gives rise to a contradiction. This contradiction c…Read more
  •  352
    Anti-reductionism and supervenience
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3): 330-348. 2007.
    In this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-Landau's attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis …Read more
  •  240
    Reasons for action: Agent-neutral vs. Agent-relative
    The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011.
    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distintion is widely and rightly regarded as a philosophically important one. Unfortunately, the distinction is often drawn in different and mutually incompatible ways. The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction has historically been drawn three main ways: the ‘principle-based distinction’, the ‘reason-statement-based distinction’ and the ‘perspective-based distinction’. Each of these approaches has its own distinctive vices (Sections 1-3). However, a slightly …Read more
  •  56
    Kantian constructivism : something old, something new
    In James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 138. 2012.
  •  154
    Getting Lost on the Road to Larissa 1
    Noûs 47 (1): 181-201. 2011.