•  451
    More than one flaw: Reply to Millican
    Sophia 46 (3): 295-304. 2007.
    Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004) claims to have detected ‘the one fatal flaw in Anselm’s ontological argument.’ I argue that there is more than one important flaw in the position defended in Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004). First, Millican’s reconstruction of Anselm’s argument does serious violence to the original text. Second, Millican’s generalised objection fails to diagnose any flaw in a vast range of ontological arguments. Third, there are independent reasons for thinking that …Read more
  •  642
    Critical review of Daniel Dombrowski's "Rethinking the Ontological Argument".
  •  707
    Perfection, near-perfection, maximality, and Anselmian Theism
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (2): 119-138. 2011.
    Anselmian theists claim (a) that there is a being than which none greater can be conceived; and (b) that it is knowable on purely—solely, entirely—a priori grounds that there is a being than which none greater can be conceived. In this paper, I argue that Anselmian Theism gains traction by conflating different interpretations of the key description ‘being than which no greater can be conceived’. In particular, I insist that it is very important to distinguish between ideal excellence and maximal…Read more
  •  979
    Disagreement
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3): 183-199. 2010.
    There has been a recent explosion of interest in the epistemology of disagreement. Much of the recent literature is concerned with a particular range of puzzle cases (discussed in the Cases section of my paper). Almost all of the papers that contribute to that recent literature make mention of questions about religious disagreement in ways that suggest that there are interesting connections between those puzzle cases and real life cases of religious disagreement. One important aim of my paper is…Read more
  •  584
    Semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions
    Philosophical Studies 67 (1). 1992.
    This paper provides a semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions. (In this respect, the title of the paper is quite well chosen.)
  •  732
    Molinism and divine prophecy of free actions
    Religious Studies 50 (2): 1-10. 2014.
    Among challenges to Molinism, the challenge posed by divine prophecy of human free action has received insufficient attention. We argue that this challenge is a significant addition to the array of challenges that confront Molinism.
  •  1429
    The ontological argument
    In Paul Copan & Chad V. Meister (eds.), Philosophy of religion: classic and contemporary issues, Blackwell. 2008.
    General discussion of ontological arguments. (Extended the discussion of ontological arguments in the then current version of my SEP entry on ontological arguments.)
  •  1055
    Critical notice of J.P. Moreland's Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1): 193-212. 2011.
    This paper is a detailed examination of some parts of J. P. Moreland's book on "the argument from consciousness". (There is a companion article that discusses the parts of the book not taken up in this critical notice.).
  •  400
    Response to Gettings
    Analysis 60 (4): 363-367. 2000.
    This article is a reply to Michael Gettings' criticisms of a previous paper of mine on Godel's ontological argument. (All relevant bibliographical details may be found in the article.) I provide a patch to my previous -- faulty -- attempt to provide a parody of Godel's ontological argument on the model of Gaunilo's parody of Anselm's Proslogion 2 argument.
  •  299
    This chapter provides a brief account of atheistic philosophy of relgion in the second half of the twentieth century.
  •  2259
    On defining art historically
    British Journal of Aesthetics 32 (2): 153-161. 1991.
    This paper is an extended critical discussion of Jerrold Levinson's historical definition of art. I try out various different avenues of attack; it is not clear whether any of them is ultimately successful.
  •  171
    Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4): 519-521. 1999.
    Book review.
  •  326
    "Humean" Supervenience?
    Philosophical Studies 101 (1): 77-105. 2000.
    As with many aspects of David Lewis’s work, it is hard to provide a better summary of his views than he provided himself. So the following introduction to what the Humean Supervenience view is will follow the opening pages of Lewis (1994a) extremely closely. But for those readers who haven’t read that paper, here’s the nickel version.
  •  574
    Weak agnosticism defended
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36 (3). 1994.
    Agnosticism has had some bad press in recent years. Nonetheless, I hope to show that agnosticism can be so formulated that it is no less philosophically respectable than theism and atheism. This is not a mere philosophical exercise; for, as it happens, the formulated position is--I think--the one to which I subscribe. I include a qualification here since it may be that the position to which I subscribe is better characterised as fallibilist atheism--but more of that anon
  •  1659
    Anselm and the ontological argument
    In Jeff Jordan (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: The Key Thinkers, Continuum. pp. 22-43. 2011.
    This chapter gives an exposition and critique of Anselm's Proslogion II argument.
  •  1513
    This paper is a response to David Oderberg's criticisms of a previous paper of mine. (Bibliographical details are provided in the article.)
  •  615
    The Ontological Argument (Cambridge Classic Philosophical Arguments Series) (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2018.
    In this Introduction, we begin with two relatively uncontroversial matters: the broad contours of the history of discussion of ontological arguments, and the major topics that require discussion in connection with ontological arguments. We then move on to consideration of the much more difficult task of the characterisation of ontological arguments—i.e. the task of saying exactly what ontological arguments are and explaining how they differ from, say, cosmological, teleological, and moral argume…Read more
  •  69
    We present a probabilistic extension to active path analyses of token causation. The extension uses the generalized notion of intervention presented in : we allow an intervention to set any probability distribution over the intervention variables, not just a single value. The resulting account can handle a wide range of examples. We do not claim the account is complete --- only that it fills an obvious gap in previous active-path approaches. It still succumbs to recent counterexamples by Hiddles…Read more
  •  316
    Natural theology
    In Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus, Cambridge University Press. pp. 15-47. 2007.
    This paper is a careful examination of the various approaches that Alvin Plantinga has taken towards natural theology over the course of his academic career (from *God and Other Minds* to *Warranted Christian Belief*). In his earliest works, Plantinga has a very clear and strict conception of the project of natural theology, and he argues very clearly (and correctly) that that project fails. In his middle works, Plantinga has a tolerably clear and slightly less strict conception of the project o…Read more
  •  902
    Where’s the biff?
    Erkenntnis 68 (2): 149-68. 2008.
    This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late pr…Read more
  •  997
    Kalam cosmological arguments have recently been the subject of criticisms, at least inter alia, by physicists---Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking---and philosophers of science---Adolf Grunbaum. In a series of recent articles, William Craig has attempted to show that these criticisms are “superficial, iII-conceived, and based on misunderstanding.” I argue that, while some of the discussion of Davies and Hawking is not philosophically sophisticated, the points raised by Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum do …Read more
  •  331
    The Philosophical Insignificance of Gödel's Slingshot
    Mind 106 (421): 121-142. 1997.
    This paper is a critical examination of Stephen Neale's *The Philosophical Significance of Godel's slingshot*. I am sceptical of the philosophical significance of Godel’s Slingshot (and of Slingshot arguments in general). In particular, I do not believe that Godel’s Slingshot has any interesting and important philosophical consequences for theories of facts or for referential treatments of definite descriptions. More generally, I do not believe that any Slingshot arguments have interesting and i…Read more
  •  494
    Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (review)
    Faith and Philosophy 13 (1): 125-133. 1996.
    This paper is a critical review of *Big Bang Cosmology* by Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. (The book is a collection of previously published papers; most are concerned, in one way or another, with kalam cosmological arguments for the existence of God.).
  •  529
    Maydole’s 2QS5 Argument
    Philo 7 (2): 203-211. 2004.
    This paper is a reply to Robert Maydole’s “The Modal Perfection Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being,” published in Philo 6, 2, 2003. I argue that Maydole’s Modal Perfection Argument fails, and that there is no evident way in which it can be repaired.
  •  388
    Paley’s Argument Revisited: Reply to Schupbach
    Philosophia Christi 10 (2): 443-450. 2008.
    This paper is a reply to Jonah Schupbach's critique of a previous paper of mine on Paley's argument for design. (Bibliographical details for earlier publications are available in the paper.)
  •  387
    Colonizing the galaxies
    Sophia 39 (2): 117-142. 2000.
    Paper presented in East-West Symposium on Science, Philosophy and Religion, Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Meeting with Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, July 1999.
  •  278
    Reply to Richard Davis
    Philosophia Christi 11 (2): 423-436. 2009.
    This paper is a response to a paper by Rich Davis in which he argues that David Lewis' modal realism is inconsistent with classical theism. I provide what I take to be a coherent modal realist formulation of classical theism.
  •  236
    Bruce Langtry's ‘God, the Best and Evil’ is a fine contribution to the literature. Here, I review the contents of the book, and then provide some critical remarks that, as fas as I know, have not been made elsewhere. In particular, I argue that his criticism of my formulations of logical arguments from evil (in my Arguing about Gods) is unsuccessful.