-
1199New Atheism' versus 'Christian NationalismIn Paolo Diego Bubbio & Philip Andrew Quadrio (eds.), The relationship of philosophy to religion today, Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 118-53. 2011.A discussion of the recent prominence of 'new atheism' and 'Christian nationalism' in the United States.
-
983Atheism: A RetrospectivePhilo 10 (1): 35-58. 2007.This paper provides a detailed examination of Michael Martin’s Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990). I argue that Martin’s project in this book is seriously damaged by his neglect of high-level theoretical considerations about rationality, justification, and argumentation. Furthermore, I suggest that this failing is endemic to recent discussions of arguments about the existence of God: there is no prospect of making progress in this area unless much more attention is paid to high-level …Read more
-
1035Review of Sobel's *Logic and Theism* (review)Philo 9 (1): 73-91. 2006.This is an extended critical review of Jordan Howard Sobel's magnum opus *Logic and Theism*.
-
455Facing facts?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4). 2004.In his recent book, Stephen Neale provides an extended defence of the claim that Gödel's slingshot has dramatic consequences for fact theorists (and, in particular, for fact theorists who look with favour on referential treatments of definite descriptions). I argue that the book-length treatment provides no strengthening of the case that Neale has made elsewhere for this implausible claim. Moreover, I also argue that various criticisms of Neale's case that I made on a previous occasion have met …Read more
-
385Swinburne on ‘mental’ and ‘physical’Religious Studies 34 (4): 483-495. 1998.This paper examines Richard Swinburne's definitions of 'mental property' and 'physical property'. After some preliminary tidying up (Section 1), the paper introduces eight putative counter-examples to Swinburne's definitions (Section 2). The paper then considers amendments to Swinburne's account of 'mental property' (Section 3) and 'physical property' (Section 4) which deal with these counter-examples. Finally, the paper closes with some brief remarks about the metaphysics of properties (Appendi…Read more
-
303Consider truth predicates. Minimalist analyses of truth predicates may involve commitment to some of the following claims: (i) truth “predicates” are not genuine predicates -- either because the truth “predicate” disappears under paraphrase or translation into deep structure, or because the truth “predicate” is shown to have a non-predicative function by performative or expressivist analysis, or because truth “predicates” must be traded in for predicates of the form “true-in-L”; (ii) truth predi…Read more
-
67Makin's Ontological Argument (Again)Philosophy 68 (264). 1993.This paper is a reply to Stephen Makin's response to my previous criticism of his defense of a conceptual ontological argument. (All relevant bibliographical details are provided in this paper.).
-
728Pruss's ontological argumentsReligious Studies 45 (3): 355-363. 2009.First, I suggest that it is possible to make some further improvements upon the Gödelian ontological arguments that Pruss develops. Then, I argue that it is possible to parody Pruss's Gödelian ontological arguments in a way that shows that they make no contribution towards 'lowering the probability of atheism and raising the probability of theism'. I conclude with some remarks about ways in which the arguments of this paper can be extended to apply to the whole family of Gödelian ontological arg…Read more
-
564Divine CausationTopoi 36 (4): 641-650. 2017.This paper compares the doxastic credentials of the claim that nothing comes from nothing with the doxastic credentials of the claim that there is no causing without changing. I argue that comparison of these two claims supports my contention that considerations about causation do nothing to make theism more attractive than naturalism.
-
284Why semantic innocence?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4). 1992.This paper rejects the imposition of "semantic innocence" as a constraint on semantic theories. In particular, it argues that recent attempts to justify the imposition of "semantic innocence" as a constraint on semantic theories fail.
-
1219Logic and TheismPhilo 9 (1): 73-91. 2006.This paper is a critical review of Howard Sobel’s ’Logic and Theism’. I discuss his analyses of ontological arguments, cosmological arguments, teleological arguments, and arguments from evil, and comment upon his accounts of Pascal’s wager and Hume on miracles. My overall judgment is that this is the very best book on arguments about the existence of God that has yet appeared.
-
133PhilosophyIn Mark Cobb, Christina Puchalski & Bruce Rumbold (eds.), The Textbook of Spirituality in Healthcare, Oxford University Press. pp. 77-82. 2012.This paper provides a discussion of philosophy as it bears on spirituality and healthcase. Topics take up include: flourishing; health; disease; spirituality; adversity, virtue; and religion.
-
264Creationism on trialSophia 42 (2): 113-127. 2003.This paper discusses the judgment of Judge William Overton in McLean vs. Arkansas Board of Education (1982), and the subsequent philosophical literature that discusses this judgment.
-
205Reply to LangtrySophia 40 (1): 73-80. 2001.This paper is a response to Bruce Langtry's criticisms of views advanced in my book *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God*. In particular, the paper discusses his criticisms of "the general objection" to ontological arguments that is developed in that work.
-
464Is God Good by Definition?Religious Studies 28 (4). 1992.As a matter of historical fact, most philosophers and theologians who have defended traditional theistic views have been moral realists. Some "divine command" theorists have held that the good is constituted by the content of divine approval -i.e. that things are good because, and insofar as, they have divine approval. However, even amongst those theists who hold that the good is independently constituted -i.e. those who hold that God's pattern of approval is explained by the fact that he approv…Read more
-
81Williamson and the Contingent A PrioriAnalysis 47 (4). 1987.This paper is a response to Tim Williamson's "The Contingent A Priori: Has It Anything To Do With Indexicals?" In that paper, Williamson claims to have produced an instance of a deeply contingent a priori truth that in no way turns on indexicals. In this paper, I suggest that Williamson has failed to substantiate this claim. In particular, I claim that one cannot know a priori that there is at least one believer without relying on some kind of indexicality.
-
372On Davies' institutional definition of artSouthern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3): 371-382. 1991.This paper is a critique of Stephen Davies' institutional definition of art. I argue that Davies' definition suffers from a range of problems.
-
439Abstract objects? Who cares!Bloomsbury Academic. 2014.This is my main contribution to P. Gould (ed.) Beyond the Control of God?: Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects Bloomsbury. (The other contibutors to this work are: Keith Yandell; Paul Gould and Rich Davis; Greg Welty; William Lane Craig; and Scott Shalkowski.) I argue that, when it comes to a comparative assessment of the merits of theism and atheism, it makes no difference whether one opts for realism or fictionalism concerning abstract objects.
-
348Review of Timothy O'Connor, Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6). 2008.This paper is a review of the cosmological argument that Tim O'Connor defends in "Theism and Ultimate Explanation".
-
1089Time, Successive Addition, and Kalam Cosmological ArgumentsPhilosophia Christi 3 (1): 181-192. 2001.Craig (1981) presents and defends several different kalam cosmological arguments. The core of each of these arguments is the following ur argument.
-
611OmnipotencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1). 2005.Recently, many philosophers have supposed that the divine attribute of omnipotence is properly understood as some kind of maximal power. I argue that all of the best known attempts to analyse omnipotence in terms of maximal power are multiply flawed. Moreover, I argue that there are compelling reasons for supposing that, on orthodox theistic conceptions, maximal power is not one of the divine attributes.
-
34A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (edited book)Monash University Publishing. 2010.Companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. (Revised edition.) Covers: department, people, institutions, and topics that have been prominent in philosophical work in Australia and New Zealand.
-
226To judge from the dust-jacket, this book has received a considerable amount of praise--and not just from the usual suspects. In particular, the publishers seem keen to promulgate the view that there is widespread support for the claim that Overman makes a clear, compelling, and well-argued case for the conclusions which he wishes to defend. However, it seems to me that those cited on the dust-jacket--Pannenberg ("lucid and sobering arguments"), Polkinghorne ("scrupulously argued"), Nicholi ("com…Read more
-
718GodIn Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, Continuum Publishing. pp. 246-68. 2012.This paper argues that considerations about causal origins of the universe do not favour theism over naturalism. Indeed, if the only data that is relevant to the choice between theism and naturalism is data about causal origins, then it turns out that considerations about causal origins favour naturalism over theism.
-
231Truth and GodProceedings of the Aristotelian Society: The Virtual Issue 1 (1). 2013.This paper was part of a special online issue on Truth. I critically discuss Peter Geach's paper "Truth and God".
-
752Modal theistic argumentsSophia 32 (2): 17-24. 1993.This paper discusses a range of modal ontological arguments. It is claimed that these modal ontological arguments fail because they depend upon controversial assumptions about the nature of modal space.
-
972Minimalism and truth aptnessMind 103 (411). 1994.This paper, while neutral on questions about the minimality of truth, argues for the non-minimality of truth-aptness.
-
394Pascal's Wager is a possible bet (but not a very good one): Reply to Harmon Holcomb IIIInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40 (2). 1996.In "To Bet The Impossible Bet", Harmon Holcomb III argues: (i) that Pascal's wager is structurally incoherent; (ii) that if it were not thus incoherent, then it would be successful; and (iii) that my earlier critique of Pascal's wager in "On Rescher On Pascal's Wager" is vitiated by its reliance on "logicist" presuppositions. I deny all three claims. If Pascal's wager is "incoherent", this is only because of its invocation of infinite utilities. However, even if infinite utilities are admissible…Read more
-
302Evil Beyond the Burden of Belief (review)Philo 3 (2): 104-107. 2000.Review of *Suffering Belief: Evil and the Anglo-American Defence of Theism* (by Andrea Weisberger). This paper was originally published at the Secular Web; it was later published in *Philo*. Details here are to the publication in *Philo*.
-
419Review 'The Rationality of Theism', ed. by P. Copan and P. Moser (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3): 535-8. 2004.Critical review of *The Rationality of Theism*, a collection of new essays edited by Paul Copan and Paul Moser.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |