-
647'The Divine Lawmaker', by John Foster (review)Faith and Philosophy 23 (1): 111-16. 2006.Short, critical review of John Foster's book *The Divine Lawmaker*
-
640Does The Universe Have A Cause?In Michael Peterson & Robert Van Arragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 1-26. 2020.In this paper, I set out a fairly careful argument for the claim that natural reality ("the universe') does not have--and could not have--a cause. I being with a discussion of the question whether causal reality could have a cause. I claim that it is obvious that causal reality cannot have a cause. I then turn to a discussion of natural reality. I contend that, necessarily, natural reality exhausts causal reality: necessarily, natural reality and causal reality are one and the same. Given that i…Read more
-
633Objection to a simplified ontological argumentAnalysis 71 (1): 105-106. 2011.This paper offers a short extension of the dialogue between Anselm and the Fool that is contained in "The Ontological Argument Simplified" by Gary Matthews and Lynne Rudder Baker. My extension of the dialogue ends with the Fool proclaiming that "what looks like an argument of elegant simplicity turns out to be no argument at all".
-
632Inverse Operations with Transfinite Numbers and the Kalam Cosmological ArgumentInternational Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2): 219-221. 1995.William Lane Craig has argued that there cannot be actual infinities because inverse operations are not well-defined for infinities. I point out that, in fact, there are mathematical systems in which inverse operations for infinities are well-defined. In particular, the theory introduced in John Conway's *On Numbers and Games* yields a well-defined field that includes all of Cantor's transfinite numbers.
-
631Infinity in Pascal's WagerIn Paul F. A. Bartha & Lawrence Pasternack (eds.), Pascal’s Wager, Cambridge University Press. pp. 260-77. 2018.Bartha (2012) conjectures that, if we meet all of the other objections to Pascal’s wager, then the many-Gods objection is already met. Moreover, he shows that, if all other objections to Pascal’s wager are already met, then, in a choice between a Jealous God, an Indifferent God, a Very Nice God, a Very Perverse God, the full range of Nice Gods, the full range of Perverse Gods, and no God, you should wager on the Jealous God. I argue that his requirement of [strongly] stable equilibrium is not we…Read more
-
627Review: Daniel A. Dombrowski: Rethinking the Ontological Argument: A Neoclassical Theistic Response (review)Mind 117 (467): 690-693. 2008.Critical review of Daniel Dombrowski's "Rethinking the Ontological Argument".
-
611Hume and the argument for biological designBiology and Philosophy 11 (4): 519-534. 1996.There seems to be a widespread conviction — evidenced, for example, in the work of Mackie, Dawkins and Sober — that it is Darwinian rather than Humean considerations which deal the fatal logical blow to arguments for intelligent design. I argue that this conviction cannot be well-founded. If there are current logically decisive objections to design arguments, they must be Humean — for Darwinian considerations count not at all against design arguments based upon apparent cosmological fine-tuning.…Read more
-
601OmnipotencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1). 2005.Recently, many philosophers have supposed that the divine attribute of omnipotence is properly understood as some kind of maximal power. I argue that all of the best known attempts to analyse omnipotence in terms of maximal power are multiply flawed. Moreover, I argue that there are compelling reasons for supposing that, on orthodox theistic conceptions, maximal power is not one of the divine attributes.
-
600Faulty Reasoning About Default Principles in Cosmological ArgumentsFaith and Philosophy 21 (2): 242-249. 2004.Robert Koons claims that my previous critique of his “new” cosmological argument is vitiated by confusion about the nature of defeasible argumentation.In response, I claim that Koons misrepresents—and perhaps misunderstands—the nature of my objections to his “new” cosmological argument. The main claims which I defend are: (1) that the move from a non-defeasible to a defeasible causal principle makes absolutely no difference to the success of the cosmological argument in which it is contained; an…Read more
-
597Consciousness, theism, and naturalismIn J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister & K. Sweis (eds.), Debating Christian Theism, Oxford University Press. pp. 131-46. 2013.I discuss J. P. Moreland's arguments from consciousness. I argue for the conclusion that considerations about consciousness favor naturalism over theism.
-
593Higher-order ontological argumentsPhilosophy Compass 3 (5): 1066-1078. 2008.This paper discusses recent work on higher-order ontological arguments, including work on arguments due to Gödel, Maydole and Pruss. After setting out a range of these arguments, the paper seeks to highlight the principal difficulties that these kinds of arguments confront. One important aim of the paper is to cast light on Gödel's ontological argument by way of an examination of a range of related higher-order arguments.
-
591Maydole’s Modal Perfection Argument (Again)Philo 10 (1): 72-84. 2007.In “On Oppy’s Objections to the Modal Perfection Argument,” Philo 8, 2, 2005, 123–30, Robert Maydole argues that his modal perfection argument—set out in his “The Modal Perfection Argument for a Supreme Being,” Philo 6, 2, 2003, 299–313—“remains arguably sound” in the face of the criticisms that I made of this argument in my “Maydole’s 2QS5 Argument,” Philo 7, 2, 2004, 203–11. I reply that Maydole is wrong: his argument is fatally flawed, and his attempts to avoid the criticisms that I have made…Read more
-
572Semantics for propositional attitude ascriptionsPhilosophical Studies 67 (1). 1992.This paper provides a semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions. (In this respect, the title of the paper is quite well chosen.)
-
572Morality Does Not Depend On GodIn Problems in Value Theory: An Introduction to Contemporary Debates, Bloomsbury. pp. 105-16. 2020.Naturalists have many and diverse reasons for thinking that morality does not depend upon God. In this paper, I do not aim to give an exhaustive inventory of these reasons. Rather, I aim to give reason that emerge from the kind of naturalism that I accept. After explaining what I mean by "God", "morality" and "dependence", I note that, on the kind of naturalism that I accept, it is impossible that God exists. Unsurprisingly, therefore, I hold that it is impossible that morality depends on God. W…Read more
-
560Weak agnosticism defendedInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36 (3). 1994.Agnosticism has had some bad press in recent years. Nonetheless, I hope to show that agnosticism can be so formulated that it is no less philosophically respectable than theism and atheism. This is not a mere philosophical exercise; for, as it happens, the formulated position is--I think--the one to which I subscribe. I include a qualification here since it may be that the position to which I subscribe is better characterised as fallibilist atheism--but more of that anon
-
553“Uncaused Beginnings” RevisitedFaith and Philosophy 32 (2): 205-210. 2015.This paper is a response to William Lane Craig's criticisms of my previous paper "Uncaused Beginnings". I argue that Craig's criticisms do not inflict any damage on the arguments of that earlier paper.
-
543The Ontological Argument (Cambridge Classic Philosophical Arguments Series) (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2018.In this Introduction, we begin with two relatively uncontroversial matters: the broad contours of the history of discussion of ontological arguments, and the major topics that require discussion in connection with ontological arguments. We then move on to consideration of the much more difficult task of the characterisation of ontological arguments—i.e. the task of saying exactly what ontological arguments are and explaining how they differ from, say, cosmological, teleological, and moral argume…Read more
-
539Charlesworth on Philosophy and ReligionIn Peter Wong, Sherah Bloor, Patrick Hutchings & Purushottama Bilimoria (eds.), Considering Religions, Rights and Bioethics: For Max Charlesworth, Springer Verlag. pp. 219-232. 2019.Max Charlesworth’s Philosophy and Religion: From Plato to Postmodernism is an erudite and scholarly work, grounded in an impressive command of the history of philosophy of religion. However, despite its many virtues, the work has some serious shortcomings, due more to what it overlooks than to what it includes. In this paper, I review Charlesworth’s taxonomy of approaches to philosophy of religion, and argue for an alternative taxonomy that does more justice to the diversity of religions and the…Read more
-
528Divine CausationTopoi 36 (4): 641-650. 2017.This paper compares the doxastic credentials of the claim that nothing comes from nothing with the doxastic credentials of the claim that there is no causing without changing. I argue that comparison of these two claims supports my contention that considerations about causation do nothing to make theism more attractive than naturalism.
-
528As the chapter headings--and title--reveal, the book is about the role of causation and chance in modern science, and, in particular, in modern cosmology. However, because the book is shot through with serious conceptual confusion, anyone who is interested in actually learning something about the role of causation and chance in modern science is advised to look elsewhere.
-
516Maydole’s 2QS5 ArgumentPhilo 7 (2): 203-211. 2004.This paper is a reply to Robert Maydole’s “The Modal Perfection Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being,” published in Philo 6, 2, 2003. I argue that Maydole’s Modal Perfection Argument fails, and that there is no evident way in which it can be repaired.
-
510Leftow on God and NecessityEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (3): 5-16. 2014.This paper is a critical examination of some of the major themes of Brian Leftow's book *God and Necessity*.
-
504Reply to professor CraigSophia 34 (2): 15-29. 1995.I hold that the considerations adduced in kalam cosmological arguments do not embody reasons for reflective atheists and agnostics to embrace the conclusion of those arguments, viz. that the universe had a cause of its existence. I do not claim to be able to show that reflective theists could not reasonably believe that those arguments are sound; indeed, I am prepared to concede that it is epistemically possible that the arguments procede validly from true premises. However, I am prepared to mak…Read more
-
498Review of P. Copan and Craig, W. (eds.) The Kalām Cosmological Argument Volume Two: Scientific Evidence for the Beginning of the Universe (review)European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3): 225-229. 2019.This is a commissioned review of Copan, P. and Craig, W. The Kalām Cosmological Argument Volume Two: Scientific Evidence for the Beginning of the Universe New York: Bloomsbury, US$172.50, ISBN 978-1-50-133587-7
-
493This paper investigates the question whether we could have reason to believe that time is two-dimensional. I connect discussion of this question to discussion of the question whether we could have reason to believe that there has been a global time freeze.
-
474Review of Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., The Kalām Cosmological Argument (2 vols) (review)Philosophia Christi 21 (2): 445-449. 2019.This is a review of *The Kalām Cosmological Argument* (edited by Paul Copan and William Lane Craig). In this review, I focus primarily on the papers in the first volume by Waters, Loke, and Oderberg. (I have also written an independent review of the second volume.)
-
474On Functional Definitions Of Art: A Response to RoweBritish Journal of Aesthetics 33 (1): 67-71. 1993.This paper is a critical assessment of M. W. Rowe's functional definition of art.
-
470Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (review)Faith and Philosophy 13 (1): 125-133. 1996.This paper is a critical review of *Big Bang Cosmology* by Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. (The book is a collection of previously published papers; most are concerned, in one way or another, with kalam cosmological arguments for the existence of God.).
-
469Review : 'God and Design', ed. by N. Manson (review)Sophia 43 (1): 127-31. 2004.Review of Neil Manson's excellent anthology on arguments for design.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |