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945Countable fusion not yet proven guilty: it may be the Whiteheadian account of space whatdunnitAnalysis 57 (4): 249-253. 1997.I criticise a paper by Peter Forrest in which he argues that a principle of unrestricted countable fusion has paradoxical consequences. I argue that the paradoxical consequences that he exhibits may be due to his Whiteheadean assumptions about the nature of spacetime rather than to the principle of unrestricted countable fusion.
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1006Response to GettingsAnalysis 60 (4): 363-367. 2000.This article is a reply to Michael Gettings' criticisms of a previous paper of mine on Godel's ontological argument. (All relevant bibliographical details may be found in the article.) I provide a patch to my previous -- faulty -- attempt to provide a parody of Godel's ontological argument on the model of Gaunilo's parody of Anselm's Proslogion 2 argument.
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801Judging theistic argumentsSophia 37 (2): 30-43. 1998.This paper is a response to an earlier paper by Mark Nelson in which he argues for the claim that the best judges of the merits of arguments for the existence of God are theists whose belief in God is properly basic. I criticise Nelson's argument, and pursue some questions about the significance of the conclusion for which he argues.
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773On behalf of the foolAnalysis 71 (2): 304-306. 2011.This paper responds to a previous paper by Gary Matthews and Lynne Rudder Baker. Their paper, in turn, was a response to my reply to an even earlier paper of theirs. (The relevant bibliographical details are in this paper.) They claim to have a new, improved, simple ontological argument. I argue that the new, simple ontological argument is not, in any way, improved.
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6310Arguments for the existence of GodOxford Bibliographies Online. 2012.This is the text of my OBO entry on arguments for the existence of God.
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550Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4): 519-521. 1999.Book review.
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2226Godelian ontological argumentsAnalysis 56 (4): 226-230. 1996.This paper aims to show that Godel's ontological argument can be parodied in much the same kind of way in which Gaunilo parodied Anselm's Proslogion argument. The parody in this paper fails; there is a patch provided in "Reply to Gettings" (Analysis 60, 4, 2000, 363-7).
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2621Theism in Western PhilosophyIn Charles Taliaferro, Victoria S. Harrison & Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Theism, Routledge. pp. 11. 2012.This chapter provides a quick sketch of the history of western philosophy of religion as it bears on theism.
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2292Minimalism and truthNoûs 31 (2): 170-196. 1997.This paper canvasses the various dimensions along which theories of truth may disagree about the extent to which truth is minimal.
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546Review of "Bangs, crunches, shrieks, whispers" by J Earman (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2): 352-4. 1998.Positive review of John Earman's *Bangs, Crunches, Shrieks, Whispers*.
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880Facing facts?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4). 2004.In his recent book, Stephen Neale provides an extended defence of the claim that Gödel's slingshot has dramatic consequences for fact theorists (and, in particular, for fact theorists who look with favour on referential treatments of definite descriptions). I argue that the book-length treatment provides no strengthening of the case that Neale has made elsewhere for this implausible claim. Moreover, I also argue that various criticisms of Neale's case that I made on a previous occasion have met …Read more
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2477Uncaused BeginningsFaith and Philosophy 27 (1): 61-71. 2010.I defend the view that it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the causal relation even though it is impossible for any other (non-overlapping) parts of reality to have no cause. I claim that, while there are good theoretical and commonsense grounds for maintaining that it is simply not possible for non-initial parts of reality to have no cause, these good grounds do not require one to claim that it is impossible that reality has an uncaused initial state.
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1017Norms of assertionIn Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Routledge. pp. 5--226. 2012.This chapter discusses norms of assertion. I defend the view that the sole constitutive norm of assertion is that you should not assert what you do not believe. I also discuss the views of some--e.g. Grice, Williamson--who have defended the stronger view that the sole constitutive norm of assertion is that you should not assert what you do not know.
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Language |