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Graham Oppy

Monash University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    253
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    12
  •  News and Updates
    108
  •  Philosophical Views

 More details
  • Monash University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Princeton University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1990
Email (login required)
Homepage
0000-0003-0453-2250
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
  • All publications (253)
  •  550
    Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4): 519-521. 1999.
    Book review.
    Ontology, MiscMetaphysics, General Works
  •  2225
    Godelian ontological arguments
    Analysis 56 (4): 226-230. 1996.
    This paper aims to show that Godel's ontological argument can be parodied in much the same kind of way in which Gaunilo parodied Anselm's Proslogion argument. The parody in this paper fails; there is a patch provided in "Reply to Gettings" (Analysis 60, 4, 2000, 363-7).
    Anselm's Ontological ArgumentOntological Arguments for Theism, Misc
  •  2621
    Theism in Western Philosophy
    In Charles Taliaferro, Victoria S. Harrison & Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Theism, Routledge. pp. 11. 2012.
    This chapter provides a quick sketch of the history of western philosophy of religion as it bears on theism.
    Philosophy of Religion, General WorksPhilosophy of Religion, Misc
  •  1017
    Norms of assertion
    In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Routledge. pp. 5--226. 2012.
    This chapter discusses norms of assertion. I defend the view that the sole constitutive norm of assertion is that you should not assert what you do not believe. I also discuss the views of some--e.g. Grice, Williamson--who have defended the stronger view that the sole constitutive norm of assertion is that you should not assert what you do not know.
    Norms of AssertionAssertion, Misc
  •  2290
    Minimalism and truth
    with John O'Leary-Hawthorne
    Noûs 31 (2): 170-196. 1997.
    This paper canvasses the various dimensions along which theories of truth may disagree about the extent to which truth is minimal.
    Minimalism about TruthDeflationism about Truth, Misc
  •  546
    Review of "Bangs, crunches, shrieks, whispers" by J Earman (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2): 352-4. 1998.
    Positive review of John Earman's *Bangs, Crunches, Shrieks, Whispers*.
    Philosophy of Cosmology, MiscGeneral RelativityPhysics of TimePhilosophy of Physical Science, Miscel…Read more
    Philosophy of Cosmology, MiscGeneral RelativityPhysics of TimePhilosophy of Physical Science, Miscellaneous
  •  880
    Facing facts?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4). 2004.
    In his recent book, Stephen Neale provides an extended defence of the claim that Gödel's slingshot has dramatic consequences for fact theorists (and, in particular, for fact theorists who look with favour on referential treatments of definite descriptions). I argue that the book-length treatment provides no strengthening of the case that Neale has made elsewhere for this implausible claim. Moreover, I also argue that various criticisms of Neale's case that I made on a previous occasion have met …Read more
    In his recent book, Stephen Neale provides an extended defence of the claim that Gödel's slingshot has dramatic consequences for fact theorists (and, in particular, for fact theorists who look with favour on referential treatments of definite descriptions). I argue that the book-length treatment provides no strengthening of the case that Neale has made elsewhere for this implausible claim. Moreover, I also argue that various criticisms of Neale's case that I made on a previous occasion have met with no successful resistance. If Neale is serious about facing facts, then he needs to face the fact that his central contentions are unsupportable.
    Theories of Reference, MiscFacts and States of AffairsRussell's Theory of Descriptions
  •  2477
    Uncaused Beginnings
    Faith and Philosophy 27 (1): 61-71. 2010.
    I defend the view that it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the causal relation even though it is impossible for any other (non-overlapping) parts of reality to have no cause. I claim that, while there are good theoretical and commonsense grounds for maintaining that it is simply not possible for non-initial parts of reality to have no cause, these good grounds do not require one to claim that it is impossible that reality has an uncaused initial state.
    Cosmological Arguments for Theism, MiscPhilosophy of Religion, MiscCausation, Misc
  •  1201
    Review: Daniel A. Dombrowski: Rethinking the Ontological Argument: A Neoclassical Theistic Response (review)
    Mind 117 (467): 690-693. 2008.
    Critical review of Daniel Dombrowski's "Rethinking the Ontological Argument".
    Anselm's Ontological ArgumentOntological Arguments for Theism, Misc
  •  2477
    Pantheism, Quantification and Mereology
    The Monist 80 (2): 320-336. 1997.
    I provide a classification of varieties of pantheism. I argue that there are two different kinds of commitments that pantheists have. On the one hand, there is an ontological commitment to the existence of a sum of all things. On the other hand, there is an ideological commitment: either collectively or distributively, the sum of all things is divine.
    MereologyPantheismOther ReligionsPhilosophy of Religion, MiscOntological Arguments for Theism, Misc
  •  1317
    Divine Causation
    Topoi 36 (4): 641-650. 2017.
    This paper compares the doxastic credentials of the claim that nothing comes from nothing with the doxastic credentials of the claim that there is no causing without changing. I argue that comparison of these two claims supports my contention that considerations about causation do nothing to make theism more attractive than naturalism.
    Divine Attributes, MiscCosmological Arguments for Theism, MiscCausation, MiscAtheism
  •  2917
    The Devilish Complexities of Divine Simplicity
    Philo 6 (1): 10-22. 2003.
    In On the Nature and Existence of God, Richard Gale follows majority opinion in giving very short shrift to the doctrine of divine simplicity: in his view, there is no coherent expressible doctrine of divine simplicity. Rising to the implicit challenge, I argue that---contrary to what is widely believed---there is a coherently expressible doctrine of divine simplicity, though it is rather different from the views that are typically expressed by defenders of this doctrine. At the very least, I th…Read more
    In On the Nature and Existence of God, Richard Gale follows majority opinion in giving very short shrift to the doctrine of divine simplicity: in his view, there is no coherent expressible doctrine of divine simplicity. Rising to the implicit challenge, I argue that---contrary to what is widely believed---there is a coherently expressible doctrine of divine simplicity, though it is rather different from the views that are typically expressed by defenders of this doctrine. At the very least, I think that I manage to show that there are ways of understanding the doctrine of divine simplicity that have not yet been adequately examined.
    Divine Simplicity
  •  1135
    Maydole’s Modal Perfection Argument (Again)
    Philo 10 (1): 72-84. 2007.
    In “On Oppy’s Objections to the Modal Perfection Argument,” Philo 8, 2, 2005, 123–30, Robert Maydole argues that his modal perfection argument—set out in his “The Modal Perfection Argument for a Supreme Being,” Philo 6, 2, 2003, 299–313—“remains arguably sound” in the face of the criticisms that I made of this argument in my “Maydole’s 2QS5 Argument,” Philo 7, 2, 2004, 203–11. I reply that Maydole is wrong: his argument is fatally flawed, and his attempts to avoid the criticisms that I have made…Read more
    In “On Oppy’s Objections to the Modal Perfection Argument,” Philo 8, 2, 2005, 123–30, Robert Maydole argues that his modal perfection argument—set out in his “The Modal Perfection Argument for a Supreme Being,” Philo 6, 2, 2003, 299–313—“remains arguably sound” in the face of the criticisms that I made of this argument in my “Maydole’s 2QS5 Argument,” Philo 7, 2, 2004, 203–11. I reply that Maydole is wrong: his argument is fatally flawed, and his attempts to avoid the criticisms that I have made of his argument are to no avail.
    Ontological Arguments for Theism, Misc
  •  6094
    Paley’s Argument for Design
    Philo 5 (2): 161-173. 2002.
    The main aim of this paper is to examine an almost universal assumption concerning the structure of Paley’s argument for design. Almost all commentators suppose that Paley’s argument is an inductive argument---either an argument by analogy or an argument by inference to the best explanation. I contend, on the contrary, that Paley’s argument is actually a straightforwardly deductive argument. Moreover, I argue that, when Paley’s argument is properly understood, it can readily be seen that it is n…Read more
    The main aim of this paper is to examine an almost universal assumption concerning the structure of Paley’s argument for design. Almost all commentators suppose that Paley’s argument is an inductive argument---either an argument by analogy or an argument by inference to the best explanation. I contend, on the contrary, that Paley’s argument is actually a straightforwardly deductive argument. Moreover, I argue that, when Paley’s argument is properly understood, it can readily be seen that it is no good. Finally---although I do not stress this very much---I note that the points that I make about Paley’s argument can carryover to modern design arguments that are based upon the argument that Paley actually gives.
    17th/18th Century British Philosophy, MiscFine-Tuning in CosmologyDesign Arguments for Theism, MiscI…Read more
    17th/18th Century British Philosophy, MiscFine-Tuning in CosmologyDesign Arguments for Theism, MiscIntelligent Design
  •  635
    Creationism on trial
    Sophia 42 (2): 113-127. 2003.
    This paper discusses the judgment of Judge William Overton in McLean vs. Arkansas Board of Education (1982), and the subsequent philosophical literature that discusses this judgment.
    AtheismPhilosophy of Religion, Misc
  •  567
    Some emendations to Leftow's arguments about time and eternity (1998)
    This paper discusses some views defended by Brian Leftow in his book *Time and Eternity*. There is a revised version of this paper that is incorporated into my later book *Describing Gods: An Investigation of Divine Attributes* (CUP, 2014).
    Divine EternityAspects of Time, Misc
  •  1095
    Library: Modern: : Review of R.c. Sproul's not a chance
    As the chapter headings--and title--reveal, the book is about the role of causation and chance in modern science, and, in particular, in modern cosmology. However, because the book is shot through with serious conceptual confusion, anyone who is interested in actually learning something about the role of causation and chance in modern science is advised to look elsewhere.
    Chance and Objective Probability, MiscFine-Tuning in CosmologyPhilosophy of Religion, MiscCosmologic…Read more
    Chance and Objective Probability, MiscFine-Tuning in CosmologyPhilosophy of Religion, MiscCosmological Arguments for Theism, MiscIntelligent Design
  •  1096
    On Rescher on Pascal's Wager
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (3). 1991.
    In Pascal's Wager: A Study Of Practical Reasoning In Philosophical Theology ,[1] Nicholas Rescher aims to show that, contrary to received philosophical opinion, Pascal's Wager argument is "the vehicle of a fruitful and valuable insight--one which not only represents a milestone in the development of an historically important tradition of thought but can still be seen as making an instructive contribution to philosophical theology".[2] In particular, Rescher argues that one only needs to adopt a …Read more
    In Pascal's Wager: A Study Of Practical Reasoning In Philosophical Theology ,[1] Nicholas Rescher aims to show that, contrary to received philosophical opinion, Pascal's Wager argument is "the vehicle of a fruitful and valuable insight--one which not only represents a milestone in the development of an historically important tradition of thought but can still be seen as making an instructive contribution to philosophical theology".[2] In particular, Rescher argues that one only needs to adopt a correct perspective in order to see that Pascal's Wager argument is a good argument. Moreover, there seems to be a certain amount of contemporary support for Rescher's claim that Pascal's Wager argument can be seen to be a good argument when properly construed .[3] However, despite this recent trend to adopt a more sympathetic stance towards Pascal's Wager argument, I propose to defend the traditional view that Pascal's Wager argument is almost entirely worthless--at least from the theological standpoint. (No doubt, it has historical significance from the standpoint of decision theory; but that's a separate matter.).
    Pascal's WagerBlaise Pascal
  •  1219
    Abstract objects? Who cares!
    Bloomsbury Academic. 2014.
    This is my main contribution to P. Gould (ed.) Beyond the Control of God?: Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects Bloomsbury. (The other contibutors to this work are: Keith Yandell; Paul Gould and Rich Davis; Greg Welty; William Lane Craig; and Scott Shalkowski.) I argue that, when it comes to a comparative assessment of the merits of theism and atheism, it makes no difference whether one opts for realism or fictionalism concerning abstract objects.
    Abstract ObjectsPhilosophy of Religion, General Works
  •  1213
    The non-esistence of god' by Nicholas Everitt (review)
    Philosophical Books 47 (2): 187-9. 2006.
    Positive review of Nicholas Everitt's *The Non-Existence of God*.
    Arguments Against Theism, Misc
  •  963
    Is God Good by Definition?
    Religious Studies 28 (4). 1992.
    As a matter of historical fact, most philosophers and theologians who have defended traditional theistic views have been moral realists. Some "divine command" theorists have held that the good is constituted by the content of divine approval -i.e. that things are good because, and insofar as, they have divine approval. However, even amongst those theists who hold that the good is independently constituted -i.e. those who hold that God's pattern of approval is explained by the fact that he approv…Read more
    As a matter of historical fact, most philosophers and theologians who have defended traditional theistic views have been moral realists. Some "divine command" theorists have held that the good is constituted by the content of divine approval -i.e. that things are good because, and insofar as, they have divine approval. However, even amongst those theists who hold that the good is independently constituted -i.e. those who hold that God's pattern of approval is explained by the fact that he approves of all and only that which is good -the dominant meta ethic has been strongly realistic.
    MonotheismDivine Goodness
  •  368
    Ontological arguments
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2014.
    Latest version of my SEP entry on ontological arguments, which first appeared in 1996. General discussion of ontological arguments. Includes a brief historical overview, a taxonomy of different kinds of ontological arguments, a brief survey of objections to the different kinds of ontological arguments identified in the taxonomy, and more extended discussions of Anselm's ontological argument (Proslogion 2), Godel's ontological argument, and Plantinga's ontological argument.
    Anselm's Ontological ArgumentOntological Arguments for Theism, Misc
  •  3618
    Anselm and the ontological argument
    In Jeff Jordan (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: The Key Thinkers, Continuum. pp. 22-43. 2011.
    This chapter gives an exposition and critique of Anselm's Proslogion II argument.
    AnselmAnselm's Ontological Argument
  •  354
    Review of 'Meinongian logic' by D Jacquette (review)
    Mind 107 (428): 894-8. 1998.
    Critical review of Dale Jacquette's *Meinongian Logic*
    Alexius MeinongPhilosophy of Language, General WorksLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc
  •  1264
    God
    In Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, Continuum Publishing. pp. 246-68. 2012.
    This paper argues that considerations about causal origins of the universe do not favour theism over naturalism. Indeed, if the only data that is relevant to the choice between theism and naturalism is data about causal origins, then it turns out that considerations about causal origins favour naturalism over theism.
    Arguments Against Theism, MiscAtheismArguments from Naturalism against Theism
  •  194
    Williamson and the Contingent A Priori
    Analysis 47 (4). 1987.
    This paper is a response to Tim Williamson's "The Contingent A Priori: Has It Anything To Do With Indexicals?" In that paper, Williamson claims to have produced an instance of a deeply contingent a priori truth that in no way turns on indexicals. In this paper, I suggest that Williamson has failed to substantiate this claim. In particular, I claim that one cannot know a priori that there is at least one believer without relying on some kind of indexicality.
    Apriority and NecessityTheories of the A PrioriThe A Priori, Misc
  •  1598
    Where’s the biff?
    with Toby Handfield, Charles R. Twardy, and Kevin B. Korb
    Erkenntnis 68 (2): 149-68. 2008.
    This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late pr…Read more
    This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preëmption and other cases that have proved problematic for causal models.
    Causal Accounts of ExplanationProcess Theories of CausationManipulability Theories of CausationCount…Read more
    Causal Accounts of ExplanationProcess Theories of CausationManipulability Theories of CausationCounterfactual Theories of CausationBayesian Reasoning, MiscCausal Modeling
  •  5236
    Review of Sobel's *Logic and Theism* (review)
    Philo 9 (1): 73-91. 2006.
    This is an extended critical review of Jordan Howard Sobel's magnum opus *Logic and Theism*.
    Philosophy of Religion, MiscOntological Arguments for Theism, MiscPascal's WagerCosmological Argumen…Read more
    Philosophy of Religion, MiscOntological Arguments for Theism, MiscPascal's WagerCosmological Arguments for Theism, MiscArguments for Theism, Misc
  •  700
    Evil Beyond the Burden of Belief (review)
    Philo 3 (2): 104-107. 2000.
    Review of *Suffering Belief: Evil and the Anglo-American Defence of Theism* (by Andrea Weisberger). This paper was originally published at the Secular Web; it was later published in *Philo*. Details here are to the publication in *Philo*.
    Arguments Against Theism, MiscThe Argument from EvilArguments from Naturalism against Theism
  •  2071
    Time, Successive Addition, and Kalam Cosmological Arguments
    Philosophia Christi 3 (1): 181-192. 2001.
    Craig (1981) presents and defends several different kalam cosmological arguments. The core of each of these arguments is the following ur argument.
    Kalam Cosmological ArgumentMathematical FinitismScience and ReligionThe Early UniverseCreation, Misc
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