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133Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary MaterialismCambridge University Press. 1982.The assumption of materialism Howard Robinson believes is false
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721Why phenomenal content is not intentionalEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2): 79-93. 2009.I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.
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176DualismStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is the theory that there is only one fundament…Read more
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113The Failure of Disjunctivism to Deal with "Philosophers' Hallucinations"In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, Mit Press. pp. 313-330. 2013.This chapter starts by restating the causal-hallucinatory argument against naive realism. This argument depends on the possibility of “philosophers' hallucinations.” It draws attention to the role of what the chapter refers to as the nonarbitrariness of philosophers' hallucinations in supporting this argument. The chapter then discusses three attempts to refute the argument. Two of them, those associated with John McDowell and with Michael Martin, are explicitly forms of disjunctivism. The third…Read more
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106Some externalist strategies and their problemsCroatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (7): 21-34. 2003.I claim that there are four major strands of argument for externalism and set out to discuss three of them. The four are: (A) That referential thoughts are object-dependent. This I do not discuss. (B) That the semantics of natural kind terms is externalist. (C) That all semantic content, even of descriptive terms, stems from the causal relations of representations to the things or properties they designate in the external world. (D) That, because meaning is a social product and no individual can…Read more
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1Physicalism, externalism and perceptual representationIn Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception, Ashgate. 1993.
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428A ’Trinitarian’ Theory of the SelfEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1): 181--195. 2013.I argue that the self is simple metaphysically, whilst being complex psychologically and that the persona that links these moments might be dubbed ”creativity’ or ”imagination’. This theory is trinitarian because it ascribes to the self these three ”features’ or ”moments’ and they bear at least some analogy with the Persons of the Trinity, as understood within the neo- platonic, Augustinian tradition.
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15The anti-materialist strategy and the "knowledge argument"In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 159--83. 1993.
Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |