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1Physicalism, externalism and perceptual representationIn Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception, Brookfield: Avebury. 1993.
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410A ’Trinitarian’ Theory of the SelfEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1): 181--195. 2013.I argue that the self is simple metaphysically, whilst being complex psychologically and that the persona that links these moments might be dubbed ”creativity’ or ”imagination’. This theory is trinitarian because it ascribes to the self these three ”features’ or ”moments’ and they bear at least some analogy with the Persons of the Trinity, as understood within the neo- platonic, Augustinian tradition.
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15The anti-materialist strategy and the "knowledge argument"In Objections to Physicalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 159--83. 1993.
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55Review of mark C. Baker, Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations Into the Existence of the Soul (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2). 2011.
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61Materialism in the philosophy of mindIn Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal, Routledge. 1998.
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291The Objects of Perceptual ExperienceAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1): 121-166. 1990.
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53Davidson and nonreductive materialism: A tale of two culturesIn Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge University Press. 2001.
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313The irrelevance of intentionality to perceptionPhilosophical Quarterly 24 (October): 300-315. 1974.
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297Selections from perceptionIn Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. pp. 153. 2009.
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13Perception, Knowledge and Belief (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3): 380-381. 2001.
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32Experience and externalism: A reply to Peter SmithProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 221-223. 1992.Howard Robinson; Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Page.
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411Varieties of Ontological ArgumentEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2): 41--64. 2012.I consider what I hope are increasingly sophisticated versions of ontological argument, beginning from simple definitional forms, through three versions to be found in Anselm, with their recent interpretations by Malcolm, Plantinga, Klima and Lowe. I try to show why none of these work by investigating both the different senses of necessary existence and the conditions under which logically necessary existence can be brought to bear. Although none of these arguments work, I think that they lead t…Read more
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Behaviorism and stimulus materialismIn Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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The disappearance theoryIn Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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84Reply to Nathan: How to reconstruct the causal argument (review)Acta Analytica 20 (3): 7-10. 2005.Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate on…Read more
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1Matter: Turning the tablesIn Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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24Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter SmithProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1): 221-224. 1992.Howard Robinson; Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Page.
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3A dualist account of embodimentIn J. R. Smythies & J. Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. pp. 43-57. 1989.
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1Sense-Data, Intentionality, and Common SenseIn G. Forrai (ed.), Intentionality: Past and Future, Rodopi Ny. 2005.
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82Quality, Thought and ConsciousnessRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 203-216. 2010.My objective in this essay is to argue for two things. The first is that intellectual mental states are not physicalistically reducible, just as qualia are not reducible. The second is that thoughts and qualia are not as different as is sometimes believed, but not because thoughts are qualia-like by being mental images, but because qualia are universals and their apprehension is a proto-intellectual act. I shall mainly be concerned with the first of these topics
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27How to give analytical rigour to 'soupy' metaphysicsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (1). 1997.(1997). How to Give Analytical Rigour to ‘Soupy’ Metaphysics∗. Inquiry: Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 95-113.
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3512 Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted MaryIn Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 223. 2008.
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168DualismIn Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. pp. 85--101. 2002.This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is the theory that there is only one fundament…Read more
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67Thought Experiments, Ontology, and Concept-Dependent TruthmakersThe Monist 87 (4): 537-553. 2004.Thought experiments are usually employed by philosophers as a tool in conceptual analysis. We pose ourselves questions such as “Would it be the same F if p?” or “Would it count as knowledge if q,” where p and q state some bizarre circumstances that are unlikely actually to occur and may even be beyond current technical possibility. The answers we are inclined to give to such questions are held to throw light on the nature of our concepts of, in these cases, identity and knowledge. But the facts …Read more
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112Relationalism Versus Representationalism: How Deep is the Divide? (review)Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248): 614-619. 2012.
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Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |