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68The Objects of Perceptual ExperienceAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1): 121-166. 1990.
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53Davidson and nonreductive materialism: A tale of two culturesIn Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge University Press. 2001.
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313The irrelevance of intentionality to perceptionPhilosophical Quarterly 24 (October): 300-315. 1974.
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298Selections from perceptionIn Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. pp. 153. 2009.
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14Perception, Knowledge and Belief (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3): 380-381. 2001.
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33Experience and externalism: A reply to Peter SmithProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 221-223. 1992.Howard Robinson; Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Page.
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427Varieties of Ontological ArgumentEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2): 41--64. 2012.I consider what I hope are increasingly sophisticated versions of ontological argument, beginning from simple definitional forms, through three versions to be found in Anselm, with their recent interpretations by Malcolm, Plantinga, Klima and Lowe. I try to show why none of these work by investigating both the different senses of necessary existence and the conditions under which logically necessary existence can be brought to bear. Although none of these arguments work, I think that they lead t…Read more
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Behaviorism and stimulus materialismIn Howard Robinson (ed.), Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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The disappearance theoryIn Howard Robinson (ed.), Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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84Reply to Nathan: How to reconstruct the causal argument (review)Acta Analytica 20 (3): 7-10. 2005.Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate on…Read more
Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |