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133Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary MaterialismCambridge University Press. 1982.The assumption of materialism Howard Robinson believes is false
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172DualismStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is the theory that there is only one fundament…Read more
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677Why phenomenal content is not intentionalEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2): 79-93. 2009.I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.
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112The Failure of Disjunctivism to Deal with "Philosophers' Hallucinations"In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, Mit Press. pp. 313-330. 2013.This chapter starts by restating the causal-hallucinatory argument against naive realism. This argument depends on the possibility of “philosophers' hallucinations.” It draws attention to the role of what the chapter refers to as the nonarbitrariness of philosophers' hallucinations in supporting this argument. The chapter then discusses three attempts to refute the argument. Two of them, those associated with John McDowell and with Michael Martin, are explicitly forms of disjunctivism. The third…Read more
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106Some externalist strategies and their problemsCroatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (7): 21-34. 2003.I claim that there are four major strands of argument for externalism and set out to discuss three of them. The four are: (A) That referential thoughts are object-dependent. This I do not discuss. (B) That the semantics of natural kind terms is externalist. (C) That all semantic content, even of descriptive terms, stems from the causal relations of representations to the things or properties they designate in the external world. (D) That, because meaning is a social product and no individual can…Read more
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1Physicalism, externalism and perceptual representationIn Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception, Brookfield: Avebury. 1993.
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405A ’Trinitarian’ Theory of the SelfEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1): 181--195. 2013.I argue that the self is simple metaphysically, whilst being complex psychologically and that the persona that links these moments might be dubbed ”creativity’ or ”imagination’. This theory is trinitarian because it ascribes to the self these three ”features’ or ”moments’ and they bear at least some analogy with the Persons of the Trinity, as understood within the neo- platonic, Augustinian tradition.
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15The anti-materialist strategy and the "knowledge argument"In Objections to Physicalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 159--83. 1993.
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55Review of mark C. Baker, Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations Into the Existence of the Soul (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2). 2011.
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61Materialism in the philosophy of mindIn Edward Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge. 1998.
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53Davidson and nonreductive materialism: A tale of two culturesIn Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge University Press. 2001.
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290The Objects of Perceptual ExperienceAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1): 121-166. 1990.
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313The irrelevance of intentionality to perceptionPhilosophical Quarterly 24 (October): 300-315. 1974.
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297Selections from perceptionIn Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. pp. 153. 2009.
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13Perception, Knowledge and Belief (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3): 380-381. 2001.
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32Experience and externalism: A reply to Peter SmithProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 221-223. 1992.Howard Robinson; Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Page.
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Behaviorism and stimulus materialismIn Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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411Varieties of Ontological ArgumentEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2): 41--64. 2012.I consider what I hope are increasingly sophisticated versions of ontological argument, beginning from simple definitional forms, through three versions to be found in Anselm, with their recent interpretations by Malcolm, Plantinga, Klima and Lowe. I try to show why none of these work by investigating both the different senses of necessary existence and the conditions under which logically necessary existence can be brought to bear. Although none of these arguments work, I think that they lead t…Read more
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The disappearance theoryIn Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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84Reply to Nathan: How to reconstruct the causal argument (review)Acta Analytica 20 (3): 7-10. 2005.Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate on…Read more
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1Matter: Turning the tablesIn Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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24Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter SmithProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1): 221-224. 1992.Howard Robinson; Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Page.
Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |