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298Selections from perceptionIn Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. pp. 153. 2009.
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13Perception, Knowledge and Belief (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3): 380-381. 2001.
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33Experience and externalism: A reply to Peter SmithProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 221-223. 1992.Howard Robinson; Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Page.
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Behaviorism and stimulus materialismIn Howard Robinson (ed.), Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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423Varieties of Ontological ArgumentEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2): 41--64. 2012.I consider what I hope are increasingly sophisticated versions of ontological argument, beginning from simple definitional forms, through three versions to be found in Anselm, with their recent interpretations by Malcolm, Plantinga, Klima and Lowe. I try to show why none of these work by investigating both the different senses of necessary existence and the conditions under which logically necessary existence can be brought to bear. Although none of these arguments work, I think that they lead t…Read more
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The disappearance theoryIn Howard Robinson (ed.), Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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84Reply to Nathan: How to reconstruct the causal argument (review)Acta Analytica 20 (3): 7-10. 2005.Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate on…Read more
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1Matter: Turning the tablesIn Howard Robinson (ed.), Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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24Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter SmithProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1): 221-224. 1992.Howard Robinson; Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Page.
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3A dualist account of embodimentIn John R. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. pp. 43-57. 1989.
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1Sense-Data, Intentionality, and Common SenseIn G. Forrai (ed.), Intentionality: Past and Future, Rodopi Ny. 2005.
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82Quality, Thought and ConsciousnessRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 203-216. 2010.My objective in this essay is to argue for two things. The first is that intellectual mental states are not physicalistically reducible, just as qualia are not reducible. The second is that thoughts and qualia are not as different as is sometimes believed, but not because thoughts are qualia-like by being mental images, but because qualia are universals and their apprehension is a proto-intellectual act. I shall mainly be concerned with the first of these topics
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27How to give analytical rigour to 'soupy' metaphysicsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (1). 1997.(1997). How to Give Analytical Rigour to ‘Soupy’ Metaphysics∗. Inquiry: Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 95-113.
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172DualismIn Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. pp. 85--101. 2002.This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is the theory that there is only one fundament…Read more
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3512 Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted MaryIn Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 223. 2008.
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67Thought Experiments, Ontology, and Concept-Dependent TruthmakersThe Monist 87 (4): 537-553. 2004.Thought experiments are usually employed by philosophers as a tool in conceptual analysis. We pose ourselves questions such as “Would it be the same F if p?” or “Would it count as knowledge if q,” where p and q state some bizarre circumstances that are unlikely actually to occur and may even be beyond current technical possibility. The answers we are inclined to give to such questions are held to throw light on the nature of our concepts of, in these cases, identity and knowledge. But the facts …Read more
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113Relationalism Versus Representationalism: How Deep is the Divide? (review)Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248): 614-619. 2012.
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133Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary MaterialismCambridge University Press. 1982.The assumption of materialism Howard Robinson believes is false
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175DualismStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is the theory that there is only one fundament…Read more
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711Why phenomenal content is not intentionalEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2): 79-93. 2009.I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.
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113The Failure of Disjunctivism to Deal with "Philosophers' Hallucinations"In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, Mit Press. pp. 313-330. 2013.This chapter starts by restating the causal-hallucinatory argument against naive realism. This argument depends on the possibility of “philosophers' hallucinations.” It draws attention to the role of what the chapter refers to as the nonarbitrariness of philosophers' hallucinations in supporting this argument. The chapter then discusses three attempts to refute the argument. Two of them, those associated with John McDowell and with Michael Martin, are explicitly forms of disjunctivism. The third…Read more
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106Some externalist strategies and their problemsCroatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (7): 21-34. 2003.I claim that there are four major strands of argument for externalism and set out to discuss three of them. The four are: (A) That referential thoughts are object-dependent. This I do not discuss. (B) That the semantics of natural kind terms is externalist. (C) That all semantic content, even of descriptive terms, stems from the causal relations of representations to the things or properties they designate in the external world. (D) That, because meaning is a social product and no individual can…Read more
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1Physicalism, externalism and perceptual representationIn Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception, Brookfield: Avebury. 1993.
Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |