•  70
    How to give analytical rigour to 'soupy' metaphysics
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (1). 1997.
    (1997). How to Give Analytical Rigour to ‘Soupy’ Metaphysics∗. Inquiry: Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 95-113.
  •  4
    A dualist account of embodiment
    In John R. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism, University of Virginia Press. pp. 43-57. 1989.
  •  1482
    Why phenomenal content is not intentional
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2): 79-93. 2009.
    I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.
  •  203
    Thought experiments are usually employed by philosophers as a tool in conceptual analysis. We pose ourselves questions such as “Would it be the same F if p?” or “Would it count as knowledge if q,” where p and q state some bizarre circumstances that are unlikely actually to occur and may even be beyond current technical possibility. The answers we are inclined to give to such questions are held to throw light on the nature of our concepts of, in these cases, identity and knowledge. But the facts …Read more
  •  396
    Dualism
    with Ralph Weir
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2026.
    This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of ideas. In general, dualism is the view that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil – or God and the Devil – are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that mind and body – or the mental and the physical – are, in some…Read more
  •  70
    The Nature of Perception (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1): 128-129. 2003.
  • Radu J. Bogdan, ed., D. M. Armstrong (review)
    Philosophy in Review 6 (5): 191-193. 1986.
  • A dualist perspective on psychological development
    Philosophical Perspectives 2 119-139. 1988.
  •  184
    The Failure of Disjunctivism to Deal with "Philosophers' Hallucinations"
    In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, Mit Press. pp. 313-330. 2013.
    This chapter starts by restating the causal-hallucinatory argument against naive realism. This argument depends on the possibility of “philosophers' hallucinations.” It draws attention to the role of what the chapter refers to as the nonarbitrariness of philosophers' hallucinations in supporting this argument. The chapter then discusses three attempts to refute the argument. Two of them, those associated with John McDowell and with Michael Martin, are explicitly forms of disjunctivism. The third…Read more
  •  125
    Some externalist strategies and their problems
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (7): 21-34. 2003.
    I claim that there are four major strands of argument for externalism and set out to discuss three of them. The four are: (A) That referential thoughts are object-dependent. This I do not discuss. (B) That the semantics of natural kind terms is externalist. (C) That all semantic content, even of descriptive terms, stems from the causal relations of representations to the things or properties they designate in the external world. (D) That, because meaning is a social product and no individual can…Read more
  •  163
    Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1): 221-224. 1992.
    Howard Robinson; Discussions: Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Page.
  •  913
    Varieties of Ontological Argument
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2): 41--64. 2012.
    I consider what I hope are increasingly sophisticated versions of ontological argument, beginning from simple definitional forms, through three versions to be found in Anselm, with their recent interpretations by Malcolm, Plantinga, Klima and Lowe. I try to show why none of these work by investigating both the different senses of necessary existence and the conditions under which logically necessary existence can be brought to bear. Although none of these arguments work, I think that they lead t…Read more
  •  16
    The anti-materialist strategy and the "knowledge argument"
    In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 159--83. 1993.
  •  1028
    A ’Trinitarian’ Theory of the Self
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1): 181--195. 2013.
    I argue that the self is simple metaphysically, whilst being complex psychologically and that the persona that links these moments might be dubbed ”creativity’ or ”imagination’. This theory is trinitarian because it ascribes to the self these three ”features’ or ”moments’ and they bear at least some analogy with the Persons of the Trinity, as understood within the neo- platonic, Augustinian tradition.
  •  426
    The irrelevance of intentionality to perception
    Philosophical Quarterly 24 (October): 300-315. 1974.