Burt Hopkins

Volume XVIII Special Issue: Gian-Carlo Rota and The End of Objectivity, 2019 Aim and Scope: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. Contributors: Gabriele Baratelli, Stefania Centrone, Giovanna C. Cifoletti, Jean-Marie Coquard, Steven Crowell, Deborah De Rosa, Daniele De Santis, Nicolas de Warren, Agnese Di Riccio, Aurlien Djian, Yuval Dolev, Mirja Hartimo, Burt C.Hopkins, Talia Leven, Ah Hyun Moon, Luis Niel, Fabrizio Palombi, Mario Ariel Gonzlez Porta, Gian-Carlo Rota, Michael Roubach, Franco Trabattoni and Michele Vagnetti. Submissions: Manuscripts, prepared for blind review, should be submitted to the Editors ([email protected] and [email protected]) electronically via e-mail attachments.

Husserl’s most systematic phenomenological work, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Ideas I) (Husserl, 2014), differentiates pure transcendental phenomenology, as an eidetic science, from the eidetic science of mathematics. In line with the tradition of transcendental philosophy arguably—ante rem—stretching back to Plato, Husserl contrasts transcendental phenomenology with mathematics and argues that its conceptuality cannot be appropriately articulated and conceived in analogy with mathematics. While both mathematics and transcendental phenomenology are eidetic sciences, phenomenology “belongs to a basic class of eidetic sciences … [that is] totally different from that to which the mathematical sciences belong” (Husserl, 2014, 136). The key differential between these two sciences on Husserl’s view concerns the nature of the essences that are the subject matter of each discipline. Mathematics deals with exact essences, which he characterizes as ideas in the Kantian sense. Phenomenology deals with inexact essences, which Husserl characterizes as morphological.

Volume XVIII Special Issue: Gian-Carlo Rota and The End of Objectivity, 2019 Aim and Scope: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. Contributors: Gabriele Baratelli, Stefania Centrone, Giovanna C. Cifoletti, Jean-Marie Coquard, Steven Crowell, Deborah De Rosa, Daniele De Santis, Nicolas de Warren, Agnese Di Riccio, Aurélien Djian, Yuval Dolev, Mirja Hartimo, Burt C. Hopkins, Talia Leven, Ah Hyun Moon, Luis Niel, Fabrizio Palombi, Mario Ariel González Porta, Gian-Carlo Rota, Michael Roubach, Franco Trabattoni and Michele Vagnetti. Submissions: Manuscripts, prepared for blind review, should be submitted to the Editors electronically via e-mail attachments.

I present the first systematic account in the literature of a Husserlian response to Natorp’s critique of Husserl’s account of the pre-givenness of both the absolute stream of lived-experience and its essencesEssences to reflectionReflections. My response is presented within the broader context of what I argue is Heidegger’s misappropriation of Natorp’s critique of the phenomenological limits of reflectionReflections in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenologyTranscendental phenomenology and the misguided French attempt to address Heidegger’s critique by introducing the dialectical notion of “pre-reflectivePre-reflective” consciousness to phenomenology. My Husserlian response shows that Husserl’s account of reflectionReflections in Ideas I is able to rebut Natorp’s critical claims that transcendental phenomenologyTranscendental phenomenology cannot access the streaming of the stream of lived-experience without “stilling” its flow and that a gap in Husserl’s account of the transformation of the natural phenomenonPhenomenon of reflectionReflections into transcendental reflectionReflections provides justification for Natorp’s criticism of the ambiguity of Husserl’s account in Ideas I of the givennessGivennesses of the essenceEssences of lived-experience investigated by transcendental phenomenologyTranscendental phenomenology.

On the basis of an analysis of Husserl’s account of the phenomenological problem of the Other in the Cartesian Meditations, I highlight its Leibnizian philosophical context. This context permits the non-Cartesian problem underlying Husserl’s account to come into relief, namely, that of the constitution of not just “the Other” but the multiplicity of Others and the corresponding problem of the constitution of the unity behind their community. I argue that both the “first person” approach to subjectivity and the “one ego, two attitudes” account of the distinction between empirical and transcendental egos elide Husserl’s non-Cartesian account of the constitutive source of the community of others.

I compare Plato’s and Husserl’s accounts of the non-original appearance and the original with a focus on their methodologies for distinguishing between them and the phenomenological—i.e., the answer to the question of the what and how of their appearance—criteria that drive their respective methodologies. I argue that Plato’s dialectical method is phenomenologically superior to Husserl’s reflective method in the case of phantasmata that function as apparitions. Plato’s method has the capacity to discern the apparition on the basis of criteria that appeal solely to its appearance, whereas Husserl’s method presupposes a non-apparent primitive distinction between the original qua primal impression and the phantasm as its reproductive modification. On the basis of Plato’s methodological superiority in this regard, I sketch a reformulation of the Husserlian approach to appearances guided by the original interrogative context of Plato’s dialectical account of the distinction between true and false appearances, eikones and phantasmata.

"Phenomenology was one of the twentieth century's major philosophical movements, and it continues to be a vibrant and widely studied subject today with relevance beyond philosophy in areas such as medicine and cognitive sciences. The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy is an outstanding guide and reference source to this important and fascinating topic. Comprising seventy-five chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook offers unparalleled coverage of the subject, and is divided into five clear parts: Phenomenology and the History of Philosophy Issues and Concepts in phnomenology Major Figures in Phenomenology Intersections Phenomenology in the World. Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy studying phenomenology, The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy is also suitable for those in related disciplines such as psychology, religion, literature, sociology and anthropology"--

The problem of ‘collective unity’ in the transcendental philosophies of Kant and Husserl is investigated on the basis of number’s exemplary ‘collective unity’. To this end, the investigation reconstructs the historical context of the conceptuality of the mathematics that informs Kant’s and Husserl’s accounts of manifold, intuition, and synthesis. On the basis of this reconstruction, the argument is advanced that the unity of number – not the unity of the ‘concept’ of number – is presupposed by each transcendental philosopher in their accounts of the transcendental foundation of manifold, intuition, and synthesis. This presupposition is ultimately traced to Kant’s and Husserl’s responses to Hume’s philosophy of human understanding and the critical limits of what Kant calls the ‘qualitative’ unity of transcendental consciousness. These critical limits are exposed in both philosophers’ attempts to account for that ‘qualitative’ unity on the basis of the ‘quantitative’ unity of number.

CONTENTS An Editor's Introduction INTRODUCTORY CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW HEIDEGGER'S ACADEMIC CAREER 1909-1930 A. Background (1889-1930) B. Lehrveranstaltungen/University Education and Teaching (1909-1930) C. Heidegger's Early Occasional Writings: A Chronological Bibliography PART I: STUDENT YEARS 1. Curricula Vitae 2. Two Essays for The Academician o Authority and Freedom (1910) o On a Philosophical Orientation for Academics (1911) 3. The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy (1912) 4. Recent Research in Logic (October-December 1912) 5. Meßkirch's Triduum: A Three-day Meditation on the War (January 1915) 6. Question and Judgment (July 1915) 7. The Concept of Time in the Science of History (July 1915) 8. The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus (1915): Supplements o Author's Notice (1917) o Conclusion: The Problem of Categories (1916) 9. On Schleiermacher's Second Speech "On the Essence of Religion" (1917) PART II: EARLY FREIBURG PERIOD 10. Letter to Engelbert Krebs on his Philosophical Conversion (1919) 11. Letter to Karl L÷with on his Philosophical Identity (1921) 12. Vita, with an Accompanying Letter to Georg Misch (June 1922) 13. Critical Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews (1920) 14. Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation (1922) PART III: THE MARBURG PERIOD 15. The Problem of Sin in Luther (February 1924) 16. The Concept of Time (July 1924) 17. Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle (December 1924) 18. Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview (Kassel Lectures, April 1925) 19. On the Essence of Truth, Pentecost Monday (May 24, 1926) 20. Letter Exchange with Karl L÷with on Being and Time (August 1927) 21. "Phenomenology," Draft B (of the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article), with Heidegger's Letter to Husserl (October 1927) 22. "Heidegger, Martin": Lexicon Article Attributed to Rudolf Bultmann (1927-1928) APPENDICES: SUPPLEMENTS BY HEIDEGGER'S CONTEMPORARIES Appendix I: Academic Evaluations of Heidegger by his Teachers and Peers A. Evaluation of Martin Heidegger's Dissertation by Arthur Schneider (July 1913) B. Evaluation of Dr. Heidegger's Habilitation by Heinrich Rickert (July 1915) C. Nomination for Associate Professor at G÷ttingen (November 1922) D. Nomination for Associate Professor at Marburg (December 1922) E. Nomination for Professor at Marburg (August 1925) F. Nomination for Husserl's Chair at Freiburg (February 1928) Appendix II: Husserl and Heidegger A. Their Correspondence to and about Each Other (1914-1934) B. "For Edmund Husserl on his Seventieth Birthday" (April 8, 1929) Appendix III: Karl L÷with's Impressions of Husserl and Heidegger, 1926-1927 Annotated Glossary Bibliography of GA-Editions of the Lecture Courses Select Secondary Bibliography.

The article explores the relationship between the philosopher and historian of mathematics Jacob Klein’s account of the transformation of the concept of number coincident with the invention of algebra and Husserl’s early investigations of the origin of the concept of number and his late account of the Galilean impulse to mathematize nature. Klein’s research is shown to present the historical context for Husserl’s twin failures in the Philosophy of Arithmetic, to provide a psychological foundation for the proper concept of number and to show how this concept of number functions as the mathematical foundation of universal arithmetic. The argument is advanced that one significant result of bringing together Klein’s and Husserl’s thought on these issues is the need to fine-tune Husserl’s Crisis project of desedimenting the mathematization of nature. Specifically, Klein’s research shows that “a ‘sedimented’ understanding of numbers” “is superposed upon the first stratum of ‘sedimented’ geometrical ‘evidences’” uncovered by Husserl’s fragmentary analyses of geometry in the Crisis. In addition, then, to the task of “the intentional-historical reactivation of the origin of geometry” recognized by Husserl as intrinsic to the reactivation of the origin of mathematical physics, Klein discloses a second task, that of “the reactivation” of the “complicated network of sedimented significances” that “underlies the ‘arithmetical’ understanding of geometry.”

This paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion is published here as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion will be published in the next volume of this journal as Part II. Part I first clarifies the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification I show that, in marked contrast to the prevailing approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concludes with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II will show how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, that is, the "collective unconscious, " can be phenomenologically accounted for if Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative approaches to the unconscious is attended to and such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious.

La manière dont Jacob Klein rend compte de l’historicité propre aux unités de base de la signification dans la pensée de la Grèce ancienne ainsi que de l’Europe moderne est présentée et étudiée en relation au « sens de l'être » dans la pensée phénoménologique heideggerienne et à la conception husserlienne de la signification ontologique instrumentale du calcul symbolique. Sur le fond des reconstructions kleiniennes des nombres éidétiques dans le Sophiste de Platon et de l’ontologie cartésienne des objets mathématiques indéterminés, deux affirmations se trouvent avancées, à savoir (1) que la composition « artithmologique » de l'être dans le Sophiste de Platon représente un défi par rapport au caractère prétendument fondamental du « sens » dans l’historicité heideggerienne de l’être et (2) que la constitution de la conceptualité propre aux unités de base du calcul symbolique excède celle de la conception husserlienne de leur « simple » instrumentalité.

Burt C. Hopkins - Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward Transcendental Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 271-273 Book Review Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward Transcendental Philosophy Steven Galt Crowell. Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning:Paths Toward Transcendental Philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001. Pp. xvii + 323. Cloth, $79.95. Paper, $27.95. The "space of meaning" announced in the title of the present collection of essays has both a historical and systematic referent. Historically, it refers to the fact that it is now "possible to recognize that what has distinguished philosophy in the twentieth century is not that it has concerned itself with language, but that, whether through the prism of language or not, it has concerned itself with meaning". Systematically, it refers to the issues that emerge when the project of transcendental phenomenology is explored in a manner that..

What is at stake for Jacob Klein in François Vieta’s analytical art is the birth of both the “modern concept of ‘number’ [Zahl], as it underlies symbolic calculi” and the expanded, in contrast to ancient Greek science, scope of the generality of mathematical science itself. Of the former, Klein writes that it “heralds a general conceptual transformation which extends over the whole of modern science”. The latter, he says, lends the “treatment” [πραγματεία] at issue in the ancient Greek mathematical idea of a “‘general treatment’ [καθόλου πραγματεία]” “a completely new sense” “within the system of ‘science.’” The generality of this new sense will concern both the method and object of science in what will come to be known as universal mathematics. This transformation of the basic concept and scope, initially of mathematics and then of “the system of knowledge in general”, “concerns first and foremost the concept of ἀριθμόσ itself”. As a result of “its transfer into a new conceptual dimension” —i.e., into the dimension in which both “the concept of ‘number’ [Zahl]... is itself... as is that which it means” “symbolic in nature”—a transfer that “becomes visible” “for the first time in Vieta’s ‘general analytic,’” there follows “a thoroughgoing modification of the means and aims of science.” Klein maintains that what this modification involves is “best characterized by a phrase... in which Vieta expresses the ultimate problem, the problem proper, of his ‘analytical art’: ‘Analytical art appropriates to itself by right the proud problem of problems, which is: TO LEAVE NO PROBLEM UNSOLVED’.”

James F. Sheridan Allegheny College As we come to the end of the century, an attentive student of con temporary European philosophy will no doubt be startled by a volume titled Husserl in Contemporary Context. Such philosophers are most likely to believe that Hussed has now been declared II classical" rather than a contemporary thinker or, worse, simply old fashioned. Access to Hussed today will most likely come through the allegedly definitive critiques of his work by Heidegger and Derrida and to a lesser extent through the readings of his work by Levinas and Merleau Ponty although Merleau-Ponty himself has been declared old fashioned by some postmodems. Hence, if by II contemporary" one understands the problematic set by the work of the late Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, et. al., Hussed's work seems strange indeed in such a contemporary context, seems better understood as the last gasp of philosophy dominated by metaphysics and thus fit only for inclusion in courses in the history of philosophy.