Gareth Lloyd

This introduction to the Common Knowledge symposium titled “Comparative Relativism” outlines a variety of intellectual contexts where placing the unlikely companion terms comparison and relativism in conjunction offers analytical purchase. If comparison, in the most general sense, involves the investigation of discrete contexts in order to elucidate their similarities and differences, then relativism, as a tendency, stance, or working method, usually involves the assumption that contexts exhibit, or may exhibit, radically different, incomparable, or incommensurable traits. Comparative studies are required to treat their objects as alike, at least in some crucial respects; relativism indicates the limits of this practice. Jensen argues that this seeming paradox is productive, as he moves across contexts, from Lévi-Strauss's analysis of comparison as an anthropological method to Peter Galison's history of physics, and on to the anthropological, philosophical, and historical examples offered in symposium contributions by Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Marilyn Strathern, and Isabelle Stengers. Comparative relativism is understood by some to imply that relativism comes in various kinds and that these have multiple uses, functions, and effects, varying widely in different personal, historical, and institutional contexts that can be compared and contrasted. Comparative relativism is taken by others to encourage a “comparison of comparisons,” in order to relativize what different peoples—say, Western academics and Amerindian shamans—compare things “for.” Jensen concludes that what is compared and relativized in this symposium are the methods of comparison and relativization themselves. He ventures that the contributors all hope that treating these terms in juxtaposition may allow for new configurations of inquiry

Ever since the famous study by Berlin and Kay (1969), colour perception has been cited as one of the prime examples where, despite great surface diversity, robust cross-cultural universals can be found. They found that although colour terminologies appear to differ so widely, these colour terminologies exhibited certain patterns and even obeyed certain general laws. But this apparent vindication of the psychic unity of humans can be challenged not just from the viewpoint of cultural relativism, but also from that of the work of those, such as Mollon, who have analysed the differences in individuals' colour discrimination.

This chapter argues that despite general agreement on a number of fundamental points regarding emotions, such as that certain measurable neurophysiological and biochemical changes are broadly correlated with emotions, considerable confusion still exists on questions such as what emotion is, and how it should be defined, whether or not there are certain basic emotions, and whether emotions should be viewed as distinct species or form a continuum. The chapter discusses the issues raised by the cultural diversity revealed by a study of ancient and modern societies.

This chapter discusses spatial cognition in humans. It examines the study by Levinson (2003) which identified diversities in human spatial cognition. It compares the findings on spatial cognition with the earlier findings concerning colour, between different human subjects and whole communities. It argues that in terms of physiological and neurological input, there are both commonalities and differences between different human subjects. As to what there is to cognize, the universal elements in the colour cognition case include the physics of the wavelengths of light and in the spatial cognition one, the directionality of gravitational forces — on earth at least — and aspects of the physics and geometry of volumes and shapes.

This chapter examines the notions of the self, agency, and causation. It first sketches out some of the major difficulties that relate to these three concepts and their interrelations, citing the apparent divergences that exist between the reports of social anthropologists on the one hand, and the findings of developmental psychologists on the other. It then turns to ancient civilizations to see what light their experiences can throw on the issues. Here it is worth reflecting on the diversity of views that can be found between different periods and even within writers of the same period.

The dichotomy between nature and culture constitutes a key element in the articulating framework of several intellectual disciplines. The dichotomy is of particular importance for the study of the problem of the psychic unity of humankind. This chapter examines the historical origins of one version of the dichotomy which has been influential in European thought. It then follows up earlier studies that investigated the contexts in which an explicit contrast between two concepts corresponding, roughly, to nature and to culture, that is _phusis_ and _nomos_, was proposed by certain ancient Greek thinkers. This investigation brings to light bboth the polemical use of that dichotomy and its continuing problematic status in philosophy and social anthropology.

This chapter argues that the problems that centre round reason, rationality, and intelligence are complex and elude easy, in some cases, any resolution. It examines the different approaches that have been adopted, reflecting different interests, different methodologies, and different starting assumptions. It begins where some of the modern debate started, namely with Lévy-Bruhl's proposal of a pre-logical mentality. Some comments are presented on the controversies that stemmed from that, on the question of apparently irrational beliefs, and on the conjecture that reasoning ability is unevenly distributed across modern cultures.

This chapter reviews some of the topics discussed in the preceding chapters. It argues that evidence serves to refute the idea that what is common in human cognitive faculties falls to the side of biology or neurophysiology, while diversity is a matter of culture. This straightforward correlation fails because the commonalities include not just biological data, but also the fact that we all become socially acculturated and have the capacity to learn a language. Conversely, the diversities that affect different individuals and groups stem from biological and neurological, as well as cultural, factors.

This chapter examines the concepts of health and well-being. It raises the question of whether there are commonalities in human perception and understanding about health and well-being that can be traced across cultures, or whether different societies' attitudes and views are irredeemably society-specific. It argues that although it is up to the individual to register whether they feel well or ill, they will do so not just in relation to their ideas on the causes and nature of diseases, but also in the light of the assumptions and values of the society to which they belong or to some sub-group within it.

This essay explores the extent to which Aristotle’s zoological researches were influenced by his general psychological theory and specific psychological doctrines, and the match or mismatch between the results of his zoological investigations and his general position on questions such as definition, essence, form, and matter. It argues that psychology provides the major articulating framework for Aristotle’s zoology. Certain key points in his zoology and specific psychological doctrines influence his interpretation of the biological phenomena.

This chapter focuses on 5th- and early 4th-century medical texts. The Hippocratic Corpus provides rich materials for the study of non-deductive inference — as also do the extant remains of Hellenistic medicine. The interest of this material lies partly in the obvious fact that the doctors were working under considerable pressure to arrive at judgements in cases where their patients' lives — as well as their own reputations — were at stake. The author puts himself as far as possible in _their_ shoes to examine what _they_ thought they could infer from the signs they cite, given how they understood disease. It is shown that there is a recurrent tension within the Hippocratic texts between the urge to generalize and the realization of its difficulty.

“The book's major parts, one on polarity and the other on analogy, introduce the reader to the patterns of thinking that are fundamental not only to Greek philosophy but also to classical civilization as a whole. As a leading classicist in his own right, Lloyd is an impeccable guide. His sophistication in adducing anthropological parallels to Greek models of polarity and analogy broadens his perspective, making him a forerunner in the study of what we are now used to calling semiotics. A striking example of Lloyd's approach is his re-examination of the dichotomy of Olympian and chthonian gods in ancient Greek world view, which surpasses the reductionist and pseudo-historical models of sky-gods and earth-goddesses that are still commonly invoked to account for polarities in Greek pantheon. “In the second part, dealing with analogy, three crucial metaphorical models for the universe turn out to be basis for a dazzlingly wide variety of scientific and philosophical perspectives. Each model is tested in the whole spectrum of Greek artistic, philosophical and scientific thought. This work is a treasure-house of insights for experts and non experts alike.” —Gregory Nagy, Harvard University.

This study of the origins and progress of Greek science focuses especially on the interaction between scientific and traditional patterns of thought from the sixth to the fourth century BC. It begins with an examination of how particular Greek authors deployed the category of "magic," sometimes attacking its beliefs and practices; these attacks are then related to their background in Greek medicine and philosophical thought. In his second chapter Lloyd outlines developments in the theory and practice of argument in Greek science and assesses their significance. He next discuses the progress of empirical research as a scientific tool from the Presocratics to Aristotle. Finally, he considers why the Greeks invented science, their contribution to its history, and the social, economic, ideological and political factors that had a bearing on its growth.

This book explores the variety of ideas and assumptions that humans have entertained concerning three main topics, first being, or what there is, secondly humanity – what makes a human being a human – and thirdly understanding, namely both of the world and of one another. Amazingly diverse views have been held on these issues by different individuals and collectivities in both ancient and modern times. The aim is to juxtapose the evidence available from ethnography and from the study of ancient societies, both to describe that diversity and to investigate the problems it poses. Many of the ideas in question are deeply puzzling, even paradoxical, to the point where they have often been described as irrational or frankly unintelligible. Many implicate fundamental moral issues and value judgements, where again we may seem to be faced with an impossible task in attempting to arrive at a fair-minded evaluation. How far does it seem that we are all the prisoners of the conceptual systems of the collectivities to which we happen to belong? To what extent and in what circumstances is it possible to challenge the basic concepts of such systems? This study examines these questions cross‐culturally and seeks to draw out the implications for the revisability of some of our habitual assumptions concerning such topics as ontology, morality, nature, relativism, incommensurability, the philosophy of language, and the pragmatics of communication.

Lloyd examines a set of topics central to ancient Greek medicine and biology, in particular theories of beliefs about animals, women, and the efficacy of drugs. He is concerned throughout with the interaction between scientific theory on the one hand and popular or folkloric belief on the other, as well as with the ideological character of ancient scientific inquiry and its limitations. Lloyd discusses the development of zoological taxonomy, the impact that Greek assumptions about the inferiority of the female sex had on medical practice, and the relationship between high and low science in pharmacology and anatomy. Anthropology provides a comparative dimension raising broader issues under debate in the philosophy and sociology of science.

This book challenges several widespread views concerning Aristotle's methods and practices of scientific and philosophical research. Taking central topics in psychology, zoology, astronomy and politics, Professor Lloyd explores generally unrecognised tensions between Aristotle's deeply held a priori convictions and his remarkable empirical honesty in the face of complexities in the data or perceived difficult or exceptional cases. The picture that emerges of Aristotle's actual engagement in scientific research and of his own reflections on that research is substantially more complex than is usually allowed.

This original and lively book explores Greek ideas about health and disease and their influence on Greek thought. Fundamental issues such as causation and responsibility, purification and pollution, mind-body relations and gender differences, authority and the expert and who can challenge them, reality and appearances, good government, happiness, and good and evil themselves are deeply implicated. Using the evidence not just from Greek medical theory and practice but also from epic, lyric, tragedy, historiography, philosophy, and religion, G. E. R. Lloyd offers the first comprehensive account of the influence of Greek thought about health and disease on the Greek imagination.