Nicholas Wolterstorff

This chapter engages the essays in this volume by Lackey and Goldberg in taking up the general question of the significance of ‘inexplicable’ disagreement. Noting that disagreement within the discipline of philosophy is common and generally thought to be unproblematic, the chapter asks why this is the case. He argues that the processes by which we come to hold our beliefs and the reasons for our convictions are never entirely transparent, leaving us room to suppose that subtle, undetectable errors underlie otherwise puzzling epistemic peer disagreements. Despite the popular framing of religious disagreements as signals that one or both sides have got things wrong and ought to alter their beliefs, it is argued that we can be entitled to our religious beliefs even when others degree for reasons we can’t identify and explain.

One of the central projects of political philosophy has been to account for the authority of the state over its citizens and over those non-citizens living or traveling within its territorial jurisdiction. Around four centuries ago, that project took a dramatic turn. Rather than discuss the authority of the state "from above" in the context of a relation to God’s authority, the authority of the state was understood "from below" without reference to God's authority. The goal of constructing a successful account from below of political authority has, however, proved elusive. This essay offers an account of political authority from below, one which appeals to natural rights we have against the state.

Among the most prominent themes in the publications of Jürgen Habermas over the past decade is that of the inter-relations among religion, postmetaphysical philosophy, and political discourse. The topic of postmetaphysical philosophy goes back a long way in Habermas’ writings. What is new is Habermas’ preoccupation with the relation of such philosophy to religion and with the relation of both of these to political discourse. This essay is a critical engagement with Habermas on this last point – the role he proposes for religion and postmetaphysical philosophy in political discourse.

This essay moves beyond critique of public reason liberalism to propose an alternative interpretation of the governing idea of liberal democracy. At the heart of that idea is a commitment to not public reason, as Rawls understands that, but to the equal right of citizens to full political voice – this voice to be exercised within an explicit or implicit constitution that imposes limits and guarantees on government, and within a legal order that protects citizens against impairment of their right to full political voice by their fellow citizens. The resulting position is the _equal political voice_ interpretation of liberal democracy_._.

Nowadays the doctrine of popular sovereignty is usually ignored. If it is taken note of and understood, it is usually rejected, either because its implicit ontology is unacceptable to those of a nominalist persuasion or because it is confused with another doctrine that emerged in the late medieval and early modern period, the doctrine of the consent of the governed. The project of this essay is to formulate the doctrine of popular sovereignty and free it from its association with the doctrine of the consent of the governed. The discussion of popular sovereignty takes the form of reflections on the work of Johannes Althusius (ca. 1557-1638).

This paper traces the history of Christian political thought, noting that it has shifted from a perfectionist understanding of government to a protectionist understanding. A protectionist understanding places a very high priority on the government's preventing (and itself avoiding) the great evil of violating persons. Liberal democracy is fundamentally protectionist in its orientation. If one attends to the nature and worth of the person and recognizes the great evil of violating persons, then one can see that the liberal polity is of inherent worth. Accordingly, Christians have good reasons to support it.

The central thesis in this essay is that the discussions by public reason liberals of the ethic of citizen suffer from a strange kind of myopia; their attention is focused exclusively on just one form of morally-based democratic political activity: policy deliberation and decision. More narrowly yet, they focus exclusively on the sorts of _reasons_ one ought to employ when engaging in that activity, and on what one should do in case one’s reasons fail to persuade all one’s fellow citizens of one’s position. The aim of this essay is to break the grip of this myopia by describing examples of two other forms of morally-committed democratic political activity, not unusual and obscure ways but ways that we all know about, ways that many of us have personally engaged in: _broad-based organizing_ and _movement organizing_.

What is the proper role, in a liberal democracy, of religious reasons for and against proposed laws or abolition of laws? The various positions taken on the issue have come to be classified as “exclusivist” or “inclusivist.” This chapter identifies and critiques what may be the deepest component in the line of thought of those who espouse the exclusivist position. Instead of focusing on respect, this line of thought focuses on coercion. It tells us that a condition of a citizen’s properly supporting a piece of coercive legislation is not only that he or she (entitledly) believe the coercion justified, but also that, he or she must offer or make available, to those one believes do not already have them, reasons that they do or would regard as justifying the coercive legislation.

The project of this essay is to stand back from all particular versions of public reason theories, describe their general structure, and assess their prospects. The prospects of this theory, this essay contends, are not bright. The arguments offered for it by its main proponents, such as Rawls and Gaus, are not satisfactory. Moreover, the view is subject to a series of objections – objections regarding the fairness of the view and the feasibility of its application to actual political life – which indicate that we need to look elsewhere when developing a satisfactory account of liberal democracy.

Gerald Gaus has developed a distinct version of public reason liberalism and has done so with a great deal of philosophical sophistication. There are two respects in which Gaus’ version of public reason liberalism is significantly distinct. He develops and employs _the moral demand argument_ far more carefully and thoroughly than any other public reason liberal does. And whereas most versions of public reason liberalism are consensus theories, his is a convergence theory. This chapter examines Gaus' view in detail, explores the main arguments Gaus offers for it, and concludes that Gaus' position is unsatisfactory.

A striking feature of Christian liturgies and hymns, especially those used on Christmas Day and Easter, is the use of the present tense when speaking of Christ’s birth or resurrection. This chapter explores the significance of “the liturgical present tense.” A theory that enjoyed wide acceptance among twentieth-century liturgical scholars was that these events are reactualized when the liturgy is enacted. The chapter argues that that is ontologically impossible, and that the liturgical present tense should instead be understood as a specific version of a widely used figure of speech—call it “the as-if trope”—in which one talks about someone as if they were what in fact they are not. The chapter concludes with suggestions as to why Christians use the liturgical-present version of this trope on Christmas Day and Easter.

This essay first argues that what Augustine has in mind by “happiness” (“beatitude”) is quite different from what the Peripatetics and Stoics had in mind. It then discusses Augustine’s diagnosis of the cause of his unhappiness before his conversion: he loved earthly things instead of God. Augustine tells the story of his conversion in such a way that one expects that, upon his conversion, he has found happiness. Book 10 makes clear that that is not the case; he remains deeply unhappy, the cause of his unhappiness now being that he yields to the temptation to delight in things other than God and God alone. Complete happiness is not possible in this life.

It is often said or assumed that the presence of religion in our society necessarily harbors within itself the threat of coercion and violence. Religion, though it may talk and dream of peace, is a menace to peace. To move toward the elimination of coercion and violence, thus to achieve peace, it is said, we must aspire to a politics of consensus on fundamental principles of justice and social order. Accordingly, all the particular religions must shape up so as to be compatible with such a politics. The central question of this essay is: Which principles of social organisation must an exclusivist religion be willing to affirm if it is to embrace a liberal democratic polity for a society in which there are other such religions?