Rineke (Laurina Christina) Verbrugge

This paper presents an attempt to bridge the gap between logical and cognitive treatments of strategic reasoning in games. There have been extensive formal debates about the merits of the principle of backward induction among game theorists and logicians. Experimental economists and psychologists have shown that human subjects, perhaps due to their bounded resources, do not always follow the backward induction strategy, leading to unexpected outcomes. Recently, based on an eye-tracking study, it has turned out that even human subjects who produce the outwardly correct ‘backward induction answer’ use a different internal reasoning strategy to achieve it. The paper presents a formal language to represent different strategies on a finer-grained level than was possible before. The language and its semantics help to precisely distinguish different cognitive reasoning strategies, that can then be tested on the basis of computational cognitive models and experiments with human subjects. The syntactic framework of the formal system provides a generic way of constructing computational cognitive models of the participants of the Marble Drop game

Provability logic is a modal logic that is used to investigate what arithmetical theories can express in a restricted language about their provability predicates. The logic has been inspired by developments in meta-mathematics such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems of 1931 and Löb’s theorem of 1953. As a modal logic, provability logic has been studied since the early seventies, and has had important applications in the foundations of mathematics. From a philosophical point of view, provability logic is interesting because the concept of provability in a fixed theory of arithmetic has a unique and non-problematic meaning, other than concepts like necessity and knowledge studied in modal and epistemic logic. Furthermore, provability logic provides tools to study the notion of self-reference.

Using a knowledge-based approach, we derive a protocol, MACOM1, for the sequence transmission problem from one agent to a group of agents. The protocol is correct for communication media where deletion and reordering errors may occur. Furthermore, it is shown that after k rounds the agents in the group attain depth k general knowledge about the members of the group and the values of the messages. Then, we adjust this algorithm for multi-agent communication for the process of teamwork. MACOM1 solves the sequence transmission problem from one agent to a group of agents, but does not fully comply with the type of dialogue communication needed for teamwork. The number of messages being communicated per communication between the initiator and the other agents from the group can differ. Furthermore, the teamwork process can require the communication algorithm to handle changes of initiator. We show the adjustments that have to be made to MACOM1 to handle these properties of teamwork. For the new multi-agent communication algorithm, MACOM2, it is shown that the gaining of knowledge required for a successful teamwork process is still guaranteed.

We investigate the theory IΔ 0 + Ω 1 and strengthen [Bu86. Theorem 8.6] to the following: if NP ≠ co-NP. then Σ-completeness for witness comparison formulas is not provable in bounded arithmetic. i.e. $I\delta_0 + \Omega_1 + \nvdash \forall b \forall c (\exists a(\operatorname{Prf}(a.c) \wedge \forall = \leq a \neg \operatorname{Prf} (z.b))\\ \rightarrow \operatorname{Prov} (\ulcorner \exists a(\operatorname{Prf}(a. \bar{c}) \wedge \forall z \leq a \neg \operatorname{Prf}(z.\bar{b})) \urcorner)).$ Next we study a "small reflection principle" in bounded arithmetic. We prove that for all sentences φ $I\Delta_0 + \Omega_1 \vdash \forall x \operatorname{Prov}(\ulcorner \forall y \leq \bar{x} (\operatorname{Prf} (y. \overline{\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner}) \rightarrow \varphi)\urcorner).$ The proof hinges on the use of definable cuts and partial satisfaction predicates akin to those introduced by Pudlak in [Pu86]. Finally, we give some applications of the small reflection principle, showing that the principle can sometimes be invoked in order to circumvent the use of provable Σ-completeness for witness comparison formulas

In everyday life it is often important to have a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, desires, and intentions of other people. Sometimes it is even useful to to have a correct model of their model of our own mental states: a second-order Theory of Mind. In order to investigate to what extent adults use and acquire complex skills and strategies in the domains of Theory of Mind and the related skill of natural language use, we conducted an experiment. It was based on a strategic game of imperfect information, in which it was beneficial for participants to have a good mental model of their opponent, and more specifically, to use second-order Theory of Mind. It was also beneficial for them to be aware of pragmatic inferences and of the possibility to choose between logical and pragmatic language use. We found that most participants did not seem to acquire these complex skills during the experiment when being exposed to the game for a number of different trials. Nevertheless, some participants did make use of advanced cognitive skills such as second-order Theory of Mind and appropriate choices between logical and pragmatic language use from the beginning. Thus, the results differ markedly from previous research.

Behavior oftentimes allows for many possible interpretations in terms of mental states, such as goals, beliefs, desires, and intentions. Reasoning about the relation between behavior and mental states is therefore considered to be an effortful process. We argue that people use simple strategies to deal with high cognitive demands of mental state inference. To test this hypothesis, we developed a computational cognitive model, which was able to simulate previous empirical findings: In two-player games, people apply simple strategies at first. They only start revising their strategies when these do not pay off. The model could simulate these findings by recursively attributing its own problem solving skills to the other player, thus increasing the complexity of its own inferences. The model was validated by means of a comparison with findings from a developmental study in which the children demonstrated similar strategic developments

How do people reason about their opponent in turn-taking games? Often, people do not make the decisions that game theory would prescribe. We present a logic that can play a key role in understanding how people make their decisions, by delineating all plausible reasoning strategies in a systematic manner. This in turn makes it possible to construct a corresponding set of computational models in a cognitive architecture. These models can be run and fitted to the participants’ data in terms of decisions, response times, and answers to questions. We validate these claims on the basis of an earlier game-theoretic experiment about the turn-taking game “Marble Drop with Surprising Opponent”, in which the opponent often starts with a seemingly irrational move. We explore two ways of segregating the participants into reasonable “player types”. The first way is based on latent class analysis, which divides the players into three classes according to their first decisions in the game: Random players, Learners, and Expected players, who make decisions consistent with forward induction. The second way is based on participants’ answers to a question about their opponent, classified according to levels of theory of mind: zero-order, first-order and second-order. It turns out that increasing levels of decisions and theory of mind both correspond to increasing success as measured by monetary awards and increasing decision times. Next, we use the logical language to express different kinds of strategies that people apply when reasoning about their opponent and making decisions in turn-taking games, as well as the ‘reasoning types’ reflected in their behavior. Then, we translate the logical formulas into computational cognitive models in the PRIMs architecture. Finally, we run two of the resulting models, corresponding to the strategy of only being interested in one’s own payoff and to the myopic strategy, in which one can only look ahead to a limited number of nodes. It turns out that the participant data fit to the own-payoff strategy, not the myopic one. The article closes the circle from experiments via logic and cognitive modelling back to predictions about new experiments.