María Cerezo

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 194 - 220 This paper offers an interpretation of Anselm of Canterbury’s semantic doctrines in _De Grammatico_, paying special attention to five distinctions present in the dialogue: _dicitur in eo quod quale/dicitur in eo quod quid, esse ut in subiecto/esse non ut in subiecto, significare/appellare, significare ut unum/significare non ut unum_ and _significare per se/significare per aliud_. It elucidates the theoretical role of these distinctions, showing that they are introduced with different purposes and that conflation between them must be avoided. Three specific features of this interpretation are the following: an analysis of the distinction between _significare_ and _appellare_ in relation to the orders of intellection and predication, an account of the difference between predication _in eo quod quid/in eo quod quale_ and essential and accidental predication, and an analysis of the thesis that ‘_grammaticus_’ not only signifies _per se qualitas_, but also _per se habere_.

This paper examines the analysis of judgements of belief that Wittgenstein offers in 5.54-5.5423 of the Tractatus. We offer an interpretation of these paragraphs wich also pays attention to 5.5423, usually forgotten. In our opinion, this interpretation fits with Wittgenstein's doctrines, and makes clear that such non-genuine propositions are nonsense. These are not, as has sometimes been proposed, the propositions of psychology. In the second part of the article we give a detailed discussion of interpretations of these paragraphs which have been offered previously.

Raymond Bradley ha ofrecido una interpretacion esencialista de la ontologia deI Tractatus Logico Philosophicus de Wittgenstein (R. Bradley, The Nature of All Being, 1992), en la que pretende desarrollar las dimensiones modales que en su opinión estan implícitas en el Tractatus. EI proposito de este trabajo es revisar la interpretación bradleyana de los nombres tractarianos corno designadores rígidos, examinando la noción tractariana de nombre y la kripkeana de designador rigido en Naming and Necessity, con un doble objetivo: contestar a la cuestión de si es posible interpretar los nombres tractarianos corno designadores rígidos, y alumbrar algunas semejanzas y diferencias entre ambas teorias deI significado.Raymond Bradley, in his book The Nature of All Being, has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logicophilosophicus and aims to develop the modal dimensions that, in his opinion, are implicit in that work. The aim of this paper is to reassess Bradley’s interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators, by examining the tractarian notion of name and the kripkeanconcept of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, with a view to answering the question as to whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible, and to bringing to light some similarities and diffirences between the two theories of meaning.

The aim of this paper is rather modest: we do not intend to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of truth (although we are convinced that there is such a thing), and we will not try to settle the issue concerning Bivalence in Aristotle. We merely want, on the one hand, to argue for the consistency between the main Aristotelian texts on truth and a possible rejection of Bivalence; and on the other hand, to investigate the conditions of a possible counterexample to Bivalence. The motivation for this research is also very specific. We are interested in the apparent violation of Bivalence introduced by vague predicates, and in particular we want to respond to a family of arguments put forward by T. Williamson in support of the idea that allowing for exceptions to Bivalence would be incoherent. We have focused on these arguments for two reasons. On the one hand, what is allegedly threatened by a denial of Bivalence is no less than the very “nature of truth or falsity”. On the other hand, Aristotle is explicitly mentioned as one of the defendants of this “natural” conception of truth, and we are reminded about the connection between Aristotle’s theory and Tarski’s semantic conception. These arguments, therefore, give us an occasion to explore Aristotle’s analysis of the nature of truth and falsity, and to examine its connection with the Tarskian conception of truth. In particular, we would like to question the assumption, which has become a commonplace in the field of analytical philosophy, that Aristotle’s notion of truth can be encoded in the pair of disquotational biconditionals that derive from Tarski’s “T schema”.

I discuss the interest-relative account of vagueness and argue for a distinction between relational vague predicates and non-relational vague predicates depending on the kind of properties expressed by them. The strategy rests on three arguments arising from the existence of clear cases of a vague predicate, from contexts in which a different answer is required for questions about whether a vague predicate applies to an item, and whether such an item satisfies the interest of an agent, and from cases where an object changes up to the point of becoming P, where P is a vague predicate. In the second part of the paper, I distinguish between relational properties and non-relational properties, and I argue for the view that some vague predicates can express non-relational properties, comparative relational properties and interest-relative properties. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that vagueness cannot be reduced to interest-relativity.

Raymond Bradley ha ofrecido una interpretacion esencialista de la ontologia deI Tractatus Logico Philosophicus de Wittgenstein (R. Bradley, The Nature of All Being, 1992), en la que pretende desarrollar las dimensiones modales que en su opinión estan implícitas en el Tractatus. EI proposito de este trabajo es revisar la interpretación bradleyana de los nombres tractarianos corno designadores rígidos, examinando la noción tractariana de nombre y la kripkeana de designador rigido en Naming and Necessity, con un doble objetivo: contestar a la cuestión de si es posible interpretar los nombres tractarianos corno designadores rígidos, y alumbrar algunas semejanzas y diferencias entre ambas teorias deI significado.Raymond Bradley, in his book The Nature of All Being, has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logicophilosophicus and aims to develop the modal dimensions that, in his opinion, are implicit in that work. The aim of this paper is to reassess Bradley’s interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators, by examining the tractarian notion of name and the kripkeanconcept of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, with a view to answering the question as to whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible, and to bringing to light some similarities and diffirences between the two theories of meaning.