Natalie Depraz

What is the deeper meaning of embodiment in phenomenology? Does it have more than a mere homophonic or logical connection with embodiment (Incarnation) in theology, or are these two completely autonomous concepts? The present study not only endeavours to show the unity of sense, which was originally brought about by the theological idea of Incarnation, but also the transposition of that sense into the phenomenological topic of embodiment. From this the question arises whether the fundamental theological meaning is still asserting itself in the phenomenological concept. The underlying theme of this study upon embodiment consists ultimately in bringing to light the occurrence of a latent metaphysical dimension in phenomenology, which would not be reducible to onto-theology.

Given its transcendental impulse, Husserl's analysis of the lived body has been considered by many phenomenologists and by most Husserl scholars as unable to account for our everyday intimate relationship with our own embodied self and with other embodied selves. Contrary to such a widespread contention, the author sets out to show that Husserl's phenomenology contains unknown descriptive resources which provide a detailed account of our individual and communitarian lived body at a transcendental level proper.

Il y a un pari d'envergure, presque une provocation, à montrer l'ampleur et l'acuité des méthodes pratiques qui tissent le propos de Husserl dans un texte qui a été considéré par ses interprètes comme le livre le plus "métaphysique", à savoir celui où l'auteur prend parti pour une thèse philosophique souvent jugée éculée: l'idéalisme. Tout le destin de la phénoménologie s'est joué autour d'une prise de position contre son "tournant idéaliste" en 1913, Heidegger ayant ouvert les hostilités, suivi par Sartre, Ricœur, Derrida et Levinas. A rebours de cette herméneutique constitutive de la critique philosophique, l'auteur cherche ici à faire voir un Husserl "praticien", "épistémologue", c'est-à-dire peu soucieux de défendre une position métaphysique. Cette épistémologie pratique de la phénoménologie peut être caractérisée comme un "empirisme transcendantal". Par là, un sens de la vérité émerge, qui puise sa validité dans l'expérience native du lecteur, c'est-à-dire dans son aptitude à vérifier par lui-même l'accord du concept en relation avec son vécu. La lecture expérientielle proposée prend alors un tour pragmatique, à l'horizon d'un renouvellement de la phénoménologie comme pratique.

En este texto planteamos la pregunta por la inscripción de la sorpresa en la fenomenología de las emociones de Husserl. Pero antes de dar por supuesto que Husserl abordó el problema de la sorpresa, nos preguntamos si verdaderamente lo hizo y sí, incluso, se puede hablar de una "fenomenología de las emociones" en su obra. El texto está, así, motivado por dos interrogantes: ¿Es la sorpresa una emoción? ¿Husserl desarrolló verdaderamente una "fenomenología de las emociones"? Esto nos conducirá a 1) plantear una redefinición de sorpresa y 2) avanzar por el camino de una fenomenología un poco reformada por el hecho de la sorpresa. En tres apartados desarrollamos este planteamiento: I. La fenomenología husserliana de las emociones, II. ¿La sorpresa es una emoción? Y III. La sorpresa, un proceso. In this paper we argue about the inscription of surprise in the phenomenology of emotions of E. Husserl. But before assuming that E. Husserl addressed the issue of surprise, we ask if he really did it and even, if it is possible to talk about a "phenomenology of emotions" his work. The paper is thus motivated by two questions: Is surprise an emotion? Did Husserl really develop a "phenomenology of emotions"? This will take us to, 1) outline a redefinition of surprise, and 2) advance through the path of a phenomenology that has been a bit reformed by the fact of surprise. This issue will be developed in three stages: I. the husserlian phenomenology of emotions, II. Is surprise an emotion? III. The surprise, a process.

How the phenomenology of empathy in Husserl and beyond and the second-person approach of cognition are able to mutually enrich and constrain each other? Whereas the intersubjective empathy is limited to face-to-face inter-individual relational experiences or, when socially embedded, results a non-individualized understanding of others in general, the second person approach of cognition opens the way for a plural relational yet individualized understanding of the other. I would like to show in this paper how the integration of both phenomenological and cognitive fields paves the way for the more encompassing description of intersubjective experience as a “relational multiplicity,” which I will ultimately describe through the empirical practice of an emergency psychiatric unit.

I would like to propose an interpretation of Ricœur’s first phenomenological works in the light of what I call an “experiential phenomenology”, by answeringthree important questions. The first is a factual and historical interrogation: why has Ricœur abandoned his project of a descriptive phenomenology after publishing his first volume of the The Voluntary and the Involuntary and why did he afterwards direct his philosophical research towards the problem of interpretation? The second interrogation is an epistemological and a methodological one: in what way is the Husserlian phenomenology a first-person approach and how does Ricœur’s phenomenology of the will lead us towards an experiential phenomenology in first person? The final question is heuristical: what criteria should we point out in order to establish a phenomenological science that is 1) descriptive and 2) approaching the experience in first-person?

Upshot: Thanks to the commentaries we have been able to further clarify the situation of generative first-person analysis in the general framework of neurophenomenology and more specifically of cardio-phenomenology as its extension and reformulation. We have also provided more detailed information about the way phenomenology as transcendental philosophy is genuinely operating as a practice in cardio-phenomenology and has a central function regarding the creation of categories and their suspensive questioning thanks to the epoché method. We have also drawn great benefits from the questions about how micro-phenomenology allows a refinement of descriptive categories and the way new categories are generated, and we have been able to provide some answers about different scales of newness in the generative process.