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60Philosophical Psychology would like to thank the following for contributing to the journal as reviewers this past year: Fred Adams Kenneth AizawaPhilosophical Psychology 25 (1): 161-163. 2012.
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55Review of Tamar Schapiro: Feeling Like It: A Theory of Inclination and Will (review)Ethics 134 (3): 438-443. 2024.
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48Comments on Talking to Our Selves by John DorisPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3): 753-757. 2018.
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47Comments on Emotions, Values, and Agency by Christine TappoletPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2): 520-524. 2018.
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40A Casual Theory of Acting for ReasonsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2): 103-114. 2015.Amanda works in a library, and a patron asks for her help in learning about duty-to- rescue laws in China. She throws herself into the task, spending hours on retrieving documents from governmental and non-governmental sources, getting electronic translations, looking for literature on Scandinavian duty-to-rescue laws that mention Chinese laws for comparison, and so on. Why? She likes to gain this sort of general knowledge of the world; perhaps the reason she works so hard is that she is learnin…Read more
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34Four Notes on John Broome’s ‘Rationality versus Normativity’Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4): 312-320. 2020.ABSTRACT I argue that Broome's view of the distinction between rationality and normativity needs more to be said for it to be preferable to more mundane views that connect reasons and rationality more intimately, and that it has curious implications about the connection between whether an agent does what she ought to do and the results of her action. I also argue that the etymology and history of words like ‘reason’ and ‘rational’ have absolutely no bearing on the issue at hand.
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293 Ought Implies Can? An Argument from EpistemologyIn Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton University Press. pp. 86-108. 2006.
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271 Praise and Blame: Toward a New CompatibilismIn Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton University Press. pp. 9-39. 2006.
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24Open-Mindedness as a Moral VirtueAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1): 75. 2011.Open-mindedness appears to be a cognitive disposition: an open-minded person is disposed to gain, lose, and revise beliefs in a particular, reasonable way. It is also a moral virtue, for we blame, for example, the man who quickly comes to think a new neighbor untrustworthy because he drives the wrong car or wears the wrong clothes—for his closed-mindedness. How open–mindedness could be a moral virtue is a puzzle, though, because exercises of moral virtues are expressions of moral concern, wherea…Read more
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232 Reason Responsiveness in a Deterministic WorldIn Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton University Press. pp. 40-85. 2006.
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20INTERLUDE. The Science Fiction of Mind DesignIn Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton University Press. pp. 109-116. 2006.
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19Comments on Lack of Character by John DorisPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3): 643-647. 2007.
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18Huckleberry FInn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance"In Michael Mckenna Randolph Clarcke & Smith Angela M. (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 141-156. 2015.This paper argue that moral ignorance does not excuse. Nobody is off the hook for doing something bad simply because she did it believing ii to be right. The paper uses the Arpaly view that cases of Akrasia can be praiseworthy as one premise in the argument.
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15Moral Worth and Normative EthicsOxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5. 2015.According to Arpaly and to Markovits, actions have moral worth iff they are done for the reasons that make them right. Can this view have implications for normative ethics? I argue that it has such implications, as you can start from truths about the moral worth of actions to truths about the reasons that make them right. What makes actions right is the question of normative ethics. I argue from the moral worth view to a pluralistic view of ethics - not Kantianism or utilitarianism but an accoun…Read more
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14ContentsIn Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton University Press. 2006.
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114 When Cheap Will Just Won’t DoIn Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton University Press. pp. 117-138. 2006.
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10AcknowledgmentsIn Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton University Press. 2006.
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9IntroductionIn Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-8. 2006.
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8BibliographyIn Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton University Press. pp. 139-142. 2006.
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8IndexIn Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton University Press. pp. 143-148. 2006.
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7Moral Psychology's Drinking ProblemIn Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. 2016.Sometimes when a person acts while drunk we see her actions as not reflective of her character ("oh, she was just drunk"). At other times we see her actions as reflective of her "deep self" ("in vino veritas"). What is the difference between the two types of cases? This paper sketches a possible answer.
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The reward theory of desire in moral psychologyIn Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2014.
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |
Philosophy of Action |
Normative Ethics |