John Dupre

This article argues, in opposition to a common interpretation of Wittgenstein deriving from Winch, that there is nothing especially problematic about the social sciences. Familiar Wittgensteinian theses about language, notably on the open-endedness of linguistic rules and on the importance of family resemblance concepts, have great relevance not only to the social sciences but also to much of the natural sciences. The differences between scientific and ordinary language are much less sharp than Winch, and probably Wittgenstein, supposed.

This book is the apologia of a frustrated reductionist. The frustration derives from Rosenberg's clear perception that the project of physicalist reduction, the reduction of all the sciences of complex objects to physics, is impossible, at least, as he often says, for beings hampered by our limited cognitive and computational abilities. The reductionism that survives this realisation is purely metaphysical. It is the firm commitment to the view that ultimately whatever happens happens because of the universally lawlike behavior of the physical particles of which everything is composed. What holds these theses together is supervenience. The physical correlate of a higher level property or kind is typically massively disjunctive. Thus although the intrinsic properties of a complex thing are fully determined by the properties of the physical particles of which they are composed, the physical property necessary and sufficient to determine such a higher level property is too complex and disjunctive for our feeble minds to grasp. The underlying physical heterogeneity of the properties or kinds we distinguish at higher structural levels is such as to make it vanishingly unlikely that these will enter into the kinds of universal laws characteristic of physics or chemistry.

Elliott Sober is among the leading contemporary contributors to the philosophy of biology. He also has an exceptional ability to explain difficult ideas clearly. He is therefore very well equipped to provide an accessible yet state-of-the-art introduction to the philosophy of biology, and in most respects this optimistic prognosis is justified by the present volume. Focussing on evolutionary biology, Sober provides a general overview of evolutionary theory; a chapter on creationism that serves as a vehicle for the discussion of the evidence for evolution; and chapters on fitness, the units of selection, adaptationism, systematics, and sociobiology. Sober displays a thorough mastery of both the biological issues and the recent philosophical controversies that have surrounded them, and the presentation is always lucid and free from unnecessary technicalities. Anyone not thoroughly conversant with contemporary discussions of evolutionary theory could learn from this book.

Biological knowledge has increased exponentially in the last century or so, and it would be surprising if some of this knowledge did not have implications for philosophy. In contrast with a good deal of Elliott Sober's best known work, which aims to bring philosophical methods to bear on issues within biology, the theme of this collection of essays is to explore some ways in which biological ideas, or more specifically evolutionary ideas, may be brought to bear on philosophical issues. Sober notes in his Introduction that there is no systematic theme beyond the attempt to explore the philosophical implications of taking evolutionary biology seriously. And certainly this is a diverse collection, especially with regard to the extent to which the various arguments of these papers depend on any particular content to evolutionary claims.

John Dupré explores recent revolutionary developments in biology and considers their relevance for our understanding of human nature and human society. Epigenetics and related areas of molecular biology have eroded the exceptional status of the gene and presented the genome as fully interactive with the rest of the cell. Developmental systems theory provides a space for a vision of evolution that takes full account of the fundamental importance of developmental processes. Dupré shows the importance of microbiology for a proper understanding of the living world, and reveals how it subverts such basic biological assumptions as the organisation of biological kinds on a branching tree of life, and the simple traditional conception of the biological organism.

In an earlier paper (Dupré 1984), I criticized a thesis sometimes defended by theorists of probabilistic causality, namely, that a probabilistic cause must raise the probability of its effect in every possible set of causally relevant background conditions (the "contextual unanimity thesis"). I also suggested that a more promising analysis of probabilistic causality might be sought in terms of statistical relevance in a fair sample. Ellery Eells (1987) has defended the contextual unanimity thesis against my objections, and also raised objections of his own to my positive claims. In this paper I defend and amplify both my objections to the contextual unanimity thesis and my constructive suggestion