•  13
    A Job for Philosophy
    Philosophy Now 4 19-23. 1992.
  •  1082
    Enacting is Enough
    with Erik Myin
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1): 24-30. 2009.
    In the action-space account of color, an emphasis is laid on implicit knowledge when it comes to experience, and explanatory ambitions are expressed. If the knowledge claims are interpreted in a strong way, the action-space account becomes a form of conservative enactivism, which is a kind of cognitivism. Only if the knowledge claims are weakly interpreted, the action space-account can be seen as a distinctive form of enactivism, but then all reductive explanatory ambitions must be abandoned
  •  70
    Focusing on the manifesto provided by Gallagher and Zahavi's The Phenomenological Mind, this paper critically examines how we should understand and asses the prospects of allying phenomenological approaches to mind with work in the cognitive sciences. It is argued that more radical and revolutionary adjustments to our standard conceptions of the mind than suggested by (at least some) the proponents of the phenomenological movement are required before such alliances will bear fruit.
  •  1028
    Was the Later Wittgenstein a Transcendental Idealist?
    In P. Coates & D. D. Hutto (eds.), Current Issues in Idealism, Thoemmes Press. 1996.
    In his paper "Wittgenstein and Idealism" Professor Williams proposed a 'model' for reading Wittgenstein's later philosophy which he claimed exposed its transcendental idealist character. By this he roughly meant that Wittgenstein's later position was idealistic to the extent that it disallowed the possibility of there being any independent reality that was not contaminated by our view things. And he thought it was transcendental in the sense that 'our view of things' is not something that we can…Read more
  •  21
    REC: Just Radical Enough
    with Erik Myin
    Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1): 61-71. 2015.
    We address some frequently encountered criticisms of Radical Embodied/Enactive Cognition. Contrary to the claims that the position is too radical, or not sufficiently so, we claim REC is just radical enough.
  •  43
    Wittgenstein's Inspiring View of Nature: On Connecting Philosophy and Science Aright
    with Glenda Satne
    Philosophical Investigations 41 (2): 141-160. 2018.
    This paper explicates Wittgenstein's vision of our place in nature and shows in what ways it is unlike and more fruitful than the picture of nature promoted by exclusive scientific naturalists. Wittgenstein's vision of nature is bound up with and supports his signature view that the task of philosophy is distinctively descriptive rather than explanatory. Highlighting what makes Wittgenstein's vision of nature special, it has been claimed that to the extent that he qualifies as a naturalist of an…Read more
  •  16
    Authors’ Response: Mind Never The Gap, Redux
    with M. D. Kirchhoff
    Constructivist Foundations 11 (2): 370-374. 2016.
    Upshot: We respond to three main challenges that the commentaries have raised. First, we argue that to deal successfully with the hard problem of consciousness, it is not enough to posit a remedy by which to move beyond the hard problem. Second, we argue that it makes no sense to explain identity. Yet this does not commit us to definitions by fiat. The strategy we pursue here, and in the target article, is not to explain identity but to explain away the appearance of non-identity. Finally, while…Read more
  •  54
    What is the true worth of Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy? Answers to this question are strongly divided. However, most assessments rest on certain popular misreadings of his purpose. This book challenges both "theoretical" and "therapeutic" interpretations. In their place, it seeks to establish that, from beginning to end, Wittgenstein regarded clarification as the true end of philosophy. It argues that, properly understood, his approach exemplifies rather than betrays critical philos…Read more
  •  15
    Voices to be heard
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (1). 2005.
    Interpretations of Wittgenstein’s work notoriously fuel debate and controversy. This holds true not only with respect to its main messages, but also to questions concerning its unity and purpose. Tradition has it that his intellectual career can be best understood if carved in twain; that we can get a purchase on his thinking by focusing on and contrasting his, “two diametrically opposed philosophical masterpieces, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and the Philosophical Investigations (…Read more
  •  1104
    This paper explores the idea that when dealing with certain kinds of narratives, ‘like it or not’, consumers of fiction will bring the same sorts of skills (or at least a subset of them) to bear that they use when dealing with actual minds. Let us call this the ‘Same Resources Thesis’. I believe the ‘Same Resources Thesis’ is true. But this is because I defend the view that engaging in narrative practices is the normal developmental route through which children acquire the capacity to make sens…Read more
  •  1057
    In his contribution to this volume, Avrum Stroll makes the assertion that there is ‘a feature of [Wittgenstein's] later philosophy that occurs only in On Certainty. This is a unique form of foundationalism that is neither doxastic nor non-doxastic' (Stroll, this volume, p. 2). He also holds that Wittgenstein’s increased attention to metaphorical language in explicating this foundationalism is yet another feature that sets it apart from the rest of his corpus. I raise doubts about appealing to ei…Read more
  •  1113
    This chapter argues that the conceptual problem of other minds cannot be properly addressed as long as we subscribe to an individualistic model of how we stand in relation to our own experiences and the behaviour of others. For it is commitment to this picture that sponsors the strong first/third person divide that lies at the heart of the two false accounts of experiential concept learning sketched above. This is the true source of the problem. To deal successfully with it we must reconsider ou…Read more
  • The story of the self
    In Karl Simms (ed.), Critical Studies, Rodopi. 1997.
  •  66
    The Presence of Mind
    John Benjamins. 1999.
    Will our everyday account of ourselves be vindicated by a new science? Or,will our self-understanding remain untouched by such developments? This book argues that beliefs and desires have a legitimate place in the explanation of action. Eliminativist arguments mistakenly focus on the vehicles of content not content itself. This book asks whether a naturalistic theory of content is possible. It is argued that a modest biosemantic theory of intentional, but nonconceptual, content is the naturalist…Read more
  •  2191
    Turning Hard Problems on their Heads
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1): 75-88. 2006.
    Much of the difficulty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advocates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions are philosophically innocent. I attempt to reveal, using a recent debate between Chalmers and Dennett as a foil, why, in approaching this topic, we cannot characterise the data purely firs…Read more
  •  4
    The Presence of Mind
    Philosophy Now 2 10-15. 1991.
  •  205
    The Natural Origins of Content
    with Glenda Satne
    Philosophia 43 (3): 521-536. 2015.
    We review the current state of play in the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. Our diagnosis is that if there is to be progress two fundamental changes are necessary. First, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content. Second, the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always and everywhere contentful must be abandoned. Reviving and updating Haugelan…Read more
  •  868
    The narrative practice hypothesis: Clarifications and implications
    Philosophical Explorations 11 (3). 2008.
    The Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) is a recently conceived, late entrant into the contest of trying to understand the basis of our mature folk psychological abilities, those involving our capacity to explain ourselves and comprehend others in terms of reasons. This paper aims to clarify its content, importance and scientific plausibility by: distinguishing its conceptual features from those of its rivals, articulating its philosophical significance, and commenting on its empirical prospects…Read more
  •  148
    The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 43-68. 2007.
    This paper promotes the view that our childhood engagement with narratives of a certain kind is the basis of sophisticated folk psychological abilities —i.e. it is through such socially scaffolded means that folk psychological skills are normally acquired and fostered. Undeniably, we often use our folk psychological apparatus in speculating about why another may have acted on a particular occasion, but this is at best a peripheral and parasitic use. Our primary understanding and skill in folk ps…Read more
  •  610
    The limits of spectatorial folk psychology
    Mind and Language 19 (5): 548-73. 2004.
      It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a…Read more
  •  35
    Truly Enactive Emotion
    Emotion Review 4 (2): 176-181. 2012.
    Any adequate account of emotion must accommodate the fact that emotions, even those of the most basic kind, exhibit intentionality as well as phenomenality. This article argues that a good place to start in providing such an account is by adjusting Prinz’s (2004) embodied appraisal theory (EAT) of emotions. EAT appeals to teleosemantics in order to account for the world-directed content of embodied appraisals. Although the central idea behind EAT is essentially along the right lines, as it stand…Read more
  •  1012
    The Mindlessness of Computationalism: The Neglected Aspects of Cognition
    In P. Pyllkkänen & P. Pyllkkö (eds.), New Directions in Cognitive Science, Finnish Society For Artificial Intelligence. 1995.
    The emergence of cognitive science as a multi-disciplinary investigation into the nature of mind has historically revolved around the core assumption that the central ‘cognitive’ aspects of mind are computational in character. Although there is some disagreement and philosophical speculation concerning the precise formulation of this ‘core assumption’ it is generally agreed that computationalism in some form lies at the heart of cognitive science as it is currently conceived. Von Eckardt’s recen…Read more
  •  12
    The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology
    Mind and Language 19 (5): 548-573. 2004.
    : It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a…Read more
  •  87
    The Extended Mind (review)
    Analysis 71 (4): 785-787. 2011.
  •  23
    The Character of Consciousness. (review)
    Philosophy 87 (2): 298-306. 2012.
  •  81
    Wittgenstein and Reason (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2). 2009.
  •  96
    Representation Reconsidered (review)
    Philosophical Psychology 24 (1): 135-139. 2011.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  3288
    There is a paradox about how our social understanding develops if we take seriously both theory theory and the cognitivist dictum that all skilful interaction has robust conceptual underpinnings. On the one hand, it is clear that young infants demonstrate a capacity to reliably detect and respond to other’s intentions. For example, recent experimental evidence confirms that they have the capacity to appropriately parse what would otherwise be an undifferentiated behaviour stream at its mentalist…Read more