António Pedro Mesquita

In this article we try to demonstrate two theses concerning both the nature and the object of Aristotelian Metaphysics. These theses are the following: 1 - Substance has not in Aristotle a purely instrumental value: in fact it refers, by its own nature, the whole of those beings which really are, that is, to individuals', 2 -For this reason, Metaphysics, as science of ens qua ens, performs a specific and unique role within Aristotle’s thought (as prima philosophia) and in this role it cannot be replaced by any other science. We argue these theses through previous translation and commentary of Metaphysics Z1. Further discussion will then show how they both assume and implicate the fundamental difference between Plato’s and Aristotle's ontologies.

Predication is a complex entity in Aristotelian thought. The aim of the present essay is to account for this complexity, making explicit the diverse forms it assumes. To this end, we tum to a crucial chapter of the Posterior Analytics (1 22), where, in the most complete and developed manner within the corpus, Aristotle proceeds to systematize this topic. From the analysis, it will become apparent that predication can assume, generically, five forms: 1) the predication of essence (τὸ αύτᾢ εἶναι κατηγορεἲσθαι), that is of the genus and the specific difference; 2) essential predication (τὸ αύτᾢ εἶναι κατηγορεἲσθαι), that is either of the genus or of the differences (or their genera); 3) the predication of accidents per se 4) and of simple accidents (ώς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεἲσθαι); and 5) accidental predication (κατἁ συμβεβηκός κατηγορεἲσθαι). However, only types 2-4 are forms of strict predication (άπλὢς). In effect, the “predication” of essence is not a genuine predication, but a formula for identity, constituting, technically, the statement of the essence of the subject (or its definition). On the other hand, accidental “predication” can only be conceived of as such equivocally, since it results from a linguistic accident through which the ontological subject of the attribution suffers a displacement to the syntactic position of the predicate, which is not, by nature, its own. In neither case does the phrase bring about any legitimate predication. The study concludes with a discussion of Aristotle’s thesis according to which no substance can be a predicate, which is implied by its notion of accidental predication, a thesis which has been - and in our opinion wrongly so - challenged in modem times.

The first part of this article attempted to refute the interpretation of Phd. 102a-107a as being the canonic place of the ontological argument in Platonic thought. The second part of this article will attempt to outline three objectives: (1) to show that the ontological argument intervenes in Plato's thought not as a strict démonstration but as a central and permanent structure whereby the idea is necessarily deduced from the sensible; (2) to show that this structure is also present in Saint Anselm's ontological argument as its philosophical meaning; (3) to elucidate how Parmenides' ontology is the paradigm which inspired both Plato and Saint Anselm.

This article, The ontological argument in Plato: (I) the problem of immortality, discusses the interpretation of Socrates’ last demonstration of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo as an ”ontological argument” and tries to refute this interpretation through an examination of the concept of immortality in Plato and its implications on the central relation soul/life. At the same time, it argues that the ontological argument should be seen as the very back-bone of Plato’s ontology, a point of view which will be developed in a forthcoming paper.

O sentido deste ensaio é o de pensar o sentido e o lugar da filosofia na época da globalização, mas por via de um recuo histórico, por forma a desafiar a visão dominante segundo a qual a globalização é um fenômeno atual. Para o efeito, procurarei abordar quatro questões: 1) Em que ambiente sociocultural, melhor, em que civilização, se dá a ruptura que conhecemos aqui por “primeira globalização”? 2) Que modo de consciência veio ela perturbar e alterar? 3) Que efeitos teve sobre a filosofia tal perturbação? 4) Que tem o homem moderno e a filosofia atual a aprender com a resposta às três questões anteriores?