Jonathan O Chimakonam

As more researchers are either discussing the approach of Conversational Thinking or deploying it in their work, one question persists; what is the nature of Conversational Thinking? In investigating this question, I will trace the roots of Conversational Thinking as a theory of meaning-making rather than a theory of meaning. I conceptualise meaning-making as an attempt, through the process of creative struggle, to create ‘presence’ from the ‘metaphysics of absence’ and to demonstrate their complementarity as equal binaries. I will show its affinity and divergence from theories of meaning such as analytic philosophy, deconstruction and hermeneutics. I will argue that the preceding three systems over-estimate the role of language in the production of meaning and that this was due to the influence and limitations of two-valued logic. To overcome these limitations, I will provide a general overview of the system of Conversational Thinking that encapsulates its foundation, architecture and doctrine, and indicate the logical underpinnings of conversational method to signal [the] methodological shift it represents in philosophy, the humanities and interdisciplinary studies.

When we talk of African philosophy as a different philosophical tradition we do not wish to suggest that it studies different range of realities from those that concern the other philosophical traditions. What we demonstrate is the difference that arises in approach or method naturally informed by the resident logic. Thus in African philosophy we study ultimate reality of which being is at the center. What being and even nothingness mean for us is not the same with what they mean in other traditions. Unity: we sometimes say that being is one single whole without wishing to say that this view is monistic. In this light we hold that being is complete with both physical and spiritual aspects. Duality: we also share the view on the duality in nature without insisting that this is strict and permanent. Duality for Africans is essentially a point of inferential departure not a terminal point. The dual arrangement of things in nature is to necessarily lead to a tripartite conception. Triadic conception: this is the terminal point of all inferences in African thought. Yes, there is duality in nature but they exist as fragments and contraries i.e. incomplete in themselves but capable of coming together to form a whole. Obtaining this fusion of contrary fragments represents an inference from duality to triadic conception of reality. What this African conception is all about is not that being is tripartite or dual but that the coming together of two aspects of being is necessary for the formation of being.

My question in this paper is whether digital technologies transform humanity and make politics impossible. Digital technologies, no doubt, are revolutionary. But I argue that what they have done in the Post-Cold War era are: (1) to further contract the spaces between politicians and the people; (2) transform actors from subjects to objects, such that we may in addition to social identities, talk about digital identities; (3) relocate the public sphere from squares to ilosphere where individuals are granted enormous expressive powers but at the same time become vulnerable to large scale manipulations; (4) and escalate the tools of politics. My argument will be that digital technologies in a subtle way are transforming humanity in the digital space and that this might have costly moral consequences not only in politics generally but specifically in liberal democracy. However, I will contend that this transformation of humanity does not make politics impossible; it only escalates it with troubling consequences like those we saw in the 2016 American presidential election.

The issue of a logic foundation for African thought connects well with the question of method. Do we need new methods for African philosophy and studies? Or, are the methods of Western thought adequate for African intellectual space? These questions are not some of the easiest to answer because they lead straight to the question of whether or not a logic tradition from African intellectual space is possible. Thus in charting the course of future direction in African philosophy and studies, one must be confronted with this question of logic. The author boldly takes up this challenge and becomes the first to do so in a book by introducing new concepts and formulating a new African culture-inspired system of logic called Ezumezu which he believes would ground new methods in African philosophy and studies. He develops this system to rescue African philosophy and, by extension, sundry fields in African Indigenous Knowledge Systems from the spell of Plato and the hegemony of Aristotle. African philosophers can now ground their discourses in Ezumezu logic which will distinguish their philosophy as a tradition in its own right. On the whole, the book engages with some of the lingering controversies in the idea of African logic before unveiling Ezumezu as a philosophy of logic, methodology and formal system. The book also provides fresh arguments and insights on the themes of decolonisation and Africanisation for the intellectual transformation of scholarship in Africa. It will appeal to philosophers and logicians—undergraduates and post graduate researchers—as well as those in various areas of African studies.

I argue that one way in which a problem such as mass poverty in the sub-Saharan Africa can be addressed is through inclusive development, which is a pro poor, pro all, programme. However, it appears that the theoretical framework that can deliver the values of inclusive development has yet to be clearly sorted out. This is because, while bringing together all actors and factors, inclusive development should not subsume individual endowments to collective values. I fault Amartya Sen’s Capabilities approach which mounts a defence of development through democratic deliberation as treating the individual in a way that seemingly trivialises the sort of relationship—a complementary one— required for inclusive development to happen, and Thaddeus Metz’s ubuntu approach which though upholds individual endowments, tends to also appeal to the collective in a way that appears to place premium on some collective values like solidarity which, I think, can blur the line between individual endowments and collective values. So, I claim that inclusive development can better be delivered using the approach of conversational thinking which has the capacity to drive the values of inclusive development such as complementarity and comprehensiveness while at the same time sufficiently isolating the endowments of the individuals from the trappings of the collective. Conversational thinking achieves this by taking the nature of the relationships of the relevant variables to factor into the effort aimed at combating social protection problems such as poverty. Keywords : Sub-Saharan Africa, Inclusive development, Conversational thinking, Mass poverty, African philosophy.

This book introduces concepts in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy. Inside, three scholars offer approaches to the problems of identity, consciousness, and the mind. In the process, they open new vistas for thought and raise fresh controversies to some of the oldest problems in philosophy. The first chapter focuses on the identity problem. The author employs an explanatory model he christened sense-phenomenalism to defend the thesis that personal identity is something or a phenomenon that pertains to the observable/perceptible aspect of the human person. The next chapter explores the problem of consciousness. It deploys the new concept equiphenomenalism as a model to show that mental properties are not by-products but necessary products of consciousness. Herein, the notion of qualia is a fundamental and necessary product that must be experienced simultaneously with neural activities for consciousness to be possible. The last chapter addresses the mind/body problem. It adopts the new concept proto-phenomenalism as an alternative explanatory model. This model eliminates the idea of a mind. As such, it approaches the mind-body problem from a materialistic point of view with many implications such as, the meaning of our existence, the possibility of thought engineering as well as religious implications.

I argue that individual autonomy and rights can be defended but only in African or qualified version of communitarianism. I posit that there are two possible versions of communitarianism: the qualified or the African and the unqualified or the version discussed mostly by Western scholars. I show that Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, Michael Eze and Bernard Matolino have formulated communitarian theories of right in African philosophy. I explain that while Menkiti and Gyekye erroneously employed the unqualified version in their proposals, Eze and Matolino who employed the qualified version failed to ground it in a non-Western or African logic. I argue that while the Western or Aristotelian logic grounds the unqualified version making it difficult to defend autonomy and rights within it, an African logic can be used to ground a qualified version of communitarianism in order to bring out an important African cultural value such as complementarity which affirms the identity of the individual first, so as to justify other communal values such as solidarity and common good, etc. I therefore contend that the qualified version is the correct specimen for analysing the individual-community relationship in African philosophy in which autonomy and rights can be defended. Keywords: individual autonomy, rights, African philosophy, Afro-communitarianism, Menkiti, Gyekye, Eze, Matolino

Nous soutenons que l’enseignement de la philosophie à travers le monde est encore hanté par une «politique» de marginalisation des traditions moins favorisées comme la philosophie africaine. Des travaux renommés montrent que le programme classique de philosophie utilisé dans les établissements d’enseignement à travers le monde est principalement occidental et, en tant que tel, très colonial. Nous soutenons que cela équivaut à une sorte d’«injustice épistémique» qui porte préjudice à la production de la connaissance. Nous affirmons en particulier que cette «politique» doit être interrompue. Nous proposons comme alternative la tradition conversationnelle, à partir de laquelle une programme de philosophie compréhensif et inconciliable avec la politique d’exclusion pourrait être mis au point.

In this paper we focus on conversational thinking to demonstrate the value of public reasoning in building a decent world and true democracies. We shall take into account the views of selected scholars, especially John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, on law and democratic practice, to explain why post-colonial Africa is weighed down by sociopolitical hegemonies that have aversion to their opposition and eliminate room for strong institutions, rule of law and human rights. In light of conversational thinking, this eliminates any chance for “creative struggle,” i.e. a philosophers struggle against the post-colonial imaginary/social agents to dethrone strong individuals and create strong institutions. In the absence of these indices which a conversational orientation may engender, it is difficult to transform bogus democracy into true democracy and thus to create a decent society. Post-colonial Africa mired in social regression, political crisis and economic stagnation urgently needs conversational tonics to overcome the ineffectiveness of bogus democracy. We postulate a thesis about three structural transformations forming what we call Democratic Transformational Programme.

Africa is in economic and social terms widely regarded as an underdeveloped continent even though we in interrogatory theory would prefer the term developing instead. Its societies are characterized by unstable institutions. Societies ride on the wheels of institutions. Institutions are social structures or building blocks of any society. Repressive colonial times replaced traditional institutions with non-compatible ones ignoring any usable part of tradition and admitting without censorship every element in the imposed modernity. My position in this essay is that social structures in postcolonial Africa are ramshackled hence the massive retrogression of the continent’s social order. To get Africa on its feet and moving in the right direction requires the reconstruction of the social structures of Africa’s modernity and the construction of its futurity. I postulate interrogatory theory as a conversational algorithm that would provide the theoretic base for the authentic African renaissance. It is constructively questioning rather than being exclusively critical i.e. it questions to reconstruct rather than being merely critical to deconstruct; dialogical rather than merely individualistic; rigorous rather than merely informative; yet radical rather than being conventional.

This conversation is inspired by Uduma O. Uduma’s essay entitled “The Question of the ‘African’ in African Philosophy: In search of a Criterion for the Africanness of a Philosophy”. In this essay, Uduma coined what he calls “the Africanness of a Philosophy Question which consists in the ultimate criterion for African philosophy. He was not the first to dwell on the Africanness issue in African philosophy but he was the first, to my knowledge, to christen it as such. Before Uduma framed the question into a proper metaphilosophical concern in African philosophy, old campaigners like Paulin Hountondji, Odera Oruka, Peter Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu,Sophie Oluwole, Innocent Onyewuenyi, etc., have all dwelt on it with some going more in-depth than others. I have also dwelt partly on this question before in an essay entitled “The Criteria Question in African Philosop hy: Escape from the Horns of Jingoism and Afrocentrism”. Incidentally, my treatment of the issue was not digestive enough as I did not mention the likes of Bodunrin, Wiredu, Oluwole and even Uduma himself—a terrible short-sightedness—one that I wish to correct in this discussion. My first aim in this work is to attempt to settle this metaphilosophical vicious circle once and for all. On the basis of this, I wish also to orchestrate a shift from the vicious circle of metaphilosophical engagements to a more f ruitful conversational engagement in contemporary African philosophy. Our method shall consist in critical conversationalism.

In the aftermath of the great debate in African philosophy, questions have been asked which triggered what we would call post-debate disillusionments. One such question posed to the advocates of Philosophical Universalism who ridiculed ethnophilosophy is: having disestablished the episteme of what they ridiculed as ethnophilosophy, what do they offer in its place? The second question posed to both the advocates of Philosophical Universalism and Philosophical Particularism2 is: in the absence of any other point to debate about and in the absence of any commonly accepted episteme, what constitutes the concern and the future direction of African philosophy now? The fact that none of the two schools had any definite answers to these questions created unexpected disillusionments which saw many who had expended great intellectual energy during the debate silently exit the stage of African philosophy. One of our goals in this essay shall be sketching a brief outline of systematic African philosophy. In doing this, we shall show how the conversational school has evolved as a new school of thought that takes phenomenological3 issues as its concern in the contemporary period. Understandably, the promise of this new school shall be the centerpiece of this essay as we engage Bruce Janz in a conversation on the concept of »philosophical space.« Our methods shall be evaluative, critical and prescriptive.

Feminists all over the world are united in their contentions on many fronts such as societal norms and conditions that militate against a woman’s expression of her rights and abilities. In as many fronts, they have gained grounds, if not outright victories. However, we observe that among the Igbo women of Eastern Nigeria there is a front which accounts for substantial female deprivation, and which feminists have consistently passed over in their contentions, namely, the feminine cognition also known as epistemology of womanhood. In this paper, using the random sampling method, we have arrived at the conclusion that consciousness oftheir own gender has deprived Igbo women of free expression of their rights and abilities, sometimes as much as constraining societal norms and conditions have done. Consequently, we recommend a conscious adjustment of the epistemology of womanhood among Igbo women.

In this paper, I consider how the discourse on global epistemic justice might be approached differently if some contributions from the African philosophical place are taken seriously. To be specific, I argue that the debate on global justice broadly has not been global. I cite as an example, the exclusion or marginalisation of African philosophy, what it has contributed and what it may yet contribute to the global epistemic edifice. I point out that this exclusion is a case of epistemic injustice. I observe that the absence of a philosophical technique that prevails on philosophers to engage with others from other traditions might be responsible for this epistemic lopsidedness and marginalisation. I go beyond the re-statement of this problem of marginalisation of African philosophy to point out relevant doctrines from the African place. I show how they are united under the methodological and ideological disposition of conversationalism. I argue that this ideology might be a better model for realising the goal of global epistemic justice which is the overcoming of all forms of exclusions and lopsidedness in global epistemic discourses through fair allocation of intellectual spaces.

That African philosophy began with frustration and not with wonder as it is in Western tradition is a radical statement with far-reaching implications. Implications that are, as challenging as they are intellectually refreshing thus reinvigorating interest in the African discourse. As the discipline of African philosophy vitiated in the post debate disillusionment met with a new generation critical fire; methodic, technical and theoretic demands and issues unresolved in the old order surface. Old questions re-emerge with new and daunting toga while new questions present fresh challenges for thought. With a carefully selected pool of emerging, original, African thinkers, the editor brought a creatively fascinating illumination upon the African episteme to herald the new era of African thought. The essays in this collection remark a sort of radical break from a long standing convention that requires serious critical reconstruction. Presenting a paradigm of creative individual philosophizing, the history, dating, criteria, logic and periodization imbroglio in African philosophy were resolved to give shape and direction to a hitherto formless discipline. Fundamental questions in ontology, epistemology, ethics and political thought gave birth to stunning metanarratives to inaugurate the conversational orientation in African philosophy. It provides a systematization that has been missing for almost a century and upon it defines an intellectually exciting future for the discipline. Whoever that wants to do African philosophy and understand it and make input must read this corpus. Carefully articulated and written, the essays in this collection constitute dependable research resources for students and researchers in all areas of African philosophy and studies.