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Iris van Rooij

Radboud University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    34
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    • Topics
  •  Recommended
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 More details
  • Radboud University
    Department of Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence
    Professor
University of Victoria
PhD, 2003
Email (login required)
Homepage
Nijmegen, Gelderland, Netherlands
0000-0001-6520-4635
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Computational Complexity
Computationalism in Cognitive Science
Theory of Computation, Misc
Levels of Analysis in Cognitive Science
Explanation in Cognitive Science
Rationality and Cognitive Science
Conceptual Analysis
3 more
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Theory of Computation
History of Psychology
Computational Philosophy
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
Philosophy of Psychology
Representationalism
2 more
  • All publications (34)
  •  27
    Identifying sources of intractability in cognitive models: An illustration using analogical structure mapping
    with Patricia Evans, Moritz Müller, Jason Gedge, and Todd Wareham
    In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society., Cognitive Science Society. 2008.
    Philosophy of Psychology
  •  115
    Higher-level processes in the formation and application of associations during action understanding
    with Lieke Heil, Stan van Pelt, Johan Kwisthout, and Harold Bekkering
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2): 202-203. 2014.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessAspects of Consciousness
  •  131
    A non-representational approach to imagined action
    Cognitive Science 26 (3): 345-375. 2002.
    This study addresses the dynamical nature of a “representation‐hungry” cognitive task involving an imagined action. In our experiment, participants were handed rods that systematically increased or decreased in length on subsequent trials. Participants were asked to judge whether or not they thought they could reach for a distant object with the hand‐held rod. The results are in agreement with a dynamical model, extended from Tuller, Case, Ding, and Kelso (1994). The dynamical effects observed i…Read more
    This study addresses the dynamical nature of a “representation‐hungry” cognitive task involving an imagined action. In our experiment, participants were handed rods that systematically increased or decreased in length on subsequent trials. Participants were asked to judge whether or not they thought they could reach for a distant object with the hand‐held rod. The results are in agreement with a dynamical model, extended from Tuller, Case, Ding, and Kelso (1994). The dynamical effects observed in this study suggest that predictive judgments regarding the possibility or impossibility of a certain action can be understood in terms of dynamically evolving basins of attraction instead of as depending on representational structures.
    Cognitive Sciences
  •  120
    One wrong does not justify another: Accepting dual processes by fallacy of false alternatives
    with Gideon Keren and Yaacov Schul
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3): 269-270. 2007.
    Barbey & Sloman (B&S) advocate a dual-process (two-system) approach by comparing it with an alternative perspective (ecological rationality), claiming that the latter is unwarranted. Rejecting this alternative approach cannot serve as sufficient evidence for the viability of the former
    Philosophy of PsychologyThe Nature of Reasoning
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