Marc Slors

The New Neurophilosophy: An Introduction to the ANTW special issue Contemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophilosophy of the 1980’s. It features two implicit ideas: First, commonsense cognitive concepts (CCC’s) like ‘free will’, ‘thoughts’, ‘consciousness’, ‘attention’ and ‘self’, belong to a variety of disciplines and cannot be appropriated by either philosophy or cognitive neuroscience. Second, the description of biological processes in the brain and the description of behavioral processes by CCC’s are so far removed from each other that a simple reduction, or even a relation of implementation between them, is implausible. What is needed instead, is a relation of interpretation: which cognitive concepts should be used to describe specific brain processes is not fixed in advance but the outcome of an ongoing negotiation between common sense practice, philosophy, and cognitive neuroscience. All articles in this special issue shed light on these two key ideas that characterize a new neurophilosophy.

In most literature on human cultural evolution and the emergence of large-scale cooperation, the main function of cultural conventions is described as providing group-markers. This paper argues that cultural conventions serve another purpose as well that is at least as important. Large-scale cooperation is characterized by complex division of labour and by a diversity of social roles associated with cultural institutions. This requires ubiquitous ‘role-interaction coordination’ – as it will be labelled. It is argued that without cultural conventions this type of coordination would be cognitively intractable. Thus, apart from functioning as group markers, they are first and foremost important group-makers.

This special issue is a follow-up on a previous issue in this journal on self-management in psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine. It is the concluding chapter of a research project that sought to unpack and develop the implications of an understanding of self-management in psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine as “management of the self.”Over the last, 20 years, self-management has gained a central place in treatment programs across various medical disciplines. It positions patients as “expert-clients,” who share knowledge, responsibilities and expertise with health professionals, and it actively involves them in the management of their own care (Crawford, Lee, May, & Active Self-Care...

In his thoughtful commentary, De Bruin invites us to say more about the notion of causation in our two-dimensional model of self-management in health care. In particular, he thinks there is a tension between 1) self-management-as-facilitation being causally efficacious and 2) “surgical” self-management interventions on specific variables being practically impossible in psychiatric conditions due to their complex dynamic nature. In particular, he asks us: “How can we establish the causal efficacy of these intentions if we are dealing with complex dynamic systems that do not allow for precise surgical interventions?”. The assumption seems to be that one can only...

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Introduction. Marc SLORS: Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction. Michael PAUEN: Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization? Sven WALTER: Need Multiple Realizability Deter the Identity-Theorist? Achim STEPHAN: Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation. Carl GILLETT: The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance. Wim DE MUIJNCK: Causation by Relational Properties. Albert NEWEN & Rimas ČUPLINSKAS: Mental Causation: A Real Phenomenon in a Physicalistic World without Epiphenomenalism or Overdetermination. Bernd LUDWIG: Warum kommen „mentale Ursachen“ physikalischen Erklärungen eigentlich nicht in die Quere? Einige grundsätzliche Überlegungen zur Verwendung des Ausdrucks „A verursacht B“ im Umkreis moderner naturwissenschaftlicher Theorien. Besprechungen/Review Articles. Buchnotizen/Critical Notes

In 'Philosophy of Mind, Brain and Behaviour' wordt het begrip 'cognitiefilosofie' voor het eerst in Nederland op de kaart gezet als een combinatie van de Angelsaksische en de fenomenologische philosophy of mind. Onderwerpen op het snijvlak van filosofie, sociale en neurowetenschappen komen aan bod, zoals sociale cognitie, persoonlijke identiteit, het lichaam-geestprobleem en theorieën over bewustzijn, emoties en vrije wil. Om een breed academisch publiek te bedienen, verschijnt dit boek in het Engels.00Marc Slors is hoogleraar cognitiefilosofie aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen. Eerder verscheen van hem bij Uitgeverij Boom 'Dat had je gedacht!'. Leon de Bruin en Derek Strijbos werken als onderzoeker en docent aan diezelfde universiteit.

Group-identification and cognition: Why trivial conventions are more important than we think In existing (evolutionary) explanations for group formation and -identification, the function of cultural conventions such as social etiquette and dress codes is limited to providing group-markers. Group formation and identification itself is explained in terms of less arbitrary and more substantial phenomena such as shared norms and institutions. In this paper I will argue that, however trivial and arbitrary, cultural conventions fulfil an important cognitive function that makes them essential to the formation of and identification with large groups. Complex role-division, both informal and institutional, is important in the functioning of any large group of people. Shared conventions enable a virtually automatic understanding of signals, scripts and rules that regulate the interaction of divided roles. They provide a cultural infrastructure within which we perceive e.g. specific behavior and clothing as a range of social-cultural affordances for role-interactions. Shared familiarity with this infrastructure is the foundation for the basic kind of trust of in-group strangers that is a requirement for the formation of large groups. This non-intellectualist view on group formation and group identification can contribute to new ways of dealing with problems in multicultural societies.

In de vroege jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw publiceerde Benjamin Libet de resultaten van experimenten waarmee hij volgens velen de illusie van een vrije wil aantoonde. Wat Libet liet zien, was dat hersenactiviteit te meten is die indicatief is voor een aankomende handeling kort voordat iemand de bewuste intentie vormt die handeling uit te voeren. Op het moment dat we bewust de ‘beslissing’ nemen een handeling uit te voeren, zijn onze hersenen al bezig geweest die handeling voor te bereiden; de bewuste beslissing komt als mosterd na de maaltijd.