Simon Derpmann

A philosophical inquiry into the ethics or the morals of distress has to address a distinction regarding its very own scope. On the one hand, situations of distress can be understood to involve particular moral considerations. On the other hand, distress can be understood as the presence of specific characteristics that may allow for a divergence from what is obliged from the moral point of view. The article reflects on the idea of distress as setting limits to moral reflection and obligation, considering particular examples that illustrate the meaning of integrity and personal ties and their practical relevance in situations of distress. In the light of these reflections it seems inadequate to claim that distress exempts one from relying on moral reasoning altogether, but rather that situations of distress engender specific moral considerations.

The emergence of H1N1 in 2009 shows that it is a mistake to regard the scenario of having to implement pandemic plans as merely hypothetical. This recent experience provides an opportunity to inquire into the current state of pandemic preparedness plans with regard to their ethical adequacy. One aspect that deserves consideration in this context is the disclosure of ethical reasoning. Accordingly, the following is an analysis of examples of pandemic plans and drafts of plans from Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. It is an analysis of the occurrence of explicit ethical reflection in these documents as well an inquiry into the related question of how ethical reflection can be understood as a constitutive element of ethical pandemic preparedness.In the analysis, different fields of ethical consideration concerning equity, personal rights and accountability are distinguished. There are both pragmatic and genuinely ethical reasons to explicitly address issues of these types in pandemic plans. The extent to which ethical language appears in the national plans in South East Asia and the Western Pacific suggests that there is limited awareness of ethical considerations, or at least insufficient ethical substantiation of pandemic action. The aim of the analysis is to show that further inclusion of ethical considerations into pandemic plans is ethically demanded. It is of particular significance that these considerations are formulated and remain discernible as instances of ethical deliberation.

The review article examines the relation of solidarity and cosmopolitanism in contemporary political philosophical and sociological debates. In some contexts solidarity and cosmopolitanism are closely related, in others they are understood to be incompatible. The main body of the report is divided into three parts displaying a tentative classification of the reviewed literature on the subject. The first part serves to outline a general account of solidarity, the communal obligations that follow from it, and its opposition to the moral arguments grounding cosmopolitan obligations. The second part deals with the actual development and realization of solidarity and cosmopolitanism, as well as the tension between both within the European Union. The third part considers some arguments for the extension of solidarity relations beyond state or nation towards cosmopolitan affiliations, obligations and institutions. Finally, a reading of solidarity and cosmopolitanism is offered in which both are compatible with each other.