Anya Plutynski

There have been two different schools of thought on the evolution of dominance. On the one hand, followers of Wright [Wright S. 1929. Am. Nat. 63: 274–279, Evolution: Selected Papers by Sewall Wright, University of Chicago Press, Chicago; 1934. Am. Nat. 68: 25–53, Evolution: Selected Papers by Sewall Wright, University of Chicago Press, Chicago; Haldane J.B.S. 1930. Am. Nat. 64: 87–90; 1939. J. Genet. 37: 365–374; Kacser H. and Burns J.A. 1981. Genetics 97: 639–666] have defended the view that dominance is a product of non-linearities in gene expression. On the other hand, followers of Fisher [Fisher R.A. 1928a. Am. Nat. 62: 15–126; 1928b. Am. Nat. 62: 571–574; Bürger R. 1983a. Math. Biosci. 67: 125–143; 1983b. J. Math. Biol. 16: 269–280; Wagner G. and Burger R. 1985. J. Theor. Biol. 113: 475–500; Mayo O. and Reinhard B. 1997. Biol. Rev. 72: 97–110] have argued that dominance evolved via selection on modifier genes. Some have called these “physiological” versus “selectionist,” or more recently [Falk R. 2001. Biol. Philos. 16: 285–323], “functional,” versus “structural” explanations of dominance. This paper argues, however, that one need not treat these explanations as exclusive. While one can disagree about the most likely evolutionary explanation of dominance, as Wright and Fisher did, offering a “physiological” or developmental explanation of dominance does not render dominance “epiphenomenal,” nor show that evolutionary considerations are irrelevant to the maintenance of dominance, as some [Kacser H. and Burns J.A. 1981. Genetics 97: 639–666] have argued. Recent work [Gilchrist M.A. and Nijhout H.F. 2001. Genetics 159: 423–432] illustrates how biological explanation is a multi-level task, requiring both a “top-down” approach to understanding how a pattern of inheritance or trait might be maintained in populations, as well as “bottom-up” modeling of the dynamics of gene expression.

Mainstream philosophy of science has embraced an “empiricist” approach to scientific method. To be slightly more precise, I venture that most philosophers of science today would endorse the view that experience is the source of most scientific knowledge. The aim of this essay will be to challenge the consensus, by showing how we cannot and should not abandon all elements of the “rationalist” tradition, a tradition often identified with philosophers such as Descartes. There are several elements frequently identified with “rationalist” science (Stump, 2005): questioning of sense experience, the attempt to rethink the “metaphysical” foundations of one’s science, using either thought experiment, or appealing to demonstrative arguments purporting to establish ‘necessary’ truths, often using either mathematics or geometry, and appeal to “virtues” not usually considered “strictly empirical,” such as simplicity. This essay explores the effective deployment of such considerations in the history and current practice of science.

Roderic Page’s new book, Tangled Trees: Phylogeny, Cospeciation and Coevolution (2003), is a worthwhile read for anyone interested in either methodological issues in systematics, or how organisms shape one another’s selective environments. “Cospeciation,” for the uninitiated, is the concurrent speciation of two or more lineages that are ecologically associated (e.g. host-parasite associations, as well as mutualistic or symbiotic associations). “Coevolution,” in contrast, is the reciprocal adaptation of hosts and parasite taxa. The main focus of Page’s book is thus when, how and why the branching process of host taxa mirrors that of parasite taxa. “Parasite” here is broadly conceived to be anything from a louse to a virus to a retrotransposon, and “host” may be anything from a genome to a whale.

This paper uses a number of examples of diverse types and functions of models in evolutionary biology to argue that the demarcation between theory and practice, or “theory model” and “data model,” is often difficult to make. It is shown how both mathematical and laboratory models function as plausibility arguments, existence proofs, and refutations in the investigation of questions about the pattern and process of evolutionary history. I consider the consequences of this for the semantic approach to theories and theory confirmation. The paper attempts to reconcile the insights of both critics and advocates of the semantic approach to theories.

Sahotra Sarkar’s Biodiversity and environmental philosophy, An introduction is an important and timely book. The book is unique in that it is genuinely interdisciplinary: Sarkar is not only an observer, but also an active participant in the new field of conservation biology, and so, his book not only reviews the best recent science, but also advances it. The book is thus exemplary of both a naturalized approach to philosophy of science and a scientifically informed approach to environmental ethics. The book has four parts: a defense of biodiversity preservation, a systematic overview of ecological theory as it pertains to conservation, a critical history of conservation biology, and a discussion of how to prioritize places for conservation. Sarkar integrates nicely the normative and scientific aspects of the problem of conservation.