•  127
    A companion to the philosophy of biology (edited book)
    Blackwell. 2008.
    Comprised of essays by top scholars in the field, this volume offers concise overviews of philosophical issues raised by biology. Brings together a team of eminent scholars to explore the philosophical issues raised by biology Addresses traditional and emerging topics, spanning molecular biology and genetics, evolution, developmental biology, immunology, ecology, mind and behaviour, neuroscience, and experimentation Begins with a thorough introduction to the field Goes beyond previous treatments…Read more
  •  79
    Review of Sandra Mitchell, Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (4). 2004.
  •  244
    Explanation in classical population genetics
    Philosophy of Science 71 (5): 1201-1214. 2004.
    The recent literature in philosophy of biology has drawn attention to the different sorts of explanations proffered in the biological sciences—we have molecular, biomedical, and evolutionary explanations. Do these explanations all have a common structure or relation that they seek to capture? This paper will answer in the negative. I defend a pluralistic and pragmatic approach to explanation. Using examples from classical population genetics, I argue that formal demonstrations, and even strictly…Read more
  •  1236
    Neutralism
    In Christopher Stephens & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Elsevier Handbook in Philosophy of Biology, Elsevier. 2004.
    In 1968, Motoo Kimura submitted a note to Nature entitled “Evolutionary Rate at the Molecular Level,” in which he proposed what has since become known as the neutral theory of molecular evolution. This is the view that the majority of evolutionary changes at the molecular level are caused by random drift of selectively neutral or nearly neutral alleles. Kimura was not proposing that random drift explains all evolutionary change. He does not challenge the view that natural selection explains adap…Read more
  •  193
    The rise and fall of the adaptive landscape?
    Biology and Philosophy 23 (5): 605-623. 2008.
    The discussion of the adaptive landscape in the philosophical literature appears to be divided along the following lines. On the one hand, some claim that the adaptive landscape is either “uninterpretable” or incoherent. On the other hand, some argue that the adaptive landscape has been an important heuristic, or tool in the service of explaining, as well as proposing and testing hypotheses about evolutionary change. This paper attempts to reconcile these two views.