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283Why Racial Profiling Is Hard to Justify: A Response to Risse and ZeckhauserPhilosophy and Public Affairs 33 (1): 94-110. 2004.In their article, “Racial Profiling,” Risse and Zeckhauser offer a qualified defense of racial profiling in a racist society, such as the contemporary United States of America. It is a qualified defense, because they wish to distinguish racial profiling as it is, and as it might be, and to argue that while the former is not justified, the latter might be. Racial profiling as it is, they recognize, is marked by police abuse and the harassment of racial minorities, and by the disproportionate use …Read more
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434What's wrong with racial profiling? Another look at the problemCriminal Justice Ethics 26 (1): 20-28. 2007.In this paper I respond to Mathias Risse's objections to my critique of his views on racial profiling in Philosophy and Public Affairs. I draw on the work of Richard Sampson and others on racial disadvantage in the USA to show that racial profiling likely aggravates racial injustices that are already there. However, I maintain, clarify and defend my original claim against Risse that racial profiling itself is likely to cause racial injustice, even if we abstract from unfair background conditio…Read more
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76The Politics of Paradox: A Response to Wendy BrownConstellations 7 (2): 242-254. 2000.What role should rights play in feminist politics and the quest for equality? This article examines Wendy Brown's response to that question in her 'suffering rights as paradoxes' and shows that for all its merits, it draws our attention away from the central question of how to describe women's interests, given the many differences amongst women.
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146Treating People as Equals: Ethical Objections to Racial Profiling and the Composition of Juries (review)The Journal of Ethics 15 (1-2). 2011.This paper shows that the problem of treating people as equals in a world marked by deep-seated and, often, recalcitrant inequalities has implications for the way we approach the provision of security and justice. On the one hand, it means that racial profiling will generally be unjustified even when it might promote collective interests in security, on the other, it means that we should strive to create racially mixed juries, even in cases where defendant and alleged-victim are of the same race…Read more
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353What can philosophy tell us about ethics and public policy? What can the ethics of public policy tell us about philosophy? Those are the questions that Jonathan Wolff addresses in his wonderful little book. At one level, of course, the answer is straightforward – ethics is a branch of philosophy, so philosophy can tell us about the ethics of public policy, understood as a matter of deciding ‘what we should do' in a manner that is institutionalised and collectively binding. But at another level, …Read more
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59When the Philosopher Enters the RoomPhilosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 4 (3): 7-19. 2014.What can philosophy tell us about ethics and public policy? What can the ethics of public policy tell us about philosophy? Those are the questions that Jonathan Wolff addresses in his wonderful little book. At one level, of course, the answer is straightforward – ethics is a branch of philosophy, so philosophy can tell us about the ethics of public policy, understood as a matter of deciding ‘what we should do’ in a manner that is institutionalised and collectively binding. But at another level, …Read more
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138Towards a democracy-centred ethicsCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22 (1): 18-33. 2019.The core idea of this paper is that we can use the differences between democratic and undemocratic governments to illuminate ethical problems, particularly in the area of political philosophy. Democratic values, rights and institutions lie between the most abstract considerations of ethics and meta-ethics and the most particularised decisions, outcomes and contexts. Hence, this paper argues, we can use the differences between democratic and undemocratic governments, as we best understand them, …Read more
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Sven Ove Hansson and Elin Palm, eds., The Ethics of Workplace Privacy (review)Philosophy in Review 26 348-350. 2006.
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391Statistical discriminationThe Philosophers' Magazine 72 75-76. 2016.Racial discrimination uses race as grounds to discriminate in the treatment owed to others; sexual discrimination uses people’s sexual features as grounds for determining how they should be treated compared to others. Analogously, statistical discrimination treats statistical inferences about the groups to which individuals belong as grounds for discriminating amongst them in thought, word and deed. Examples of statistical discrimination include the employer who won’t hire women of childbearing …Read more
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289Sven Ove Hansson and Elin Palm, eds., The Ethics of Workplace Privacy Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 26 (5): 348-350. 2006.
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127Privacy Rights and Democracy: A Contradiction in Terms?Contemporary Political Theory 5 (2): 142-162. 2006.This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people's freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, an…Read more
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370States and Citizens: History, Theory, ProspectsContemporary Political Theory 4 (1): 85-87. 2005.
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345Racial profiling and jury trialsThe Jury Expert 21 (1): 20-35. 2009.How, if at all, should race figure in criminal trials with a jury? How far should attorneys be allowed or encouraged to probe the racial sensitivities of jurors and what does this mean for the appropriate way to present cases which involve racial profiling and, therefore, are likely to pit the words and actions of a white policeman against those of a young black man?
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403Privacy, democracy, and securityThe Philosophers' Magazine 63 99-105. 2013.It is especially hard, at present, to read the newspapers without emitting a howl of anguish and outrage. Philosophy can heal some wounds but, in this case, political action may prove a better remedy than philosophy. It can therefore feel odd trying to think philosophically about surveillance at a time like this, rather than joining with like-minded people to protest the erosion of our civil liberties, the duplicity of our governments, and the failings in our political institutions - includin…Read more
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130Privacy, democracy, and securityThe Philosophers' Magazine 63 99-105. 2013.It is especially hard, at present, to read the newspapers without emitting a howl of anguish and outrage. Philosophy can heal some wounds but, in this case, political action may prove a better remedy than philosophy. It can therefore feel odd trying to think philosophically about surveillance at a time like this, rather than joining with like‐minded people to protest the erosion of our civil liberties, the duplicity of our governments, and the failings in our political institutions ‐ including o…Read more
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51On PrivacyRoutledge. 2011.This book explores the Janus-faced features of privacy, and looks at their implications for the control of personal information, for sexual and reproductive freedom, and for democratic politics. It asks what, if anything, is wrong with asking women to get licenses in order to have children, given that pregnancy and childbirth can seriously damage your health. It considers whether employers should be able to monitor the friendships and financial affairs of employees, and whether we are entitled t…Read more
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419Mrs. Aremac and the camera: A response to RybergRes Publica 14 (1): 35-42. 2008.In a recent article in Respublica, Jesper Ryberg argues that CCTV can be compared to a little old lady gazing out onto the street below. This article takes issue with the claim that government surveillance can be justified in this manner. Governments have powers and responsibilities that little old ladies lack. Even if CCTV is effective at preventing crime, there may be less intrusive ways of doing so. People have a variety of legitimate interests in privacy, and protection for these is importan…Read more
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456Neuroscience v. privacy? : a democratic perspectiveIn Sarah Richmond, Geraint Rees & Sarah J. L. Edwards (eds.), I know what you're thinking: brain imaging and mental privacy, Oxford University Press. pp. 205. 2012.Recent developments in neuroscience create new opportunities for understanding the human brain. The power to do good, however, is also the power to harm, so scientific advances inevitably foster as many dystopian fears as utopian hopes. For instance, neuroscience lends itself to the fear that people will be forced to reveal thoughts and feelings which they would not have chosen to reveal, and of which they may be unaware. It also lends itself to the worry that people will be encouraged to s…Read more
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347Must privacy and sexual equality conflict? A philosophical examination of some legal evidenceSocial Research: An International Quarterly 67 (4): 1137-1171. 2001.Are rights to privacy consistent with sexual equality? In a brief, but influential, article Catherine MacKinnon trenchantly laid out feminist criticisms of the right to privacy. In “Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade” she linked familiar objections to the right to privacy and connected them to the fate of abortion rights in the U.S.A. (MacKinnon, 1983, 93-102). For many feminists, the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had suggested that, notwithstanding a dubious past, lega…Read more
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790Mill and the secret ballot: Beyond coercion and corruptionUtilitas 19 (3): 354-378. 2007.In Considerations on Representative Government, John Stuart Mill concedes that secrecy in voting is often justified but, nonetheless, maintains that it should be the exception rather than the rule. This paper critically examines Mill’s arguments. It shows that Mill’s idea of voting depends on a sharp public/private distinction which is difficult to square with democratic ideas about the different powers and responsibilities of voters and their representatives, or with legitimate differences o…Read more
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128Must Privacy and Sexual Equality Conflict? A Philosophical Examination of Some Legal EvidenceSocial Research: An International Quarterly 67 1137-1172. 2000.This paper examines MacKinnon’s claims about the relationship of rights to privacy and equality in light of the reasoning in Harris and Bowers. When we contrast the Majority and Minority decisions in these cases, it shows, we can distinguish interpretations of the right to privacy that are consistent with sexual equality from those that are not. This is not simply because the two differ in their consequences – though they do - but because the former, unlike the latter, rely on empirical and no…Read more
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652Is judicial review undemocratic?Perspectives on Politics 7 (4): 897-915. 2009.This paper examines Jeremy Waldron’s ‘core case’ against judicial review. Waldron’s arguments, it shows, exaggerate the importance of voting to our judgements about the legitimacy and democratic credentials of a society and its government. Moreover, Waldron is insufficiently sensitive to the ways that judicial review can provide a legitimate avenue of political activity for those seeking to rectify historic injustice. While judicial review is not necessary for democratic government, the paper c…Read more
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353Is It Ethical To Patent Human Genes?In Gosseries Axel, Marciano A. & Strowel A. (eds.), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice, Basingstoke & N.y.: Palgrave Mcmillan. pp. 246--64. 2008.This paper examines the claims that moral objections to the patenting of human genes are misplaced and rest on confusions about what a patent is, or what is patented by a human gene patent. It shows that theese objections rest on too simple a conception of property rights, and the connections betwteen familiar moral objections to private property and moral objections to the patenting of human genes. Above all, the paper claims, objections to HGPs often reflect worries about the lack of democra…Read more
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18Law and the philosophy of privacyContemporary Political Theory 16 (3): 402-404. 2017.This is a frustrating book: on the one hand, it promises a new outlook on the philosophy of privacy, based upon the work of Luciano Floridi and Baruch Spinoza, which is a welcome extension of the sources used to think about privacy in contemporary political philosophy; on the other hand, it virtually ignores the existing literature on the philosophy and law of privacy. As the presentation of the legal and philosophical issues tends to be schematic, it is quite difficult to know what the book off…Read more
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472Jo Ellen Jacobs, The Voice of Harriet Taylor Mill Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 24 (2): 118-119. 2004.
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11De la vie privéeAuthorhouse UK. 2023."Annabelle Lever montre très bien à quel point une vie accomplie est aussi une vie privée." - Gil Delannoi, Sciences Po "La nature et l'étendue de nos droits à la vie privée est une des questions centrales de notre époque. Dans ce livre accessible et agréable à lire, Annabelle Lever examine ce que signifie la vie privée et les liens complexes que celle-ci entretient avec la démocratie. Lever offre une contribution remarquable à notre compréhension de l'importance de la vie privée pour les sociét…Read more
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114Ethics and the patenting of human genesJournal of Philosophy, Science and Law 1 31-46. 2001.Human gene patents are patents on human genes that have been removed from human bodies and scientifically isolated and manipulated in a laboratory. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the USPTO) has issued thousands of patents on such genes, and patents have also been granted by the European Patent Office, (the EPO). Legal and moral justification, however, are not identical, and it is possible for a legal decision to be immoral although consistent with legal precedent and procedure. So, it …Read more
Annabelle Lever
SciencesPo, Paris
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SciencesPo, ParisProfessor