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Do we need haecceitates to be haecceitists?Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 18 573-586. 2007.
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711To exist and to count: A note on the minimalist viewDialectica 63 (3): 343-356. 2009.Sometimes mereologists have problems with counting. We often don't want to count the parts of maximally connected objects as full-fledged objects themselves, and we don't want to count discontinuous objects as parts of further, full-fledged objects. But whatever one takes "full-fledged object" to mean, the axioms and theorems of classical, extensional mereology commit us to the existence both of parts and of wholes – all on a par, included in the domain of quantification – and this makes mereolo…Read more
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31Pragmatic and dialogic interpretations of bi-intuitionism. Part 1Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (4): 449-480. 2014.We consider a “polarized” version of bi-intuitionistic logic [5, 2, 6, 4] as a logic of assertions and hypotheses and show that it supports a “rich proof theory” and an interesting categorical interpretation, unlike the standard approach of C. Rauszer’s Heyting-Brouwer logic [28, 29], whose categorical models are all partial orders by Crolard’s theorem [8]. We show that P.A. Melliès notion of chirality [21, 22] appears as the right mathematical representation of the mirror symmetry between the i…Read more
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994Assertion and hypothesis: a logical framework for their opposition relationsLogic Journal of the IGPL 25 (2): 131-144. 2017.Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola by outlining a pragmatic logic for assertions and hypothe…Read more
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386On assertion and denial in the logic for pragmaticsJournal of Applied Logic 25. 2017.The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence
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497A Notion of Logical Concept Based on Plural ReferenceActa Analytica 33 (1): 19-33. 2018.In To be is to be the object of a possible act of choice the authors defended Boolos’ thesis that plural quantification is part of logic. To this purpose, plural quantification was explained in terms of plural reference, and a semantics of plural acts of choice, performed by an ideal team of agents, was introduced. In this paper, following that approach, we develop a theory of concepts that—in a sense to be explained—can be labeled as a theory of logical concepts. Within this theory, we propose …Read more
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7Comments on HughesDialectica 59 (4): 481-484. 2005.The aim of this paper is to discuss Hughes’ formulation of three‐dimensionalism. Firstly, I observe that the linguistic data do not clearly support his formulation. Secondly, the arguments he uses to state his formulation could be disputed either on the basis of a difference between ordinary language and regimented language, or on the basis of a different notion of temporal part.
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298A Multimodal Pragmatic Treatment of the Knowability Paradox.In Gillman Payette & Rafał Urbaniak (eds.), Applications of Formal Philosophy: The Road Less Travelled, Springer International Publishing Ag. pp. 195-209. 2017.
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865Composition and Relative CountingDialectica 71 (4): 489-529. 2017.According to the so-called strong variant of Composition as Identity (CAI), the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals can be extended to composition, by resorting to broadly Fregean relativizations of cardinality ascriptions. In this paper we analyze various ways in which this relativization could be achieved. According to one broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about objects, while concepts occupy an additional argument place. It should be possible to paraphrase t…Read more
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43Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part II”Mind and Society 6 (1): 35-39. 2007.This is an excerpt from the contentIn the introduction to part I of the symposium we stated that a rational agent could be thought of as an agent who has good reasons for its actions. In formal analyses of economic, medical, political, military and forensic decisions rationality, that is the “goodness” of those reasons, is inextricably intertwined with probability. Typically, those analyses concern decisions in a particular class of uncertain situations, namely “risky” situations, where all the …Read more
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226Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument against the Type Solution to the Knowability ParadoxTheoria 77 (2): 180-193. 2011.The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument to the effect that, if there are truths not actually known, then there are unknowable truths. Recently, Alexander Paseau and Bernard Linsky have independently suggested a possible way to counter this argument by typing knowledge. In this article, we argue against their proposal that if one abstracts from other possible independent considerations supporting reasons for typing knowledge and considers the motivation for a type-theoretic approach with re…Read more
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114To Be is to Be the Object of a Possible Act of ChoiceStudia Logica 96 (2): 289-313. 2010.Aim of the paper is to revise Boolos’ reinterpretation of second-order monadic logic in terms of plural quantification ([4], [5]) and expand it to full second order logic. Introducing the idealization of plural acts of choice, performed by a suitable team of agents, we will develop a notion of plural reference . Plural quantification will be then explained in terms of plural reference. As an application, we will sketch a structuralist reconstruction of second-order arithmetic based on the axiom …Read more
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159Artifact Categorization. Trends and ProblemsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3): 351-373. 2013.The general question (G) How do we categorize artifacts? can be subject to three different readings: an ontological, an epistemic and a semantic one. According to the ontological reading, asking (G) is equivalent to asking in virtue of what properties, if any, a certain artifact is an instance of some artifact kind: (O) What is it for an artifact a to belong to kind K? According to the epistemic reading, when we ask (G) we are investigating what properties of the object we exploit in order to de…Read more
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26Errata Corrige to “Pragmatic and dialogic interpretation of bi-intuitionism. Part I”Logic and Logical Philosophy 25 (2). 2016.
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225If engineering function is a family resemblance concept: Assessing three formalization strategiesApplied ontology 6 (2): 141-163. 2011.
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142.4. Criteri d’identità e adeguatezza logicaRivista di Estetica 49 141-160. 2012.Aim of the paper is to make some steps towards a formal characterization of identity criteria. First of all, we analyse some logical requirements identity criteria are supposed to satisfy and observe that some commonly used identity criteria fail to meet some of them. We focus in particular on the equivalence requirement. We consider then the proposals which have been given so far and aimed at providing logical adequacy to non-equivalent identity conditions. To this purpose, we analyse Williamso…Read more
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Some observations on the identity of indiscerniblesRivista di Storia Della Filosofia 57 (1): 28-45. 2002.
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1Individuals, Essence, and Identity. Themes of Analytic Metaphysics (edited book)Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2002.
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57Propositions. An introductionGrazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1): 1-27. 2006.According to Frege a proposition—or, in his terms, a thought—is an abstract structured entity constituted by senses which satisfies, at least, the three following properties: it can be semantically assessed as true or as false, it is the object of so called propositional attitudes and it can be grasped. What Frege meant by 'grasping' is the peculiar way in which we can have epistemic access to propositions. The possibility for propositions to be grasped is put by Frege as a warrant for their exi…Read more
Padua, Italy
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |