Massimiliano Carrara

Aim of the paper is to make some steps towards a formal characterization of identity criteria. First of all, we analyse some logical requirements identity criteria are supposed to satisfy and observe that some commonly used identity criteria fail to meet some of them. We focus in particular on the equivalence requirement. We consider then the proposals which have been given so far and aimed at providing logical adequacy to non-equivalent identity conditions. To this purpose, we analyse Williamson’s and De Clerq and Horsten’s treatment of identity criteria. We expand their formal framework, characterizing identity conditions in terms of contexts and levels of granularity too.

The key-terms "language," "knowledge" and "metaphysics" arguably shape most of the recent researches in analytic philosophy. This volume aim to address some of the currently debated issues revolving around these three fundamental areas and, in particular: can the notion of "descriptive name" be extended to names of natural kinds? What does it mean for a belief to be justified? Is there a principled way to draw the distinction between causal and non causal relations? Do future contingent claims require us to employ a notion of relative truth? In what sense analytic sentences could be taken to be known a posteriori? The twelve papers collected in this volume arise from a selection of those presented during the First Graduate Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy held at the University of Padua in September 2007. The authors are all young and brilliant scholars coming from some of the most prestigious universities in the world: University College, Nottingham, Princeton, Kentucky, Stanford, Eastern Piedmont, St. Andrews, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Duhram, Catholic University of Leuven, London School of Economics.

In questo articolo sviluppiamo una Logica Dialeteista con Assunzioni e Conclusioni Esclusive, DLEAC. A questo scopo, verrà adottata la semantica della Logica del Paradosso (LP), estesa definendo una specifica nozione di modello. L’apparato deduttivo viene modificato specificando le nozioni di Assunzione e Conclusione, considerate come atti linguistici. Successivamente, introduciamo un nuovo paradosso — il paradosso del diniego —, sia informalmente che formalmente, derivandolo all’interno di un’estensione di DLEAC concepita apposta per esprimerlo. Un tale paradosso rappresenta un serio problema per il dialeteismo, nello specifico per la versione di Priest in cui si considerano gli atti linguistici di asserzione e diniego, e gli atteggiamenti proposizionali di accettazione e rifiuto, come esclusivi. Infine, discutiamo due proposte che Priest potrebbe avanzare per superare il paradosso: raffinare le nozioni pragmatiche in gioco e mostrare che il paradosso è un caso di dilemma razionale. Si mostra che entrambe le strategie non sono efficaci.