Barry Allen

Juxtaposing two dates in human evolution poses a mystery. Anatomically modern people (with our bodies, brains, and genes) apparently first appear in Africa 100,000 years ago. Yet there is no evidence of them behaving like us — no evidence of modern human culture — until 50,000 years ago. For the first 50,000 years of our existence we were archaeologically indistinct from Neanderthal or erectus. Then everything quickly changed, forever. Why this gap? What were we waiting for? Klein, a leading American paleoanthropologist, denies that these facts are complete. There had to be more biological evolution, right up to the moment people started behaving like modern humans, which he attributes to a relatively recent genetic mutation. Yet it is biologically possible that "the dawn of culture" is not a biological event at all. It could be a cascade of consequences following the delayed expression of what Steven Jay Gould calls an evolutionary spandrel, a coincidental side-consequence of evolved structures, not directly shaped by natural selection. Modern culture would have been potential from the biological beginning, but waited on an expression it took time and circumstance to discover.

The work of French philosopher Raymond Ruyer (1902–87) is making a belated appearance in English translation with the publication of these two works. Ruyer is a philosopher of science who continues a French tradition of finding Lamarck neglected and Darwin overrated. Ruyer is also among those who think the best hints for problems of evolutionary biology come from the theory of development. He advances arguments seldom aired in Anglophone philosophy, including a rehabilitation of biological teleology, a reformulation of the problem of consciousness, and a new statement of panpsychism. Finalist or teleological action advancing life-cycle goals is a primitive characteristic of life, and for Ruyer it is the primary expression of consciousness. He departs from default positions in Anglophone philosophy when he declines to equate consciousness with either mental representation or neurological action. Consciousness comes with organic form and is coextensive with life and even surpasses it, as Ruyer finds the activity characteristic of consciousness in all natural physical forms. This is his new panpsychism: nature is full of consciousness. Bergson lit the fuse of neofinalism when he dismissed biological finality as an inverted mechanism no less defective than its specular counterpart. What makes Ruyer's finalism new is its replacement of a Platonic-Christian teleology with a new theory based on a Stoic model, which includes the idea of a universe that is one ultimate domain of finality—a kosmos, with all finalist activity harmoniously one finalist activity: deus sive natura.

What is it to enter a way of thought? No way of thought can be summarized. Translation is unreliable. Following a historical development is exhausting and remains external to the vitality of the thought. For Jullien, a way of thought can be entered effectively only by beginning to work with it, which for him means passing through it in order to learn how to question something beyond doubt. What we cannot imagine doubting may suddenly alter under the oblique effect of another way of thought that cannot share, or even imagine, our certainty. Jullien reads a single Chinese sentence, the beginning of the Yijing, or Book of Changes, “China’s oldest book.” He reads the sentence from close up and far away, literally and set into play with other inaugurations from Genesis and Hesiod. Yijing begins not with a word but a line. One unbroken line repeated six times. {—}. This sign has a name: {qian}, which Jullien translates “initiatory capacity.” The first line of the text is a commentary on the hexagram. It consists of four monosyllables, all equal, without tense, without subject or complement, making a complete series without hierarchy. {Yong heng li zhen} “Beginning expansion profit rectitude.” The sentence (it is a sentence) “opens widely but does not bump up against anything,” lacking passions we may think significance requires. Its subtle, almost irresistible power is to unfold the obvious and hold sway without seeming to constitute a point of view. Alluding to that other canonical commencement, Genesis, Jullien observes that the Chinese sentence includes humanity without singling us out. We are duly swept up in the “ten thousand things.” Where the biblical sentence sets a history in motion, the Chinese sentence discloses a regulating mechanism. Its beginning is not the rupture of a first day. Instead, it names an unfolding that occurs everywhere at every moment and never runs dry. China does not fit into the opposition of Greece and the Bible (“Athens or Jerusalem”). “Might these alternatives have been too hastily sealed?” A question that probably would not be felt as vital without the detour through China.

Dewey was a pragmatist, and pragmatism is an empiricism. I think Dewey would insist that his empirical orientation in the theory of knowledge is not independent of his democratic orientation in social philosophy. My contribution to the discussions of this volume pursues three questions. One is how Dewey saw the connection between empiricism and democracy. Another is whether there is a comparable empiricism in Chinese tradition. A third is whether ideas of knowledge and ideas of government are really as close as Dewey, American Pragmatism, and indeed Western philosophy as a tradition tend to assume they are.