Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran

This paper examines the model of the emotions put forward by Reinach and Scheler at the beginning of the 20th century and presents it as a plausible alternative to the contemporary “perceptual model.” According to the Reinach-Scheler view, emotions are not perceptions of value, but possible responses to values given to us in value-feelings. The paper is divided into two parts. The first is an historical investigation of the origins of the model in Reinach’s and Scheler’s works within the broader context of early phenomenology. The second part presents systematic arguments for the distinction between value-feeling and emotional response.

This chapter provides an introductory survey of phenomenological theories of the emotions from 1874 until 1950. In accordance with the different phases of the developments of phenomenological movement until the middle of the last century, this chapter will distinguish between four main approaches to the emotions: 1) The origins of the movement, starting with Brentano’s descriptive psychology, which subsequently influenced Husserl’s foundation of phenomenology as an analysis of the intentional structure of consciousness and its objects; 2) The realist phenomenology, mainly in the work of Scheler and Pfänder, whose interest was the description of the essence or a priori traits of the emotions and the contents of emotional consciousness; 3) Heidegger’s opposition to understand the emotions as internal mental states and his focus on their existential significance; 4) Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the emotions as an embodied form of engagement with the world

This paper maintains that empathy with fictional characters, aka fictional empathy, is morally valuable insofar as it can provide the empathizer with knowledge of values. More precisely, the paper argues that fictional empathy enables the empathizer to become imaginatively acquainted with the other’s values, even if these values are very different from one’s own. After motivating the topic in the introduction (section 1), the paper presents some thoughts about the epistemology of value and empathy, establishing a distinction between direct and imaginative acquaintance with values (section 2). Next, it argues that empathy can lead the empathizer to co-experience the other’s values and, in so doing, make her directly or imaginatively acquainted with them (section 3). The paper discusses a possible challenge concerning the epistemic function of the imagination and explores different ways in which we can become imaginatively acquainted with values (section 4). It then examines features of fiction that explain why fictional empathy might be better suited than empathy for real others in pursuing this task (section 5). The paper closes by providing some reasons why we should regard the imaginative acquaintance with value attained through fictional empathy as morally valuable (section 6).

This volume brings together two philosophical research areas that have been subject to increased attention: work regarding the unique character of having an experience and studies on the nature and powers of imagination. The importance of imagination seems to stand in tension with the assumed unique and irreplaceable role of experience in our lives. However, new arguments in various philosophical debates suggest there is a need to examine how both areas of research interrelate and can enrich one another. The chapters in this volume examine whether the traditional accounts of experience and imagination need to be challenged. They are divided into thematic sections that discuss epistemological, ontological, normative, phenomenological, and intersubjective questions related to experience and imagination.

This paper offers a reading of Hartmann’s philosophy of literature from the perspective of contemporary aesthetics. In particular, I focus on his defense of the truth-value of literary works. After outlining the main concern of the paper (sect. 1), I place Hartmann’s view within the context of current aesthetic cognitivism (sect. 2). In the following three sections, I discuss Hartmann’s account, examining his critique of the thesis that literature is cognitively valuable because it transmits factual truths (sect. 3); his defense of the view that literature discloses life (sect. 4); and the link between cognitive value and the ontology of the literary work (sect. 5). Finally, I discuss Hartmann’s focus on the concept of “truth” in the light of recent debates on knowledge of “what it is like” and on “understanding” (sect. 6).

This paper explores Landmann-Kalischer’s analogy between the sensing of secondary qualities and the feeling of values in her work “Philosophie der Werte” (Philosophy of Values) (1910). Attention is paid to the epistemic motivation of the analogy, the distinction between pure feelings and affects, and the relation of pure feelings to value judgments. Her account is contrasted with two other accounts of the Brentanian tradition: Scheler’s approach within early phenomenology and Meinong’s account within the Graz School. I demonstrate that Landmann-Kalischer’s pioneering work helped to forge a new view of affectivity which became dominant among Brentano’s followers. According to this new view, there is a type of affective experience which is both intentional and cognitive. More precisely, she argued that the affective experience in question is a feeling. The paper also argues that her account can enrich today’s meta-ethical research. It is argued that her account of pure feelings provides arguments against the view that makes emotions responsible for the apprehension of value. Furthermore, it is shown that we need an analysis of how objective knowledge of value can be obtained from our affective intuitions.

This chapter examines Else Voigtländer’s place within early phenomenology. The chapter starts by disclosing her relation to Lipps and to prominent phenomenologists of the Munich Circle, such as Pfänder, Scheler, Geiger, and Daubert. It proceeds to offer an analysis of her work as it is embedded within the phenomenological tradition. In particular, the chapter focuses on her original application of the phenomenological method, her contribution to the emotivist theory of self-consciousness, her analysis of the social dimension of the self, her development of a concept of affectivity as intimately linked to value, and her study of specific phenomena, such as Ressentiment and erotic love. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the mechanisms that might have led to Voigtländer’s omission from the canon of phenomenology and an argument for the necessity of rewriting the history of the phenomenological movement to include her as a fully-fledged member.

This paper explores Max Scheler’s (1874–1928) essay “On Shame and Feelings of Modesty” (Über Scham und Schamgefühl) (1913). It analyzes Scheler’s view on shame as a specifically human self-conscious emotion in which the subject becomes aware of the positive values of the self, i.e., her self-worth. It is argued that, in the context of current research, Scheler should be regarded as defending a radical revisionary approach to this emotion. First, against today’s widespread view that shame is an intrinsically social emotion that requires real or imagined others to take place and which emerges to guarantee compliance with social norms, Scheler argues that shame is an emotion about the self which requires neither a relation with others nor internalized social norms. Second, rather than regarding shame as having a negative impact on the individual and her interpersonal relations, for Scheler, shame accomplishes the valuable function of disclosing and protecting positive values of the self, even if this self is not one’s own. With both claims, Scheler challenges what Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni (2011) have labeled respectively “shame socialism” and “shame pessimism,” and offers an alternative to understand the nature, functions, and varieties of shame which remains as innovative today as it was in his own time.

This chapter examines the critiques of sentimentalism developed by Moritz Geiger and José Ortega y Gasset within the field of phenomenological aesthetics. It explores and evaluates the main arguments behind this critique: namely the existence of an aesthetic attitude, an intellectualized view of appreciation, and the predominance of form over content. Though both authors utilize Kant’s idea of “aesthetic disinterestedness”, they endorse a view of appreciation which differs from the Kantian one in substantial respects.

Tener miedo del más allá, sentirse amado incondicionalmente por un ser superior, avergonzarse de la condición imperfecta del ser humano, son algunos ejemplos de emociones que no dudaríamos en calificar como religiosas. Ahora bien ¿Cómo describir su estructura? ¿Por qué llamamos a estas emociones “religiosas”? ¿Cuálos son los rasgos distintivos que sirven para diferenciarlas de las emociones “no religiosas”? En este artículo se examinan los rasgos distintivos de las emociones religiosas. Para ello, se analizan tres elementos cruciales de la experiencia emocional: su fenomenología, sus bases cognitivas y su relación con los valores. Se argumenta que las emociones religiosas poseen profundidad experiencial afectando totalmente a la persona, tienen un contenido religioso y responden a valores religiosos. Cada una de estas tres condiciones es necesaria para considerar a una emoción como religiosa, aunque por sí sola ninguna es suficiente. Son las tres condiciones conjuntas lo que explica el carácter religioso de una emoción.

In contrast to previous conceptualizations of episodic self-esteem as a cognitive assessment of one’s own self, recent proposals have categorized this phenomenon as an affective state. In this vein, self-esteem has been regarded as a self-conscious emotion (Salice 2020) and an existential feeling (Bortolan 2018, 2020). While concurring with these recent accounts on the affective nature of self-esteem, this chapter also argues that none of them fully captures its nature. It argues that self-esteem is better understood as an umbrella term for a group of intentional feelings in which the subject valuates herself and senses fluctuations in her own value. The chapter also discusses the place of self-esteem feelings within the affective mind.

It is widely assumed that the expression of an emotion is the external bodily manifestation of an internal psychological state. In contrast to this “general view”, this paper presents and discusses an alternative view put forward by Scheler and developed by authors close to the phenomenological tradition. According to the “phenomenological view”, emotional expression is a phenomenon of the lived body. In exploring this view, the paper analyzes four of its main tenets: a) the concept of the lived body as distinct from the physical body; b) the idea that emotional expression functions as a symbol; c) the thesis of the universal grammar of emotions; and d) the distinction between final and expressive movements. In the conclusion, I discuss the value and relevance of the phenomenological view to contemporary research.

This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); 2) its place in the taxonomy of the affective mind (ontology); and 3) the psychological mechanisms responsible for the inversion of value (psychology). The early phenomenological accounts are then analyzed in the light of recent accounts of Ressentiment elaborated by authors close to the phenomenological tradition. It is argued that the early phenomenological accounts provide central insights on the interrelation between affectivity and value.

According to Brentano and his followers, there is a genuine affective mode of intentional reference which consists in presenting the targeted objects imbued with value as being good or bad, and as inviting us to adopt a pro- or contra-attitude toward them. Let us call this view “the affective intentionality thesis”. In Brentano’s version of this thesis, not only do strictly affective phenomena such as feelings and emotions exhibit a sui generis affective intentionality, but so do conative ones, such as wishes, desires, and acts of the will. However, in the version defended by the majority of his early phenomenological followers, this thesis applies only to affective phenomena in the narrow sense. This paper analyzes the reception of this later version of “the affective intentionality thesis” in Edith Stein’s early works, arguing that a further transformation of the thesis took place within her work. It argues that, for Stein, the intentionality exhibited by affective phenomena comes in different forms. According to this reading, the mode in which states that are affective in the strictest sense present their object as imbued with value admits variations. As I will demonstrate, a close analysis of her views on the stratification of the affective life and the different types of affective phenomena (general feelings, moods, emotions, and sentiments) suggests that at least three different forms of affective intentionality can be identified. I call them object intentionality, horizon intentionality, and personal intentionality. Since similar views can be found in other early phenomenologists, I suggest that Stein’s views can be taken as representative of a transformation that took place within this movement.

In meinem Aufsatz möchte ich die Frage danach behandeln, warum es so schwierig ist, mit dem Hassen aufzuhören. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, werde ich zunächst auf die Struktur des Hasses eingehen: Ich werde für die These plädieren, dass der Hass als eine Gesinnung zu verstehen ist, die aus einem Prozess der Sedimentierung feinlicher Gefühle entsteht. Der Hass hat eine Geschichte. Diese Geschichte werde ich mich danach widmen, um die Hartnäckigkeit und Beharrung des Hasses besser zu verstehen. Denn seine Geschichte macht der Hass nicht nur zu einer vorübergehenden Gemütsbewegung, sondern zu einem Teil unserer Person. Anschließend werde ich eine Antwort auf die Frage meines Aufsatzes geben, warum es so schwierig ist, mit dem Hassen aufzuhören.

Seit ungefähr Mitte der 90er-Jahre und bis heute wird der Frage nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen Ästhetik und Ethik hauptsächlich in der angloamerikanischen und der angelsächsischen analytischen Ästhetik besondere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. In der Einleitung des Bandes Aesthetics and Ethics. Essays at the Intersection (1998), der eine der ersten Publikationen über das Thema ist, macht Levinson deutlich, dass das Buch das Ziel hat, Debatten der Ästhetik und Ethik zu verbinden, die während der vergangenen 30 Jahre isoliert behandelt worden sind (Levinson 1998, 1). Er bezieht sich dabei auf die angloamerikanische Ästhetik. Seit der Veröffentlichung dieses Bandes ist eine beachtliche Zahl von Beiträgen entstanden, die explizit Themen an der Schnittstelle beider Disziplinen behandeln. Vor diesem Hintergrund soll in diesem Beitrag die Beziehung zwischen Ästhetik und Ethik unter dem Gesichtspunkt der zeitgenössischen philosophischen Ästhetik behandelt werden. Dabei sollen die Anknüpfungspunkte zwischen der neuen englischsprachigen Literatur und den Beiträgen in der deutschen ästhetischen Tradition sichtbar gemacht werden.

If, as argued in some simulationist accounts, empathy aims at grasping the phenomenal richness of the other’s experience and resonating with it, it is difficult to explain our empathy with emotions that we have never experienced ourselves. According to a long philosophical tradition, imagination is constrained by experience. We have to be acquainted with the qualitative feel of the other’s experience in order to imagine it. A critical view of simulationist accounts would claim that if we cannot imagine how the other feels because we are not acquainted with it, empathy cannot take place. Contrary to such criticism, this paper takes a moderately optimistic view of the simulationist claim. It develops a model to explain how we imagine the other’s emotions by drawing on phenomenal concepts, affective memories, and imaginative scaffoldings. I argue that this model can explain how we empathize with the other’s emotions regardless of whether these are familiar or novel to us. However, in the latter case, the imagined phenomenal quality is not identical but probably only similar to the other’s emotion. This similarity suffices for us to speak about empathy.

This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of contempt. To this end, I will focus on four main features of this emotion. 1) In the first section, applying the phenomenological methodology to the case of contempt, I will distinguish the structure of this emotion from the structure of similar negative affective phenomena. Attention will be paid especially to the relation between contempt and hatred. 2) The emotional experience of contempt is analyzed in the next section acknowledging three main dimensions: quality, valence, and expression. 3) The third section undertakes an analysis of the cognitive content of contempt focusing on its judgmental structure and its intentional objects. 4) In the last section, I discuss the role of contempt in moral life. Against recent defenses of this emotion, I argue that contempt is morally wrong.

Written more than a hundred years ago, Stein’s On the Problem of Empathy is, today more than ever, essential reading material for anyone interested in social cognition. In this book – which still inspires current research – Stein provides a systematic account of the empathic experience. Stein’s view of empathy as a process, and her understanding of its main forms and functions in presenting the other as a spiritual being, provide valuable insights on the intersubjective nature of the human being. Yet, it is not only from the perspective of social cognition that Stein’s book is relevant today. In fact, the book approaches a wide range of issues, from the idea of personhood to social ontology and ethics, and it exemplifies the power of phenomenology to shed light on the basic structure of human consciousness (for an overview: Calcagno 2007; Lebech 2004; MacIntyre 2006; Moran 2004). In this chapter, my aim is to explore the relevance of Stein’s book on empathy for contemporary research by focusing on three main issues which, in my view, can enrich current scholarship. The first issue concerns Stein’s understanding of empathy as a three-step process through which we become conscious of the other’s experience. The second relates to her views of the intentional structure of the emotions as revelatory of the realm of value. The third is her idea that not only emotions but also moods might have correlates, e.g., the fact that the world appears to be bathed in black for the depressive person. These three issues are not exhaustive of the ways in which Stein’s early work can be an inspiration for today’s researchers, but they are illustrative of how her insights can advance three central debates of contemporary philosophy: on social cognition, on the relation between emotion and value, and on the intentionality of moods.

In diesem Aufsatz werden die Fragen nach dem Ort der Werte in der Erfahrung und nach ihrer Natur als Qualität besonderer Art anhand von Ansätzen der Brentanoschule und der Gestaltpsychologie untersucht. Konkret geht es darum, diejenigen Positionen innerhalb dieser Schulen zu analysieren, welche die Werte sowohl in Abhängigkeit von den Eigenschaften des Objektes, an dem diese haften, als auch von der psychophysischen Konstitution des Subjektes, welche sich auf Werte bezieht, verstehen. Brentanos Dispositionalismus, Meinongs erste und zweite dispositionalistische Theorie der Werte und Landmann-Kalischers Theorie der Werte als sekundäre Qualitäten werden exemplarisch als Vertreter der Brentanoschule untersucht, während Köhlers These der Werte als Gestaltqualitäten die Auffassung der Berliner gestalttheoretischen Schule repräsentieren soll. Die Untersuchung dieser Positionen wird einen neuen Blick auf das Wertphänomen werfen, die sich sowohl vom Realismus als auch vom Emotivismus unterscheidet, und welche darin besteht, es in Abhängigkeit von unseren affektiven Dispositionen zu erklären, seien diese als Gemütsbewegungen, Begehrungen, Gefühle oder emotionale Wahrnehmungen verstanden.

This paper provides an account on how to understand “emotional depth” and applies it to the particular case of religious experiences. After motivating the topic (section 1), I turn to classical and contemporary approaches to “emotional depth”. I divide these accounts into two main groups depending on whether they interpret depth as a constitutive or a momentary feature of the affective experience. I argue that despite their descriptive power, none of the existing accounts adequately captures the depth of affective religious experiences (section 2). Next, I present and critically assess Kurt Stavenhagen’s neglected account of the depth of religious feelings. In particular, I explore his concept of “specific depth”. In my reading, this notion conveys the momentary structure of a feeling (section 3). I then proceed to develop my own account according to which emotional depth is a phenomenal quality which depends on the intentional structure of a feeling. In particular, I argue that the feature of depth is explainable in terms of the specific ways in which a feeling is directed toward an object (directedness) and evaluatively presents it (evaluative presentation). Drawing on this idea, I examine three varieties of affective intentionality and distinguish between emotions, sentiments, and moods (section 4). I then apply my model to explain the depth of affective religious experiences (section 5). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 6).

In ordinary language, “calmness”, “melancholy”, “cheerfulness”, and “sadness” are employed to describe affective states experienced by sentient beings. More precisely, these terms are used to report instances of moods. Yet, the very same terms are used to describe what seem to be properties of certain objects (e.g., things, situations) which, unlike sentient beings, are unable to feel. We usually describe atmospheres employing these terms: We speak about the calmness of a forest, the melancholy of a painting, the cheerfulness of a field of flowers and the sadness of a landscape. Are we in fact referring to the same phenomenon? If not, why then do we employ the same terms?