Dalia Nassar

In this paper, I trace a ‘leading thread’ from Kant’s Critique of Judgment to Goethe that involves a shift from a conceptual framework, in which a priori concepts furnish necessity and thereby science, to a framework in which sensible experience plays a far more significant and determining role in the formation of knowledge. Although this shift was not enacted by Kant himself, his elaboration of organic unity or organisms paved the way for this transformation. By considering both the methodological difficulties that Kant encounters in his attempt to articulate the structure of organisms and Goethe’s response to these difficulties, my goal is to locate a specific trajectory in the history of nineteenth century philosophy, in which empirical experience and sensibility play a far more significant role than otherwise acknowledged.

TRADITIONALLY, SCHLEIERMACHER’S REDEN ÜBER DIE RELIGION has been considered to emphasize intuition and immediacy as the means by which to understand and relate to the world. This reading was popularized by Wilhelm Dilthey and carried on into the twentieth century by Karl Barth and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Though none of these thinkers is solely interested in the Reden, it forms their starting point and as such informs much of their interpretation of Schleiermacher’s later works. More recently, however, an emphasis on Schleiermacher’s notion of mediacy has appeared, with readings ranging so widely that some call Schleiermacher a “good Kantian,” remaining within the limitations of Kant’s first Kritik, while others claim that Schleiermacher is proto-Hegelian, and still others, that he is a proto-pragmatist. In emphasizing one or the other, immediacy or mediacy, intuition or mediation, these attempts have avoided the complexity of Schleiermacher’s project: the fact that Schleiermacher considers immediacy and mediacy, intuition and mediation, of equal significance and goes so far as to place them side by side in his understanding of experience and of knowledge.

The absolute was one of the most significant philosophical concepts in the early nineteenth century, particularly for the German romantics. Its exact meaning and its role within philosophical romanticism remain, however, a highly contested topic among contemporary scholars. In The Romantic Absolute, I offer a new assessment of the romantics and their understanding of the absolute, filling an important gap in the history of philosophy, especially with respect to the crucial period between Kant and Hegel.

The Origins of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and its relation to his transcendental philosophy have for a long time intrigued historians of philosophy.1 When did Schelling’s interest in the philosophy of nature commence,2 and what inspired this apparent transition in his thought?3 How did his Naturphilosophie figure into his later departure from Fichte, and in what ways did his early commitments influence this departure?4 These have been the overarching questions of the debate, and they have been answered from varying angles. However, by emphasizing a transition or even a break between Schelling’s earlier views and his Naturphilosophie, this debate has been largely concerned with locating a moment in Schelling’s ..

In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784–1785), in which he not only challenges Herder’s conception of nature but also, and more importantly, his methodology. Kant’s complaint is that by relying on analogy, Herder draws deeply mistaken conclusions that overlook fundamental differences between human and nonhuman beings. But was Kant’s critique of Herder entirely fair? And how does it compare to Kant’s own use of analogy? My claim is that Herder’s use of analogy posed a fundamental methodological challenge to Kant, a challenge he sought to meet in the years following the reviews. In so doing, however, Kant found himself in the untenable situation of, on the one hand, granting analogy greater significance, and, on the other, severely restricting its use. By tracing the shifts in Kant’s thought through the lens of analogy, I aim to show that Kant’s transformed understanding of analogy reveals a fundamental tension between his a priori “metaphysics of nature” and empirical science, a tension that fundamentally shaped the philosophies of nature after Kant.

In this paper, I consider Schelling’s early understanding of intellectual intuition. I argue that although the common interpretation of intellectual intuition traces it back to Fichte’s enumerations in the First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre of 1797, an examination of the early Schelling reveals that he was employing the term well before Fichte (already in 1795) and in a way that is decisively distinct from Fichte. Thus, I disagree with well-known Schelling scholars, including Xavier Tilliette, who regard the early Schelling as a mere disciple of Fichte. In contrast, I argue that the more influential thinker in Schelling’s earliest development, especially with regard to intellectual intuition, is Spinoza. I illustrate through close textual analysis of Schelling’s Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), that Schelling is employing a conception of intellectual intuition that mirrors Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge. I emphasize, however, that in spite of Schelling’s proximity to Spinoza, he retains a certain distance—one which he repeatedly emphasizes. I consider and provide an explanation of why Schelling continues to distinguish himself from Spinoza, in spite of the clear similarities in their understanding of knowledge and in their conception of the absolute as causa sui.

This paper considers one of the most controversial aspects of Friedrich Schelling’s philosophy, his notion of intellectual intuition and its place within his philosophy of nature. I argue that Schelling developed his account of intellectual intuition through an encounter with--and ultimate critique of--Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge. Thus, Schelling’s notion of intuition was not an appropriation of Fichte’s conception of intuition as an act of consciousness. Nonetheless, and in spite of his sympathy with Spinoza, Schelling contended that intellectual intuition must be “productive” or “constructive.” I explicate how Schelling justified his use of intellectual intuition in his Naturphilosophie, and detail its relation to his notion of the philosophical “construction” of nature.

Since the early 1990s, there has been a resurgence of interest in philosophy between “Kant and Hegel,” and in early German romanticism in particular. Philosophers have come to recognize that, in spite of significant differences between the contemporary and romantic contexts, romanticism continues to “persist,” and the questions which the Romantics raised remain relevant today. The Relevance of Romanticism: Essays on Early German Romantic Philosophy is the first collection of essays that offers an in-depth analysis of the reasons why philosophers are (and should be) concerned with romanticism. Through historical and systematic reconstructions, the collection offers a deeper understanding and more encompassing picture of romanticism as a philosophical movement than has been presented thus far, and explicates the role that romanticism plays—or can play—in contemporary philosophical debates.

Over the last two decades, environmental theorists have repeatedly pronounced the “end” of nature, arguing that the idea of nature is neither plausible nor desirable. This chapter offers an environmental reappraisal of romanticism, in light of these critiques. Its goals are historical and systematic. First, the chapter assesses the validity of the environmentalist critique of the romantic conception of nature by distinguishing different strands within romanticism, and locating an empiricist strand in the natural-scientific work of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Second, the chapter considers the systematic significance of Goethe’s “romantic empiricism,” and argues that while an abstract notion of nature is problematic, a concrete conception achieved through the mutually supportive work of observation and reflection is essential for environmental thought