Dalia Nassar

Though Novalis was considered by both his contemporaries and his first critics to have made both an important philosophical as well as literary contribution, his place and significance in the history of philosophy has only rarely been clearly demarcated. It is only with the publication of the Novalis Schriften that an interest in Novalis’s philosophical contribution has arisen. Though the main discussion in the literature focuses on one of the central concepts in Novalis’s thought, that of presentation (Darstellung, Repräsentation), it fails to provide an adequate interpretation of it because it does not directly address a more fundamental concept in his thought, the absolute. After all, for Novalis, presentation is always presentation of the absolute, and the possibliity or impossibility of presentation is determined by the nature of the absolute. This paper attempts to correct the contemporary debate by emphasizing and clearly defining the absolute, examining it in relation to presentation.

The possibility of positing critiques of the contemporary from within Hegel’s political philosophy is by no means evident. In fact, Hegel’s political philosophy has been plagued with accusations of quietism and conservatism and Hegel himself claims that the philosophical task is retrospective and descriptive. Yet, in spite of this claim, Hegel posits a critique of his contemporaries, the Jacobins. I attempt to answer the question, is Hegel’s critique of the Jacobins consistent with his political philosophy as a whole? Or, is this critique a mere inconsistency in Hegel’s system? In essence, is Hegel justified, on his own grounds, to criticize the Jacobins? In order to answer this question, I identify what Hegel means by the “genuinely philosophical viewpoint,” which he equates with the “world-historical perspective,” and show that this perspective is not limited to historical description, but does in fact allow and even call for political discernment and critique.