Dalia Nassar

The possibility of positing critiques of the contemporary from within Hegel’s political philosophy is by no means evident. In fact, Hegel’s political philosophy has been plagued with accusations of quietism and conservatism and Hegel himself claims that the philosophical task is retrospective and descriptive. Yet, in spite of this claim, Hegel posits a critique of his contemporaries, the Jacobins. I attempt to answer the question, is Hegel’s critique of the Jacobins consistent with his political philosophy as a whole? Or, is this critique a mere inconsistency in Hegel’s system? In essence, is Hegel justified, on his own grounds, to criticize the Jacobins? In order to answer this question, I identify what Hegel means by the “genuinely philosophical viewpoint,” which he equates with the “world-historical perspective,” and show that this perspective is not limited to historical description, but does in fact allow and even call for political discernment and critique.

The article argues that a close examination of the development of Schelling’s thought reveals that, already in the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling had abandoned his earlier understanding of the relationship between the infinite and finite—as elaborated in his philosophy of nature—and began to articulate a more Platonic understanding of the absolute. It thus challenges the widespread interpretation of Schelling’s development, and contests the commonly accepted views of Schelling’s relationship to romanticism.

This article appeared in a special issue of the Goethe Yearbook, on Goethe and German Idealism. In it, I consider Novalis' unparalleled admiration for Goethe's scientific writings in contrast to his rather lukewarm reception of Goethe's poetry. I argue that Novalis' ideal of a “romantic encyclopedia” in which all the arts and sciences are understood in their relations to one another (as opposed to in isolation, like Diderot and D'Alemberts' project) is inspired by Goethe's practice as a scientist. I develop Novalis' idea of an “empiricism that is nothing but genuine idealism,” illustrate its parallels with Goethe's “gentle empiricism,” and argue that Novalis’ conception of romantic science and his understanding of idealism as empiricism is directly inspired by Goethe’s practices as a poet and scientist. I consider the implications of this for our understanding of the meaning of “romantic” science.